DocketNumber: No. CV97-543720
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 11245, 30 Conn. L. Rptr. 304
Judges: CORRADINO, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 8/16/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
On November 7, 1997, the defendants filed a disclosure of defense to the effect that the plaintiff, i.e. First Union, represented there was a modification agreement that was to be effective and the Grills were not to make payments until notified. On the same date, the defendants filed an answer wherein, among other things, they denied paragraph 6 of the complaint, which alleged that the note and mortgage were "now in default by virtue of nonpayment of the instalments of principal and interest due on April 1, 1995, and each and every month thereafter . . ." No special defenses were filed, but there were a series of setoffs all based on the alleged instructions to the Grills not to make payments until notified. The first setoff claimed the alleged instructions violated the covenant CT Page 11246 of good faith and fair dealing. The second setoff made the same claim based on a violation of §
The Grills also filed three counterclaims all based on the same factual allegation — the plaintiff instructed them not to make payments until directed to do so. The first counterclaim states the plaintiff breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The second makes the same allegation and refers to §
The "plaintiff" referred to in all these just-mentioned pleadings is the First Union National Bank. The substituted plaintiff, EMC Mortgage Corporation, came into this case in the following way: EMC Mortgage Corporation (EMC) purchased the note and the mortgage as part of a bulk transfer of a pool of loans in late 1997. The note and mortgage were not actually transferred from First Union to EMC until May 28, 1998. The foregoing representation is made by way of affidavit by an employee of EMC and is not contested.
On September 3, 1998, EMC filed a motion to substitute itself as plaintiff. An objection to this motion was filed September 10th. Neither of these pleadings were acted upon.
On September 21, 1998, the defendants filed a "Revised Counter Claims and Set Offs." The same setoffs as alleged in the November 7, 1997 pleading are claimed, but three new counterclaims are made.
The new counterclaims, as all the counterclaims, rest on the factual allegation by the Grills that "the plaintiff" instructed them not to make payments until instructed to do so. The new fourth counterclaim is based on intentional misrepresentation, the fifth and sixth counterclaims allege CUTPA violations — one based on negligent misrepresentation, the next on intentional misrepresentation. Nowhere in the revised pleading is EMC mentioned. Apparently, EMC was not a party at the time the just referred to pleading was filed because on September 23, 1998, EMC filed another motion to have itself substituted as plaintiff. The file does not reflect that this motion was acted upon, but CT Page 11247 somehow perseverance paid off because a judge on October 22, 1998 denied the defendant's objection to EMC's motion to be substituted as plaintiff. But a motion to reargue the motion to substitute was then granted. EMC then felt the need to file a new motion to substitute which was finally granted June 1, 1999.
Other interesting procedural events occurred, but one in particular should be noted — the defendants had a motion for nonsuit granted on October 4, 1999, and this motion has not been vacated. The court will now discuss the summary judgment motion.
The rules that apply for deciding a motion for summary judgment are well known. If there is a genuine issue of material fact, the court cannot decide it, but if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law the motion should be granted.
From this premise, however, the Grills want to go much further than the mere right to assert defenses that could have properly been asserted against First Union. At page 8 of their brief, the Grills say, "But EMC Mortgage is an assignee who is not a holder in due course and therefore it is First Union for the purposes of defending counterclaims and special defenses."
"Defenses" are not counterclaims, cf. New Idea Pattern Co. v. Whelan, CT Page 11248
"(A) counterclaim is a cause of action existing in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff and in which the defendant might have secured affirmative relief had he sued the plaintiff in a separate action. . . . Practice Book § 116 provides that a counterclaim must arise out of the transaction which is the subject of the plaintiffs complaint." (Practice Book § 116 is now Practice Book §
10-10 .)
Abstractly considered, it is certainly true that the claims made in the counterclaim arise out of the transaction which is the subject of the complaint, but no valid "counterclaim" can be asserted by the Grills against EMC because they have no ascertainable claim in their "favor" against EMC. None of the allegations of the counterclaims concern actions taken by EMC against the Grills; they all involve alleged improper actions taken by First Union prior to the assignment of the note to EMC. Referring to the language of the Glen Valley case, it cannot be said that any purported counterclaim against EMC is a claim in which the Grills "might have secured affirmative relief had (they) sued the plaintiff (here, EMC) in a separate action. . . ." id. at p. 160.
The Grills do not contest in this motion EMC's characterization of the factual allegations of the counterclaim as involving only First Union and not EMC. The point is that, given these allegations, there is no understandable way that the Grills could secure affirmative relief against EMC if they sued EMC separately.
Merely because EMC cannot avoid the defenses that could have been used against First Union because EMC may not be a holder in due course does not mean that it can be subjected to monetary liability to a party not injured by EMC's actions. Furthermore, the Grills can assert these defenses if properly pleaded to EMC's action on the note and can bring suit against First Union for affirmative relief if they so desire, so it is difficult to see how the Grills are prejudiced in their assertion of any rights that may have accrued to them by the alleged wrongful actions of First Union.
In this brief, the Grills argue "Mortgagees should not be able to defeat valid defenses by selling a bad loan to a third party which then CT Page 11249 can foreclose while the defendants are left to sue the mortgagee in another action while homeless." (Page 8 of 3/2/01 brief.)
The court agrees — the defenses that could have been asserted against First Union can be asserted against EMC if it is not a holder in due course and First Union can be sued for its actions. That the Grills are not left facing the dilemma their brief suggests is underlined by the fact that as far back as the November 7, 1997 answer, they. denied they were in default. If they can prevail on that position they will have defeated the action adopted by EMC and will still have the option to sue First Union.
As noted by Judge Ballen in Program Plus, Inc., et al v. Bonazzo, et al,
What about the summary judgment as directed toward the setoffs in this case? Procedurally speaking, the alleged setoffs here are not properly setoffs, since it is intrinsic to the notion of setoffs and why they were developed that the claim alleged to be a setoff must be a claim "arising out of a transaction independent of the contract on which the plaintiff sues," Avery v. Brown,
In any event, there is a more fundamental reason why the setoffs will not lie against EMC. As discussed earlier, a setoff is really a subspecies of counterclaim. Just as a counterclaim will not be against EMC given the allegations of this case, so too setoff should not be permitted given those allegations.
In OCI Mortgage Corp. v. Marchese,
This is not to say that the defendants cannot raise some of the allegations made in the setoffs in the form of defenses, especially if it is established that EMC is not a holder in due course. Also, EMC would be hard pressed to blanketly object to any amendment to the answer which added appropriate special defenses since the disclosure of defense and CT Page 11251 original November 7, 1997 answer which included counterclaims and setoffs gave fair warning of possible defensive matters. Why shouldn't the liberal view on amendment of complaints which permits additional claims by a plaintiff under the relation back doctrine not apply to the defendants and their right to add defenses given the procedural history of this case?
In any event, with that observation, the court will grant the motion for summary judgment.
Corradino, J.
Wallingford v. GLEN VALLEY ASSOCIATES, INC. , 190 Conn. 158 ( 1983 )
New Idea Pattern Co. v. Whelan , 75 Conn. 455 ( 1903 )
Rosen v. Colligan , 19 Conn. Super. Ct. 122 ( 1954 )
Savings Bank of New London v. Santaniello , 130 Conn. 206 ( 1943 )