DocketNumber: No. CV97 0403722
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 8588
Judges: DiPENTIMA, J.
Filed Date: 8/12/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The plaintiff filed a complaint with the CHRO on March 11, 1997, alleging that her employer KX Industries allowed its employee, Oscar McClain, to repeatedly sexually harass her in violation of §
The complaint was assigned to an investigator under §
In her main brief, the plaintiff raises several grounds for sustaining her appeal. She first argues that the CHRO's findings of fact as to KX Industries' remedial efforts are not supported by substantial evidence and its conclusions therefrom are unreasonable. She then claims that these findings and conclusions deprived her of due process of law. Her third claim is that the CHRO erred in finding that legitimate non-discriminatory reasons excused KX Industries from liability.
In a reply brief, the plaintiff raised additional grounds arising from new state legislation and new U.S. Supreme Court decisions. She claims that
In 1994, the legislature amended the statutes providing for the enforcement of anti-discrimination statutes by the CHRO. The statutory provision applicable to this case, General Statutes §
(b) Within ninety days of the filing of a complaint, the executive director or his designee shall review the file. The review shall include the complaint, the respondent's answer and CT Page 8590 the responses to the commission's requests for information, if any, and the complainant's comments, if any, to the respondent's answer and information responses. If the executive director or his designee determines that the complaint fails to state a claim for relief or is frivolous on its face, or there is no reasonable possibility that investigating the complaint will result in a finding of reasonable cause, the complaint shall be dismissed.
Thus, the statute permits the CHRO to dismiss a complaint without conducting a full investigation. Nevertheless, under General Statutes §
The CHRO investigator concluded her review of the plaintiff's complaint under §
Further, you are hereby notified that as a result of these activities, your complaint has been reviewed out for the reason that there is no reasonable possibility that further investigation will result in a finding of reasonable cause inasmuch as it was determined that the respondent appears to have taken actions necessary to remedy your complaint of sexual harassment. Your complaint affidavit indicates that you were sexually harassed until 12-30-96. You complained of sexual harassment to the respondent on 12-30-96. There is evidence to indicate that respondent investigated and disciplined Mr. McClain. There is no evidence to indicate that you were sexually harassed after that time. In that the respondent remedied your complaint they have met their legal obligations. You did not provide any additional or substantive evidence which might refute the response.
(ROR, 15.) In rejecting the plaintiff's reconsideration request, the CHRO concluded,
By statute, merit assessment determinations are made based completely on the complaint affidavit, the answer and complainant's rebuttal, if any. Complainant's affidavit makes no claim of any complaints being made prior to December 30 nor was CT Page 8591 any rebuttal submitted disputing respondent's assertions that prompt and effective remedial action was taken that resulted in no further incidents. The file therefore fully supported the dismissal of this case.
(ROR, 7.)
The crux of the plaintiff's arguments in her main brief is that the CHRO should not have denied her a hearing because 1) she made out a prima facie case of sexual harassment and 2) the record was inadequate to decide the merits of KX Industries defenses. It is clear from a review of the record that the plaintiff relied solely on the allegations of her complaint until she requested reconsideration. Other than the complaint, the only evidence before the CHRO during the merit assessment review was provided by KX Industries1. (ROR, 41). The record reflects the following facts provided by KX Industries.
The plaintiff was and is employed by KX Industries assembling water filters. She began working there March 6, 1996. On December 30, 1996, she complained to Richard Ianuzzi, manager of Human Resources, that Oscar McClain had on "numerous occasions, touched her breasts and her buttocks as well as asked her when she would give him some of her . . . (private parts)." (ROR, 84, December 30, 1996 Memo of R. Ianuzzi.) On that day Ianuzzi went with the plaintiff to see Randy Shults, Director of Operations and McClain's supervisor, who heard the plaintiff's complaints. The plaintiff told Ianuzzi that another employee, Vincenza Piscitelli, had been sexually harassed by McClain. Ianuzzi spoke with Piscitelli on December 30, 1996, who confirmed that McClain had touched her and used similar language with her in the past. Also on December 30, 1996, Ianuzzi and Shults informed McClain of the charges of sexual harassment. He was issued a final warning and suspended without pay from December 30, 1996 to January 6, 1997. The plaintiff and Piscitelli were told of the action and agreed with it. (ROR, 55-56.)
KX Industries had established a policy against sexual harassment. (ROR, 47.) In the employee handbook at KX Industries, in addition to statements forbidding acts of sexual harassment, there is a procedure set forth for reporting such acts. (ROR, 83 and reverse 83.)
