DocketNumber: No. X07 CV98-0070702S
Citation Numbers: 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 7283, 27 Conn. L. Rptr. 414
Judges: BISHOP, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 6/15/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
In response, by pleading dated June 29, 1999, United filed an answer, several special defenses, and a multi-count counterclaim. Counts Eleven and Twelve of United's counterclaim allege, in pertiment part' that the Town has engaged in trade or commerce within the State, that it contracted with United to conduct trade or business within the State, and that its various acts and omissions as specifically enumerated constitute a violation of Connecticut General Statutes
C.G.S.
A "person" is defined to mean, "a natural person, corporation, limited liability company, trust, partnership, incorporated or unincorporated association, and any other legal entity." Since a municipality is, in fact, a legal entity, its activities in the conduct of any trade or commerce, may fall within the broad parameters of CUTPA.1 Excepted from the proscriptions of CUTPA are "(1) Transactions or actions otherwise permitted under law as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of the state or of the United States;" C.G.S.
In Connelly, the terms of this exception were determinative. The specific issue in Connelly was whether a municipal housing authority, acting as landlord, may be held liable for violations of CUTPA. Id. 356. The court held: "The plaintiffs' claims for damages in count two of their complaint fail because they are premised solely on CUTPA. Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that the defendant is engaged in "trade" or "commerce" as defined by that act, the defendant nonetheless is exempted from CUTPA scrutiny because, as a municipal housing authority regulated by the United States department of housing and urban development (HUD), its actions fall within the ambit of General Statutes
The plaintiff has pointed to no regulations or legislative scheme governing its behavior relating to the issuance of bids and contract administration relating to the construction of a municipal building. Thus, the court is unconvinced that merely because the plaintiff is a municipality it is exempt from the proscriptions of CUTPA.
However, in order for activities to fall under the CUTPA umbrella they must constitute "trade" or "commerce" as defined in the act. C.G.S.
Thus, while the court is unprepared to state that a municipality may never be subject to CUTPA, the court agrees with the plaintiffs contention that the facts, as alleged in the pleadings in this case, do not implicate the remedial provisions of CUTPA.
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is granted.
So Ordered
Bishop, J.