DocketNumber: No. CV00-01778265
Citation Numbers: 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 10803, 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 43
Judges: D'ANDREA, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 9/5/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
It is undisputed that the plaintiff did not communicate in writing to the defendants, its clients, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, the basis or rate of the fee, or the scope of the matter to be undertaken. This failure violated the provisions of Rule 1.5(b). The parties have not called to the court's attention any appellate decision in Connecticut which would resolve the precise issue presented. The closest appellate case is Silver v. Jacobs,
In two superior court cases cited by the plaintiff, Presnick v. Bond, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 10596 (July 11, 1994, Sylvester, J.); Kagan and Levine v. Wilson, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV93 0525685 (January 31, 1995, O'Neill, J.), the issue of whether violation of Rule 1.5(b) bars recovery was never discussed or decided, expressly or otherwise, and both cases predate Silver. A third case cited by the plaintiff, DeSarbo, Jensen Reichert P.C. v. Bozzuto's Carting Co.,Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV90 0307495 (July 28, 1995, Barnett, J.) predates Silver and held that the word "shall" in Rule 1.5(b) was not mandatory. Because both Connecticut General Statutes
Two Connecticut Superior Court cases found that the use of the verb "shall" in Rule 1.5(b) carries with it the thrust of the imperative, and declined to award legal fees to attorneys who had failed to abide by the rule. Kantrovitz Brownstein P.C. v. Ruotolo, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV95 0371252 (December 20, 1996, Burns, J.T.R.); Landino v. Black Tie Limousine, Inc., Superior Court judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV98 048538 (January 26, 1999, Burns, J.T.R.).
It must be remembered that this matter involves an application for a prejudgment remedy wherein a hearing is not, and is not intended to be, a full hearing on the merits of the case. Because of the limited nature of the hearing, and because the court is not convinced that under Rule 1.5(b) the plaintiff can recover any attorney's fees from the defendant, the court cannot find probable cause that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment in the amount of the prejudgment remedy sought. See C.G.S. §
At the final hearing the issues of the existence of a contract between the parties, the reasonableness of the fees and the Rule 1.5(b) question can be more fully explored. Indeed, the plaintiffs' argument that it is excepted from the Rule because of the equivalent of a prior representation of the defendant Thomas Heithaus can be further considered as well. The court does not intend any rulings made herein to be considered the law of the case.
The application for prejudgment remedy is denied.
So Ordered.
D'ANDREA, J.