A basic principle of administrative law is that the scope of the court's review is very limited. CT Page 8592
Our Supreme Court has established a firm standard that is appropriately deferential to agency decision making, yet goes beyond a mere judicial `rubber stamping' of an agency's decisions. Connecticut Light Power v. Dept. of Public Utilities Control,
219 Conn. 51 ,57 ,591 A.2d 1231 (1991); Woodbury Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,174 Conn. 258 ,260 ,386 A.2d 232 (1978). Courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the agency where substantial evidence exists on the record to support the agency's decision, and where the record reflects that the agency followed appropriate procedures. Samperi v. Inland Wetlands Agency226 Conn. 579 ,587 ,628 A.2d 1286 (1993); Lieberman v. State Board of Labor Relations,216 Conn. 253 ,262 ,579 A.2d 505 (1990); Baerst v. State Board of Education,34 Conn. App. 567 ,571 ,642 A.2d 76 , cert. denied,230 Conn. 915 ,645 A.2d 1018 (1994).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cabasquini v. Commissioner of SocialServices,
General Statutes §
The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
"Even as to questions of law, [t]he court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion. . . . Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts. . . . New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission,
"Judicial review of [an administrative agency's action] is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (General Statutes § c. 54,
"Substantial evidence exists if the administrative record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Reden v. Kozlowski,
Before reaching the substantive issues, the court addresses the plaintiff's claim that the CHRO abused its discretion in refusing to consider the evidence proffered on her request for reconsideration. Although she was notified of the opportunity at the beginning of the merit assessment review, the plaintiff did not comment on the employer's answer and informational responses. (ROR, 24.) In her request for reconsideration, she proffered new evidence that she and another employee had made complaints to either a supervisor or human resource manager prior to December 30, 1996.
(ROR, 11.)
Under the pertinent regulation, Conn. State Agency Reg. § 46a-54-79(d), the CHRO may reconsider the finding dismissing the complaint if
(1) an error of fact or law should be corrected;
(2) new evidence has been discovered which materially affects the merits of the case and which, for good reasons, was CT Page 8594 not presented during the investigation; or
(3) other good cause for reconsideration has been shown.
The plaintiff offered no explanation as to why the evidence was not submitted during the merit assessment review process. The plaintiff had been advised more than once that her complaint would be processed pursuant to the steps set forth in §
As to the plaintiff's claim that since her complaint set forth a prima facie case of sexual harassment it should have survived merit assessment review, the law is otherwise.
In determining whether a complaint of discrimination in employment is supported by reasonable cause, the CHRO is not limited to determining whether the complainant can make a prima facie case. Ierardi v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities,
15 Conn. App. 569 ,579 , cert. denied,209 Conn. 813 (1988), cited with approval in Adriani v. Commission Human Rights and Opportunities,220 Conn. 307 ,315 (1991). Rather, the CHRO must look at the preliminary information as a whole in assessing whether reasonable cause, as defined in General Statutes §46a-83 (b), is or is not present.
Cohen v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 549621 (March 1, 1996), p. 7. Here, pursuant to the merit assessment review procedure under General Statutes §
The plaintiff also argues that the CHRO's dismissal deprived her of due process of law because issues of credibility and the merits of KX Industries' defenses should have been left to a hearing officer's determination. Specifically, she claims that it was error for the CHRO to dispose of her complaint "on the basis CT Page 8595 of KX Industries' denial of that claim and its self-serving claim that it had remediated the problem complained of." (Plaintiff's brief
In her main brief and her reply brief, the plaintiff claims that the CHRO erred in its application of the law by dismissing the complaint on the basis of KX Industries' informational responses. The plaintiff misconstrues the role of the CHRO in this statutory scheme. The purpose behind the discriminatory complaint procedure in §§
While the substantive law of sexual harassment may have changed during the pendency of this appeal, that development does not affect the result here. Both the U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, U.S. (1998) and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, CT Page 8596
Nor does
If a complaint is dismissed pursuant to subsection (b) . . . of section
46a-83 , as amended by this act, or is dismissed for failure to accept full relief pursuant to subsection (c) of said section46a-83 , as amended by this act, and the complainant does not request reconsideration of such a dismissal as provided in subsection (e) of said section46a-83 , as amended by this act, . . . the executive director of the commission shall issue a release and the complainant may, within ninety days of receipt of the release from the commission, bring an action in accordance with section46a-100 , as amended by this act, and sections46a-102 to46a-104 , inclusive.
(Emphasis added.)
The plaintiff's appeal must be dismissed, not because there was insufficient proof of sexual harassment but because there was insufficient proof of the employer's liability for that harassment. The CHRO's findings and conclusions are supported by the record and the law.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
DiPentima, J.