DocketNumber: No. CR-11-95-91272S
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 13171
Judges: FOLEY, J.
Filed Date: 11/21/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
On June 27, 1995, at about 7:50 A.M., Trooper Covey of the CT Page 13172 Connecticut State Police stopped the defendant, Robert Marion, on Route 12 in Thompson, Connecticut. The defendant was operating a 1976 Dodge pickup truck which did not have a Connecticut emissions sticker affixed to its windshield. The vehicle was also stopped because the defendant did not appear to be wearing a seat belt. As the trooper approached the vehicle, the defendant stated that he had a "permitted loaded handgun" in the vehicle, for which he meant that he had a valid permit to carry the weapon. Trooper Covey had the defendant step to the rear of the vehicle, looked into the passenger compartment and retrieved the handgun. The trooper testified that he retrieved the handgun for safekeeping as there was a ten year old boy in the passenger seat of the vehicle. In so doing, he observed in plain view, a "Marine Corps style K-bar type knife", the blade of which appeared to be over four inches in length. In addition, Trooper Covey observed several rifles, 3 military style 30-round banana clip ammunition magazines fully loaded, and a hay claw found in the cab compartment of the vehicle. The defendant was arrested for Risk of Injury (General Statutes §
The defendant claims that the initial stop and subsequent seizure of the knife were illegal in that Trooper Covey did not have probable cause to stop and search the vehicle; that the defendant was not required by law to display an emissions sticker and that since the vehicle was not equipped with a shoulder restraint seat belt, Trooper Covey could not have seen whether the defendant was properly wearing a lap-type seat belt. He further claims that there is insufficient evidence with which to continue prosecution of some of the charges.
II. Issues Presented
The defendant specifically argues in his motion to Dismiss and to suppress the following issues:2
1. Did the trooper have probable cause to stop the defendant's motor vehicle?
2. Did the officer have probable cause to search the defendant's motor vehicle after being told that the defendant was in possession of a weapon for which he had a permit?
3. Is Section
4. Is there sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution on a charge of Risk of Injury to a Minor?
5. Is there sufficient evidence to support the bringing of a charge pursuant to General Statutes
1. Did the trooper have probable cause to stop thedefendant's motor vehicle?
The defendant's claim is that Trooper Covey did not have probable cause to stop his vehicle based on the fact that the pickup truck was being operated with a junk plate therefore he was not required to have an emissions sticker on the vehicle and that there were no shoulder seat restraints to be seen by Trooper Covey since the vehicle was not equipped with them. This claim lacks merit because: 1) the defendant's vehicle was not exempt from the requirements of the emissions statute; 2) even if it were, the trooper, upon not seeing an emissions sticker, was justified in detaining the defendant's vehicle to determine whether it was exempt from the statute; and 3) upon not observing a seat belt on the operator, the trooper was justified in briefly detaining the vehicle to determine whether the defendant violated General Statutes §
It cannot be reasonably argued that the police may not detain a motorist for violation of its state traffic regulations. See,State v. Aillon,
General Statutes §
This claim is, however, defeated by the language in General Statutes § 14-671 concerning the licensing of junk dealers. That statute provides that a motor vehicle junk yard may apply to the commissioner of motor vehicles for the issuance of a junk yard license. The licensee, instead of registering each vehicle owned by him, is issued a number plate and certificate of registration containing that number and mark by the commissioner of motor vehicles. "[E]ach motor vehicle owned by such licensee shall be regarded as registered under such distinguishing number and mark." General Statutes § 14-671.(Emphasis added.) Because the vehicle is "registered" and not otherwise exempt, the defendant is required to comply with the requirements of General Statutes §
The trooper further had the right to stop the defendant in the absence of an emission sticker since the commissioner of motor vehicles has interpreted the emission statute to require a temporary emissions sticker to be placed on vehicles being operated with a junk plate. See, Connecticut Motor Vehicle Regulations § 14-164c-4.4 In any event, the absence of an emissions sticker on a vehicle would give the officer the right to detain the motorist briefly to determine whether or not the vehicle was exempt from the requirements of General Statute §
2. Did the officer have probable cause to search thedefendant's motor vehicle after being told that the defendant wasin possession of a weapon for which he had a permit?
Immediately after being stopped, the defendant promptly and properly reported to Trooper Covey that there was a loaded handgun in the vehicle. Upon hearing this, Trooper Covey had the defendant exit the vehicle, move to the rear of the vehicle and retrieved the gun. His declared purpose in doing so was to secure the weapon for his own safety, as well as the safety of the ten year old passenger and the other troopers, Dency and Cancellaro, CT Page 13175 who had arrived in a back-up capacity shortly after the initial stop, until his dealings with the defendant were concluded. It was while retrieving the handgun that Trooper Covey plainly observed within the truck, a K-bar style knife; several rifles; 3 military style, 30-round banana clip ammunition magazines fully loaded with 5.56 caliber ammunition; and a hay claw. A reasonable person might appropriately consider the vehicle to be a mobile arsenal of weapons.
Once a vehicle has been lawfully stopped, an officer is allowed to act reasonably to protect himself. Accordingly, an officer may make a protective sweep of a vehicle or "frisk" a subject who is believed to be armed and dangerous. Terry v. Ohio,
In the Supreme Court case of Michigan v. Long, supra at 1047-1048, a case involving a motor vehicle infraction stop, the court stated:
"In two cases in which we applied Terry to specific factual situations, we recognized that investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106 (1977), we held that police may order persons out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation, and may frisk those persons for weapons if there is a reasonable belief that they are armed and dangerous. Our decision rested in part on the "inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile." Id., at 110...... Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect. These principles compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.14 See CT Page 13176 Terry,392 U.S., at 21 . "[T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." Id., at 27.
