DocketNumber: No. CV 93-0455059S
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 340
Judges: BERGER, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 1/14/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The parcel is bounded on the east by the applicant's land now zoned quarry industrial, on the south by property of CT Page 341 the railroad, now zoned general industrial and on the west by property of the Wooster Court Industrial Park in Bristol, now zoned general industrial and a 100 foot strip in Plainville zoned restricted industrial. (Return Item D). The property to the north is comprised of a factory and 4 lots all owned by the applicant. The applicant owns other land which fronts on Camp Street but which is not part of the zone change request. (Return Item D). A substantial portion of the property contains wetlands and a conservation license has been granted to the Farmington River Watershed Association, Inc.
The zone change was opposed by many residents living primarily on Camp Street and Washington Street as well as the Boston and Main Corporation. (Return Items J, K). Additionally, Nelson and Jeannette Granger, Robert Mastrianni, and Tilcon Connecticut Inc., retained Attorney Gregory Granger to oppose the request. (Return Item N).
The present case involves a decision of the Commission in its legislative capacity, First Hartford Realty Corporation v. Planning and Zoning Commission,
An act of a zoning authority must meet two basic tests: (1) it must promote the public welfare, and (2) it must be done in a reasonable manner. In the application of these tests, courts allow zoning authorities a wide and liberal discretion in determining what the public need is and how it can be met. This is so because local zoning authorities live close to the circumstances and conditions which create local zoning problems and shape the method of their solution. Wade v. Town Planning and Zoning Commission,
A review of the record indicates that there was much concern about what the land could be used for if the zone change request was granted. With the exception of nineteen specified uses, any use is allowed in a restricted industrial zone. (Return Item A, pp. 5-13). There was nothing in the proposal of course, that would (or could) limit the use and, as noted by the Central Connecticut Regional Planning Agency in its report, "the proposed change does not guarantee that the use will be light industrial. . . ." (Return Items C; N). Commissioner Guarino, as did others, commented that the proposal was not in accordance with the Town Plan of Development. The 1983 Plan indicated that the parcel should be used for office and light industry. (Return Items N; EE). The Plan was adopted one year before the Commission enacted its Technology Park Regulations in 1984. Since that time, the Commission has interpreted the Technology Park Regulations as conforming with the phrase "office/light industry" in the Plan. (Return Items M; N; Z). This court is entitled to accord considerable deference to the Commission's interpretation. Fedorich v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
a. Banks and business services.
b. Office or office buildings: business, professionals; utility; semi-public or government.
c. Light manufacturing, assembly or processing of components or goods.
d. Interior communications systems, processing or storage of data.
e. Research and development buildings.
(Return Item A, p. 5-15).
This court believes that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the denial. The immediate area certainly has an industrial flavor but it is surrounded by residential development. The Commission cannot be faulted for not approving a change of zone to an almost unrestricted use. Traditionally, zoning commissions were not bound by plans of development as they were considered only advisory, Dooley v. Town Plan and Zoning Commission,
The plaintiff additionally maintains that the RI zone is the only appropriate classification since it does not require 200 foot frontage as does the TP zone. While the issue of whether a variance might be procured has been raised, this court will not address that issue at this time. Maybe it is possible, maybe it is not. This court only notes, as pointed out by the Commission's attorney at trial, that the applicant owns sufficient land on Camp Street. Indeed, this proposal was apparently drafted deleting a parcel fronting on Camp Street. (Return Item D).
D. CT Page 344
Finally, the plaintiff has argued that this denial constitutes a taking of property under our state and federal constitutions. Suffice it to say that no proper showing has been made that the plaintiff has been denied all reasonable use of the land. See generally, Gil v. Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Agency,
The plaintiff has argued that the present zoning classification of R-11 is no longer appropriate for this parcel. That may well be the case. Yet, that does not necessarily mean that this specific application to change to a Restricted Industrial zone must be granted. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
MARSHALL K. BERGER, JR. JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT
Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission , 154 Conn. 470 ( 1967 )
Fedorich v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 178 Conn. 610 ( 1979 )
Hall v. Planning & Zoning Board , 153 Conn. 574 ( 1966 )
Wade v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission , 145 Conn. 592 ( 1958 )