DocketNumber: No. CV98-0416972
Citation Numbers: 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 15625
Judges: ALANDER, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 12/2/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Gurliacci v. Mayer,
The plaintiffs Jacqueline Pelkey, Peter Pelkey, Sr., and their minor child, Sharese Pelkey initially brought a sixteen count complaint against defendants Robert Frew II and Jan A. Frew, their minor son, Robert Frew III, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, the Child Advocate, and the Claims Commissioner alleging negligent, reckless and malicious actions with respect to the care and custody of the minor child, Sharese Pelkey. The claims against the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, the Child Advocate, and the Claims Commissioner have previously been dismissed by the court on sovereign immunity grounds. The defendant Robert Frew III is CT Page 15626 the father of the child born to the plaintiff Sharese Pelkey and the defendants Robert Frew II and Jan A. Frew were at one time the foster parents of the plaintiff Sharese Pelkey.
The defendants Robert Frew II and Jan A. Frew seek to dismiss the five counts against them because they assert that, during the relevant time period, they were foster parents and therefore state employees entitled to sovereign immunity pursuant to §
Section
In count nine of the first amended complaint, the plaintiffs claim that the defendants Robert Frew II and Jan A. Frew were negligent while the plaintiff Sharese Pelkey was in their custody and care because they allowed the defendant Robert Frew II to have sexual relations with the plaintiff Sharese Pelkey and she became pregnant. The time period covered by count nine is the period after April 11, 1996 when Sharese Pelkey was placed in the care of the defendants as foster parents. The parties disagree as to whether the conduct complained of was within the scope of the defendants' employment as foster parents and therefore barred by §
In deciding whether a state employee was acting within the scope of his employment for purposes of §
The plaintiffs also assert that count nine is not barred by §
The Supreme Court in Hunte determined that the licensed foster parents in that case were state employees for purposes of §
On April 11, 1996, the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Sequino, J., granted temporary custody of Sharese Pelkey to the Department of Children and Families (DCF). DCF placed the minor child with the defendants. On April 19, 1996, Judge Sequino confirmed the order of temporary custody with DCF and specifically confirmed the child's placement by DCF with the defendants as foster parents. There appears to be no dispute that, although the defendants were not licensed as foster parents pursuant to the department's regulations, the defendants actually functioned as foster parents for the minor child. Since the defendants served as foster parents and DCF retained the right to control the exercise of their duties, the defendants were state CT Page 15628 employee entitled to immunity under §
Three of the remaining counts of the plaintiffs' complaint which are directed at the defendants Robert Frew II and Jan A. Frew, counts six, seven, and eight, do not concern that period of time when the defendants were serving as foster parents for Sharese Pelkey and consequently do not involve their conduct as foster parents. Count six alleges custodial interference in March of 1996 due to the defendants attempts to seek custody through the probate court. Count seven alleges custodial interference from July 7 through July 16, 1996 and count eight claims custodial interference around July 23, 1996, both of which were times when DCF had removed Sharese Pelkey from the defendants' home and they were no longer acting as her foster parents. Since the defendants were not acting as foster parents during the relevant time periods covered by these claims, they are not entitled to §
Count fifteen of the complaint asserts that the defendants are vicariously liable for the acts of their minor child, Robert Frew III, pursuant to General Statutes §
For the foregoing reasons, count nine of the plaintiffs' complaint is hereby dismissed. The motion to dismiss counts six, seven, eight and fifteen is denied.
BY THE COURT
Judge, Jon M. Alander