DocketNumber: No. LPL-CV-97-0398264S
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 981, 21 Conn. L. Rptr. 254
Judges: LAGER, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 1/29/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The operative allegation of the first special defense is that "[p]laintiff was notified of possible lead hazard condition and assumed the risk of injury" (¶ 8), while the second affirmative defense alleges that by failing to vacate the premises the tenant "assumed the risk and danger to herself and her minor child" (¶ 12). The doctrine of assumption of risk was abolished as part of Tort Reform, General Statutes §
The third affirmative defense is more explicit in raising parental negligence, alleging that the "[p]laintiff failed to exercise reasonable care and supervision of the minor child" (¶ 14). Likewise, the first counterclaim contains the same allegation (¶ 19) and alleges that as "a result of such neglect the said minor child was injured" (¶ 20).
This court has concluded previously that the doctrine of parental immunity bars claims alleging negligent parental supervision and the negligent exercise of parental discretion whether raised as a special defense or a counterclaim. Martinezv. Maturana, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 473382 (July 14, 1997) (Lager, J.); Pickering v. Stanchak, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 470124, 20 CONN. L. RPTR. 97 (July 14, 1997) (Lager, J.); Sabatucci v. Murphy, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. 247259 (July 14, 1997) (Lager, J.); Ayala v. Meehan, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham at Putnam, Docket No. 049450, 20 CONN. L. RPTR. 25 (June 30, 1997) (Lager, J.); Tobin v.Connecticut Housing Finance Authority, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 333231 (June 17, 1997) (Lager, J.); Norwood v. Gordon, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 472232 (April 28, 1997) (Lager, J.). In that regard, this court has cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895G, CT Page 983 comment (k), which cautions against abrogating parental immunity for acts "involving the exercise of parental authority or supervision . . [and] the performance of parental duties such as the use of care to provide a safe place to live or adequate necessaries or proper instruction and training." See Henderson v.Woolley,
However, as to the fourth special defense, which alleges that the "plaintiffs intentionally permitted the minor child to ingest lead paint chip [sic]" (¶ 15, emphasis supplied), the plaintiffs motion to strike must be denied. Taken as true, as required, the allegation that the parent intentionally permitted the minor child to ingest lead paint barely suffices to allow that defense to survive this motion to strike based on the ground of parental immunity. Intentional parental conduct, at least under certain specific factual circumstances which cannot be elucidated at this stage of the case, may not be protected by the doctrine of parental immunity. See Henderson v. Woolley, supra,
In sum, the plaintiffs' motion to strike the first, second and third special defenses and the first counterclaim is granted. The plaintiffs' motion to strike the fourth special defense is denied. CT Page 984
LINDA K. LAGER, JUDGE