DocketNumber: No. 62579
Citation Numbers: 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 6103
Judges: AUSTIN, J.
Filed Date: 6/23/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Whether the court should grant the motion to strike the CT Page 6104 special defense as to co-plaintiff Mazzotta because the special defense alleges comparative negligence on the part of the co-plaintiff Parnasso only.
FACTS
The following facts are alleged in the revised complaint #115. On February 9, 1990 co-defendant Vallerie Transportation Service ("Vallerie") was the owner of a tractor trailer which was being operated by co-defendant Donald H. Raymond as Vallerie's servant agent and employee in a generally southerly direction in the middle lane of Interstate 91 in Cromwell Connecticut. At this time and place Anthony Parnasso1 was the owner of a motor vehicle (the "Parnasso vehicle") operated by co-plaintiff Aldo S. Parnasso ("Parnasso") in a generally southerly direction in the extreme right-hand lane of Interstate 91 in Cromwell Connecticut. Co-plaintiff Melinda Mazzotta was a passenger in the Parnasso vehicle. The vehicles collided due to the negligence of the defendants. The first count of the revised complaint alleges that Mazzotta sustained injuries because of this collision. The second count of the revised complaint alleges that Parnasso sustained injuries because of this collision.
The defendants allege in a special defense to the first count and a separate special defense to the second count that the collision was caused by Parnasso's own negligence.
The plaintiffs now move to strike the special defense to the first count because it is legally insufficient in that the negligence of Parnasso cannot be imputed to Mazzotta.
DISCUSSION
"The motion to strike is used to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading." Ferryman v. Groton,
The plaintiffs argue that the special defense to the first count of the revised complaint is legally insufficient because the negligence of the operator of a motor vehicle cannot ordinarily be imputed to the passenger of the motor vehicle. CT Page 6105 Silverman v. Silverman,
The defendants argue that the special defense to the first count is legally sufficient because under Tort Reform II General Statutes
General Statutes
In a negligence action to recover damages resulting from personal injury wrongful death or damage to property occurring on or after October 1, 1987, if the damages are determined to be proximately caused by the negligence of more than one party each party against whom recovery is allowed shall be liable to the claimant only for his proportionate share of the recoverable economic damages and the recoverable noneconomic damages . . . .
The plaintiffs' cause of action is a negligence action which falls within the ambit of General Statutes
At oral argument the plaintiffs argued that the special defense was improper under Practice Book 1642 because it contradicted the plaintiff's allegation that the negligence of the defendants was the sole proximate cause of the collision. The court cannot consider this ground of impropriety because "grounds other than those specified should not be considered by the trial court in passing upon a motion to strike." Morris v. Hartford Courant Co.,
1 W. Moller W. Miller W. Horton, Connecticut Practice Book Annotated (3d Ed. 1989) Authors' Comments, 164, p. 334.
CONCLUSION CT Page 6106
The court denies the motion to strike because under Tort Reform II, damages are apportioned among all joint tortfeasors so that the comparative negligence of one co-plaintiff, if proved will serve to lessen the recovery had by all co-plaintiffs against the defendants.
AUSTIN, J.