DocketNumber: No. CVH 5221
Judges: DIPENTIMA, J.
Filed Date: 11/8/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The parties stipulated to a finding of the following pertinent facts:
1. The plaintiffs Machelle J. Neiditz, Herman Neiditz and Janice Neiditz are respectively 78, 75 and 72 years old.
2. No amount has been paid against the underlying judgment.
3. As of September 22, 1995, the total judgment debt inclusive of interest but exclusive of attorneys' fees was $249,784.90.
4. In March 1995, the defendant tendered a partial payment of $15,886.13 with a proposed schedule of payment including accrued interest over the course of 15 years without collateral or security. The tender was refused.
5. In August 1995, the defendant offered to pay $100,000 toward the judgment with a proposed schedule of payment including accrued interest over the course of 10 years without collateral or security. The offer was refused.
Based upon the uncontroverted testimony of the defendant's Deputy Director of Administration and Fiscal Matters, the court finds further that the defendant Hartford Housing Authority is a public corporation created under C.G.S. §
The plaintiff seeks immediate payment of the judgment plus attorney's fees1. The defendant proposes to pay the judgment over a period of ten years. (Ex. E).
Discussion
There are limitations on the enforcement of a judgment against a housing authority. C.G.S. §
All real and personal property, including choses in action, of a housing authority shall be exempt from levy and sale by virtue of an execution, and no execution or other judicial process shall issue against the same nor shall any judgment against a housing authority be a charge or lien upon its real property; provided the provisions of this section shall not apply to or limit the right of the obligees to foreclose or otherwise enforce any mortgage of a housing authority or the right or obligees to pursue any remedies for the enforcement of any pledge or lien given by a housing authority on its rents, fees or revenues.
Because of this statutory limitation and the following provisions from §
An obligee of an authority shall have the right, in addition to all other rights conferred on such obligee, subject only to any contractual restrictions binding upon such obligee: (a) By mandamus or other proceeding in the superior court, to compel such authority and the commissioners, officers, agents or employees thereof to perform each and every term, provision and covenant contained in any contract of such authority with or for the benefit of such obligee and to require the carrying out of any or all such covenants and agreements of such authority and the fulfillment of all duties imposed upon such authority by this chapter and (b), by suit or other proceeding in the superior court, to enjoin the performance of any acts which may be unlawful or in violation of any of the rights of such obligee of such authority.
C.G.S. §
The plaintiffs argue that because the property of the Housing Authority is exempt from execution under C.G.S. §
"Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. It is designed to enforce a plain positive duty. The writ will issue only when the person against whom it is directed is under a clear legal obligation to perform the act compelled and the party seeking the writ has a clear legal right to performance." Gelinas v. WestHartford,
Neither party has cited a case that addresses the use of a writ of mandamus to enforce a judgment against a housing authority where the housing authority has offered to pay the judgment in instalments. As noted previously in I, supra, this CT Page 13351 willingness to pay distinguishes this case from the Adler andRainsville cases cited by the plaintiffs. In weighing the equities in this unfortunately protracted proceeding, the court considered that willingness to pay along with the testimony and evidence as to the finances of the defendant. Defendant's Exs. B, C and D, which is the June correspondence between the defendant and the HUD Director, Office of Public Housing, along with the testimony of Mr. Roberge, convinced the court that, while an order of immediate payment of the judgment would not be equitable, neither would an order for a ten year payment schedule as suggested by the defendant. Taking into account the role of the defendant in providing low and moderate income residents of Hartford safe, decent and affordable housing, the court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to a writ of mandamus that does not order immediate payment of the judgment.
Conclusion
A writ of mandamus may issue ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs $100,000 within twenty days of this judgment and the balance, with the accrued statutory interest, in equal installments within three years: November 27, 1996, November 27, 1997 and November 27, 1998. The court awards reasonable attorneys fees of $12,000 for this action, which are to be paid in two installments: $4,000 on December 31, 1995, and $8,000 on December 31, 1996.
Judgment plus costs may enter accordingly.
Alexandra Davis DiPentima, Judge