DocketNumber: No. CV87 0242069
Citation Numbers: 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 416, 7 Conn. Super. Ct. 384
Judges: LEWIS, J.
Filed Date: 1/15/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The criteria for the granting of summary judgment were reiterated just last week by the Appellate Court in Cummings
Lockwood v. Gray,
In support of its motion for summary judgment the defendant submitted the deposition of the plaintiff as well as a number of supporting exhibits. These documents indicate that the plaintiff signed an application for employment. Mrs. Cogan stipulated that this application did not guarantee employment for any particular length of time. The application does not mention termination in any fashion.
In her deposition the plaintiff states that at the time she was being interviewed for possible employment, Lorraine Beach, a supervisor for the defendant, stated that "every employee will be treated fairly." On September 26, 1983 the plaintiff received a letter from an employee relations representative offering her a position as a data entry operator. This letter does not refer to length of employment or to termination. The plaintiff commenced work on October 17, 1983, and her employment was terminated on December 2, 1986. In her deposition the plaintiff states that she was terminated for absenteeism, and also because she believes the defendant was "cutting back" on the number of its employees. The plaintiff agreed that in 1985 she was absent from work and on sick leave for approximately thirty-one weeks from February to September. She received sick pay and indicated that she did not work because of "depression." Her absentee record indicates that although she returned to work September through November of 1985, she was absent on sick leave from early December of that year until late May of 1986, a period of some twenty-five weeks, again for depression. The CT Page 418 plaintiff returned to work but then was out again during the months of October and November of 1986 and was terminated on December 2, 1986. Her "overall performance rating" was deemed unsatisfactory in a review in late November, 1986.2
The defendant claims that based on these facts, which the plaintiff does not dispute, its termination of Mrs. Cogan does not violate any agreement, express or implied, that would result in Mrs. Cogan being anything other than an at will employee.
In opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment, Mrs. Cogan submitted her own affidavit, and also that of Robert Moore, a former supervisor with the defendant, who refers in his affidavit to a "Policy Statement Number 1032." Mr. Moore states that the defendant distributed this statement to employees such as Mrs. Cogan, and that the employees relied on it as a part of their working relationship with defendant. This document is entitled "General Plant Conduct Rules," and contains more than forty rules constituting "prohibited conduct." It states that offenses or violations of the rules "may be cause for suspension or discharge." Among these rules is "absenteeism without reasonable cause."
The plaintiff's own affidavit indicates that because of Policy Statement 1032 she believes that she should not have been terminated summarily, but rather was entitled to some form of disciplinary hearing, including a review of whether her absenteeism was "without reasonable cause."
The elements of wrongful discharge in Connecticut have been analyzed quite extensively and can be summarized by saying that unless an employee has an agreement, express or implied, that he will not be terminated except for just cause, or unless he has a contract for a specific number of years,3 the employee is deemed to be an employee at will, and his services may be terminated at the whim of the employer, and without any liability on the latter's part. See generally Coelho v. Posi-Seal International, Inc.,
In addition to express contracts creating job security, implied contracts can be created in several ways. including statements contained in employee handbooks or policy manuals. Finley v. Aetna Life Casualty Co.,
The doctrine of promissory estoppel has been applied in this area where the employee has a "term contract of fixed duration," and the employer has made a definite promise of job security upon which the employee relied. D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School,
I believe the statement by Mrs. Beach regarding treating employees fairly does not constitute an agreement that the plaintiff was other than an employee at will. However, as to Statement 1032, the Court of Appeals of Michigan in Schippers v. SPX Corp.
Bearing in mind that the evidence in a summary judgment motion must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in this case, it is my belief that the reference in Policy Statement 1032 concerning suspension or discharge, and absenteeism without reasonable cause, creates a question of fact as to whether the employee in this case, Mrs. Cogan, was entitled to be terminated only upon a showing of just cause. See also Finley v. Aetna Life Casualty, supra, 199 ("In the absence of definitive contract language. . .the determination of what the parties intended to encompass in their contractual commitments is a question of the intention of the parties, and CT Page 420 an inference of fact.").
Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.
So ordered.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 15th day of January 1992.
WILLIAM B. LEWIS, JUDGE