DocketNumber: No. CV 98-0413123
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 4440
Judges: MUNRO, JUDGE. CT Page 4441
Filed Date: 3/30/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Jacques was tried by a jury before Parker, J. and found guilty of attempt to commit murder and carrying a pistol without a permit. His total effective sentence is 25 years of incarceration, suspended after 21 years. His conviction was affirmed. State v. Jacques,
The petitioner's Second Amended Petition, dated July 12, 2000 is in two counts. Jacques claims that his trial counsel, Attorney Bruce Sturman rendered ineffective counsel to the petitioner for:
"a. failing to conduct sufficient investigation into the legal issues in the case.
b. failing to conduct sufficient investigation into the prosecution's proof.
c. failing to conduct sufficient investigation into the defense case.
d. failing to conduct sufficient investigation into the witnesses available to support the defense case, including Miller Bellevue, Roland Conte, Woody Boisette, Jean Beausejour, Mark A. Soderberg, Francine Nawracaj, Donna Tetrault, and Officer Kevin Leach.
e. failing to call witnesses to support the defense case, including Roland Conte, Woody Boisette, Jean Beausejour, Mark A. Soderberg, and Francine Nawracaj.
f. failing to establish what clothing the petitioner was wearing on February 4 and 5, 1996.
g. failing to object to the admission of prejudicial evidence by the prosecutor, such as the Department of Public Safety Forensic Laboratory's photographs of its own weapons.
h. failing to move to strike Nadia Joseph's testimony because of Nadia Joseph's failure to understand the meaning and obligation of an oath.
i. failing to object to the admission of Nadia Joseph's out-of-court CT Page 4442 statements."
Jacques also claims that his counsel, Gail Heller rendered ineffective counsel to the petitioner in the ways alleged above in subparagraphs a through d. There also was a third count, against appellate counsel, which was abandoned at the time of the trial of the matter.
At trial, the petitioner, Attorney Gail Heller, Attorney Bruce Sturman, Arthur Brautigan, an investigator for the public defender's office and Attorney Conrad Seifert testified as witnesses. Attorney Seifert was called as an expert witness on behalf of the petitioner. Numerous exhibits, including the trial transcript were placed in evidence before the habeas court.
"In Strickland v. Washington, [
"The court imposed this prejudice requirement because [t]he government is not responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, attorney errors that will result in reversal of a conviction or sentence. Attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial. They cannot be classified according to likelihood of causing prejudice. Nor can they be defined with sufficient precision to inform defense attorneys correctly just what conduct to avoid. Representation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another. Even if a defendant shows that particular errors of counsel were unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense." (Internal quotation marks omitted.Id., 155.
"With regard to the performance component of this inquiry, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. . . . The constitution guarantees only a fair trial and a competent attorney; it does not ensure that every conceivable constitutional claim will be recognized and raised. . . . The defendant is also not guaranteed assistance of an attorney who will make no mistakes. . . . What constitutes effective assistance [of counsel] is not and cannot be fixed with yardstick precision, but varies according to the unique circumstances of each representation." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jeffrey v. Commissioner ofCorrection,
"Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls CT Page 4444 within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. . . . [C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id, 219-20.
"Even if trial counsel's assistance is shown to be ineffective, the petitioner cannot succeed in his claim unless he proves prejudice. . . . This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable . . . An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. . . . It is not enough for the [petitioner] to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceedings. . . . Rather, [t]he [petitioner] must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. . . . When a [petitioner] challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 220-21.
"A court deciding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim need not address the question of counsel's performance if it is easier to dispose of the claim on the ground of insufficient prejudice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Taft v. Commissioner of Correction,
"A habeas court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Some of the factual findings will have been unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that were affected will have been affected in different ways. Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect. . . . [A] court making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris v. Commissioner ofCorrection,
On the evening of February 4, 1996, Fresnel Eugene was murdered and Nadia Joseph, Eugene's girlfriend, was brutally wounded outside of the Laurel Ridge Apartments in Norwich, Connecticut. Both of these victims were well known to the defendant. There are varying accounts from the trial witnesses' testimony and petitioner's at the habeas trial as to the events immediately proceeding the commission of the crimes. What does emerge, definitively is that there were several people at the crime scene. Nadia Joseph, the victim, identified the petitioner as the one who shot and beat her. Bellevue, a witness at trial, testified he had seen the petitioner in possession of a gun at some time before the date of the crime. Other witnesses to the crime identified the assailant as an individual in a that, in dark clothing, in jeans, and in a dark colored T shirt.
When the petitioner was arrested for these crimes he made inculpatory statements which placed him at the scene of the crime. At the trial on the habeas matter, the petitioner testified that while he was in the vicinity of the scene of the crime, he had, during the commission of the crimes, stayed in a motor vehicle. It was his firm position that many of the people who he wanted more investigatory interviews with would have confirmed his position. However, his testimony as to his presence in the car is wholly inconsistent with the blood splatter on his pants, which were jeans. He provided more that one explanation for the blood on his pants; each was inconsistent with each other: none were consistent with the high velocity blood splatter pattern on his jeans. That blood splatter was consistent with a back splatter of blood from a gunshot wound at close range. The victim Joseph had gunshot powder residue on her head which was also consistent with a close range shot, less than three feet. This evidence would not have been controverted by any of the individuals that Jacques sought to have further information from.
