DocketNumber: No. CV00 037 62 07
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 2647
Judges: MELVILLE, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 2/15/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
I direct the payment of all my debts . . . and all legacy, succession, transfer, inheritance, estate and other similar taxes that may become payable, at or by reason of my death as an administration expense. I direct that the Federal Estate Tax, State Succession Tax, inheritance or other taxes be paid without any proration or apportionment against any legatee, devise, beneficiary or other recipient of such property.1
The third paragraph of the decedent's will provides that the rest, residue and remainder of the estate be divided equally among six individuals, two of whom are the appellees herein. The decedent's property included annuities and IRA accounts totaling $1,320,666.52, the total amount of which was included in the decedent's taxable estate for purposes of federal estate and Connecticut succession taxes. The appellees were not listed as beneficiaries on these annuities and IRA accounts. The appellant filed a final account with the probate court dated February 4, 2000, indicating that $693,953.08 was paid in federal estate and Connecticut succession taxes from the residuary estate. After the taxes, debts and expenses were paid, no residue remained to be divided among the residuary beneficiaries. Accordingly, the appellees, Bonnie A. Reynolds and Richard A. Reynolds, filed an objection to the final account alleging that pursuant to General Statutes §
In the reasons of appeal the appellant alleges that the decedent's property passed according to the terms of her will, as she intended, and that the decedent's property should be distributed according to the final account submitted on February 4, 2000. On October 4, 2000, the appellees moved to strike the reasons of appeal on the ground that they are legally insufficient because the appellant does not allege that the decedent's CT Page 2648 direction against proration of taxes was clear and unambiguous, as required by General Statutes §
The reasons of appeal in a probate appeal serve essentially the same functions in defining issues and limiting evidence as does the complaint in a civil matter. Baskin's Appeal from Probate,
General Statutes §
In this case, in the reasons of appeal, the appellant specifically CT Page 2649 alleges that the decedent's will directed that "the federal estate tax, state succession tax, inheritance or other taxes to be paid without anyproration or apportionment against any legatee, devise, beneficiary, or other recipient of such property." General Statutes §
"(a) When it appears . . . in any appropriate proceeding in the Probate Court that an executor . ., has paid a death tax levied or assessed under the provisions of . . . the Connecticut estate tax, or under the provisions of . . . the federal estate tax, upon or with respect to any property required to be included in the gross estate of a decedent under the provisions of any such law, the amount of the tax so paid, except when a testator otherwise directs in [her] will . . . shall, except as hereinafter provided in subsection (b), be equitably prorated among the persons interested in the estate to whom such property is or may be transferred or to whom any benefit accrues." (Emphasis added.)
In other words Connecticut law provides for a statutory presumption that federal estate and state succession taxes are to be prorated among the beneficiaries. See Cornell v. Cornell,
The appellees' motion to strike is based on their assertion that the appellant fails to specifically allege in the reasons of appeal that the decedent's will contained a clear and unambiguous direction against proration. However, the appellees do not cite to, and the court is unaware of any authority mandating that the pertinent statutory language must be included in the reasons of appeal. "[T]echnical rules as to the formation and determination of issues are not properly applicable to reasons of appeal from probate." Estate of Zajicek v. Appeal from Glastonbury ProbateCT Page 2650Court, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 528186 (May 13, 1994, Corradino, J.). Moreover, "it is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted. Indeed, the pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically. Doe v. YaleUniversity,
MELVILL, J.