DocketNumber: No. CV 93 0522353
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 2206
Judges: HENNESSEY, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 3/8/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The plaintiff, Janice MacArthur, filed a six count complaint against the defendants the Town of Suffield the Commissioner of Transportation, Emil Frankel, and George and Gertrude Lathrop [the Lathrops]. Counts five and six, which are the subject of the motion presently before the court, are directed against the Lathrops and sound in negligence and nuisance, respectively. The plaintiff alleges that she was injured when she fell on a public sidewalk abutting the Lathrops' property. The plaintiff alleges that the sidewalk was in a state of disrepair that made it hazardous to pedestrian traffic. CT Page 2207
On August 13, 1993, the Lathrops filed a motion for summary judgment, as to counts five and six, a memorandum in support of the motion and exhibits pursuant to Practice Book 379 and 380. In their memorandum, the Lathrops argue that there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because they owed no duty to the plaintiff and because they have committed no affirmative act that would make them liable for a nuisance. On November 5, 1993, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book 380; Wilson v. New Haven,
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to judgment as a matter of law. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.
(Citations omitted.) Dougherty v. Graham,
The Lathrops argue that, as abutting landowners, they have no duty to third parties who are injured on a public sidewalk. "`The existence of a duty is a question of law. . . . Only if such duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand. (Citation omitted.) Shore v. Stonington,
In the present case, there is a town ordinance in Suffield, Sec.
The owner of any premises in the town in front of whose premises any sidewalk is in need of repair shall forthwith repair all defects therein in any way endangering or incommoding public travel upon the same and shall maintain such sidewalk in a safe condition and convenient for the use of the public and shall remove therefrom without delay any and all obstructions that may be placed or found thereon.
This ordinance may create a duty on the part of the Lathrops to maintain the sidewalk in a safe condition for pedestrian traffic. However, CT Page 2209
[i]t is a general rule of construction of statutes or ordinances which impose upon property owners the performance of a part of the duty of a municipality to the public that a legislative intent is indicated, unless it is plainly expressed otherwise, that a breach thereof shall be remediable only by the municipal government or by enforcement of a penalty prescribed therein, and that there is no right of action to an individual citizen specially injured in a consequence of such breach. The most conspicuous cases of this sort are those that deny liability to private suit for violation of the duty imposed by ordinance upon abutting property owners to maintain sidewalk pavements. . . . When a statute creates an exception to a general rule, it is to be construed strictly and its language is not to be extended beyond its evident intent.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Willoughby v. New Haven,
While the Suffield ordinance may impose upon the Lathrops a duty to maintain the public sidewalks that abut their property, the ordinance does not impose upon the property owners any liability to injured third parties. The Lathrops may owe a duty to the city, but the ordinance does not create liability based on a failure to comply with the statute. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment as to count five is granted. CT Page 2210
The Lathrops next argue that they cannot be liable for a nuisance because the plaintiff has failed to allege an affirmative act. "An abutting landowner is under a duty to avoid affirmative acts which `render the walk unsafe for public travel.'" Coyle v. City of Waterbury,
The plaintiff has failed to allege an affirmative act on the part of the Lathrops and the facts do not evidence an affirmative act on the part of the Lathrops. The Lathrops cannot, as abutting landowners, be liable for maintaining a nuisance where they have not performed an affirmative act that constitutes a nuisance. Accordingly, the Lathrops' motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to the plaintiff's nuisance claim in count six.
Mary R. Hennessey, Judge
Bartha v. Waterbury House Wrecking Co. , 190 Conn. 8 ( 1983 )
Dougherty v. Graham , 161 Conn. 248 ( 1971 )
Batick v. Seymour , 186 Conn. 632 ( 1982 )
Shore v. Town of Stonington , 187 Conn. 147 ( 1982 )
Willoughby v. New Haven , 123 Conn. 446 ( 1937 )
Stevens v. Neligon , 116 Conn. 307 ( 1933 )
Hanlon v. Waterbury , 108 Conn. 197 ( 1928 )
Perkins v. Weibel , 132 Conn. 50 ( 1945 )
Tenney v. Pleasant Realty Corporation , 136 Conn. 325 ( 1949 )