Correctional Facility. He was there each morning and found it an expedient way to see people `familiar with the system' as they came into it, particularly when they were difficult to locate outside. Eli Joseph had nothing favorable to say for the petitioner. Bellevue did not want to speak with Brautigan or get involved in the matter. Brautigan met Roland Conte at Corrigan as well and had nothing positive to offer for the petitioner. Brautigan spoke with him a second time and Conte told him that the criminal matters were all involved with voodoo. Brautigan met with Shirleen Joseph two or three times. She was the petitioner's girlfriend and he thought she would be helpful to his cause. Brautigan was told by her that she never loved the petitioner, she felt guilty cheating on her New York boyfriend with Jacques and that it was a relationship of convenience. When Brautigan asked her about the two men from New York, she could describe their activities in visiting with Jacques but not their names or how to reach them. As to the names Jean Beausejour and Woody Boisette, Heller and Sturman never heard of them as references to be interviewed from the petitioner. Brautigan met with the petitioner himself at least 10 times. Jacques gave him a list of people to talk to, as he did; the petitioner never mentioned Woody Boisette or Jean Beausejoir to Brautigan. Jacques gave Brautigan the names of Jean Remy Touissant and Cadieux Joseph as the two individuals from New York who were with him on the day of the crime. Jacques gave Brautigan a telephone number for them which was no good when he tried it. Jacques was no more CT Page 4446 help to Brautigan in finding these two people. Heller informed the petitioner that they could not reach these two individuals from New York; he had no other ways to reach them.
Ultimately, the petitioner's own expert, Conrad Seifert, had no opinion as to the sufficiency of Heller's representation of the petitioner. She did not participate in the proceedings except as mentioned herein. Sturman conducted both the probable cause hearing and the trial. The petitioner has failed to establish any prejudice to him as a result of the nature and extent of the investigation conducted by Heller in the pretrial proceedings she was involved in.
Sturman read the statement of Donna Tetrault and the police report regarding her statements. He did not have her interviewed because he already had access to her statements. At the commencement of voire dire for the criminal trial, the state's witness list had the name of Donna Tetrault on it. Sturman assumed pursuant to her statements that she would place Jacques at the crime scene. He had already admitted in his own statement to being there. However, in any case, at trial, Sturman cross examined her on her initial identification and change of it to undermine her credibility. Her testimony was in any case not pivotal because Jacques had put himself at the scene. Therefore, the defense theory pursued by Sturman was to put the gun in someone else's hand, or at least, not in Jacques' hand. As the respondent points out in his trial brief, this strategy was in part successful for the petitioner was acquitted of the most serious charge of murder.
The petitioner's expert, Attorney Conrad Seifert focused on the failure of Sturman to interview Donna Tetrault as the only part of the claim of failure to investigate that had any merit in the habeas petition. As to any other potential witness the petitioner claimed that his counsel did not adequately investigate, Seifert acknowledged that he could not say that it would have made a difference to the outcome of the case.
Donna Tetrault initially gave no statement to the police at the time of the crime. A few days later, she gave different statements to the police. She stated that she saw a group of people at the crime scene and that one was wearing a T-shirt, which was unusual because of the cold temperature outside, and, that the petitioner was wearing a down-type coat. (A different witness had identified the individual who committed the crime as someone wearing a puffy coat.) However, Seifert acknowledged that to give her an opportunity later to re-identify the petitioner might have caused more harm than to help. Seifert acknowledged that Tetrault was a reluctant witness at trial and that he had know way of knowing CT Page 4447 whether an interview of her by the defense prior to trial would have helped. Ultimately, Seifert opined that it was a trial tactical decision regarding this issue and there was no way to know whether the outcome might have been different. At best, the defense may have been better prepared; at worst, Tetrault might have become a more willing, less reluctant witness for the state.
Seifert felt that Sturman should have interviewed Bemier and Hudgins as well. He felt that Sturman might then have been more able to deal with the identification problems regarding petitioner. However, the record regardless, was sufficient to support identification of Jacques when he himself placed himself at the crime scene and was wearing pants at his arrest that demonstrated his presence at the immediate crime scene at the time the crime occurred. No other evidence was presented in this hearing from which the court could conclude that any pre-trial interviews with these two would have produced a different result or any inconsistencies to overcome the other trial evidence sufficient to convict Jacques of the weapons and attempted murder charge.
After listening to her testimony and observing the inconsistent statements of Ms. Joseph, the trial judge (Parker, J.) asked her if she understood what a statement under oath was, to which she replied no. Seifert, petitioner's expert, opined, and petitioner argues here, that the petitioner's trial counsel failed to make the most of this CT Page 4448 opportunity. Seifert opined and petitioner urges that Sturman should have made a motion to strike Nadia Joseph's trial testimony. Seifert testified that he believed that such a motion to strike would have been unsuccessful, whoever, the petitioner would have been "psychologically served" by said motion being made in front of the jury: it would have underlined the point and made an exclamation point of it in front of the jury. Further, he opined that while such a motion would most likely have been unsuccessful, it would have created what he perceived to be an appealable issue.
The habeas petition is dismissed.
The Court
Munro, J.