The Connecticut courts have adopted this same reasoning. InState v. Escobales,
Too often, police officers are mortally wounded following traffic violation stops. An officer should not be made to choose between his own safety and what could later be construed as an illegal search and seizure. Law enforcement personnel have enough responsibility and concerns confronting them when they approach a person they have pulled over, and we refuse to impose upon them a Hobson's choice of not making a limited intrusion where they believe a weapon is concealed when to do so greatly increases the risk that they will be shot. See United States v. Jackson,
652 F.2d 244 ,249-50 (2d Cir. 1981).
The court concludes that Trooper Covey's actions upon learning of a loaded weapon in the motor vehicle were entirely reasonable and appropriate. While the defendant did possess a valid permit for the weapon, and did inform Trooper Covey of that fact, the trooper was justified in verifying that information independently. In so doing, and until that information could be verified, he acted reasonably to separate the defendant from the weapon during his dealings with the defendant. A loaded weapon is dangerous in and of itself whether its possessor has a permit to carry it or not. An armed person detained during a traffic stop may intentionally assault an officer. Since the knife was observed during the protective sweep of a vehicle filled with various other weapons, it shall not be suppressed. The trooper did have probable cause to do a protective search of the defendants vehicle. The defendants Motions to Suppress and To Dismiss are denied.
3. Is Section
The defendant next claims that the charge of Illegal CT Page 13177 Possession of a Weapon in a Motor Vehicle, General Statutes §
The question of whether the definition of "dangerous instrument" found in General Statutes §
In a prosecution under General Statutes §
The term "weapon" used in General Statutes §
The articles specifically mentioned are generally recognized as dangerous weapons per se. State v. Holloway supra; State v.Ryan,
4. Is there sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution on acharge of Risk of Injury to a Minor?
The statute under which the defendant has been charged reads as follows:
Sec.
53-21 . Injury or risk of injury to, or impairing morals of, children. Any person who wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that its life or limb is endangered, or its health is likely to be injured, or its morals likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair CT Page 13179 the health or morals of any such child, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years or both. (1949 Rev., S. 8369.)
In the case of State v. Dennis,
"The apparent legislative purpose in combining the two parts in a single section was to proscribe two general types of behavior likely to injure physically or to impair the morals of a minor under sixteen years of age: (1) deliberate indifference to, acquiescence in, or the creation of situations inimical to the minor's moral or physical welfare; see State v. Smith,
149 Conn. 487 ,181 A.2d 446 ; and (2) acts directly perpetrated on the person of the minor and injurious to his moral or physical well-being. See State v. Coulombe,143 Conn. 604 ,124 A.2d 518 ; State v. Silver,139 Conn. 234 ,93 A.2d 154 . The legislature undoubtedly had in mind acts of such a nature that a general criminal intent could be inferred from them. See Proctor v. United States, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 341, 342,177 F.2d 656 ; State v. Johnston,207 La. 161 ,169 ,20 So. 2d 741 ; Steele v. State,189 Tenn. 424 ,430 ,225 S.W.2d 260 ; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (12th Ed.) 131." State v. Dennis, at 250.5
It is the state's position that the defendant's conduct in placing his ten year old son in such close proximity to dangerous weapons (including the loaded handgun, hay claw, rifles, knife, and other ammunition) falls within the purview of the statute. The court does not agree.
This statute cannot be analyzed in this instance without reference to General Statute
Responsibilities re storage of loaded firearms with respect to minors. No person shall store or keep any loaded firearm on any premises under his control if he knows or reasonably should know that a minor is likely to gain access to the firearm without the permission of the parent or guardian of the minor unless such person (1) keeps the firearm in a securely locked box or other CT Page 13180 container or in a location which a reasonable person would believe to be secure or (2) carries the firearm on his person or within such close proximity thereto that he can readily retrieve and use it as if he carried it on his person. For the purposes of this section, "minor" means any person under the age of sixteen years.
This statute indicates that it is permissible to have a loaded firearm in the vicinity of a minor provided that the weapon is locked or within the close proximity of the adult. This statute implicitly suggests that, with supervision, it is not illegal to have loaded weapons in the presence of minors.
We presume that laws are enacted in view of existing relevant statutes and that the legislature intended them to be read together so as to constitute one consistent body of law. Dept. ofAdministrative Services v. Employees' Review Board,
It is an often stated proposition that in construing a statute, common sense must be used, and courts will assume that the legislature intended to accomplish a reasonable and rational result. Stoni v. Wasicki,
This court holds that it would not be consistent with the legislative scheme, nor would it be consistent with common sense to hold that a father commits the crime of Risk of Injury to a Minor when he permits his son, under the father's supervision and control, to be in the mere presence of otherwise legal weapons. This section of the statutes was designed to proscribe two general types of behavior likely to injure physically or to impair the morals of a minor under sixteen years of age, neither of these proscribed activities has occurred under the facts presented by this case. The defendant's Motion to Dismiss this charge is granted. CT Page 13181
5. Is there sufficient evidence to support the bringing of acharge of Failure to Store Loaded Firearm Pursuant to GeneralStatutes
The information in this matter charges the defendant with a violation of General Statutes §
Foley, J.
United States v. Jan W. Jackson , 652 F.2d 244 ( 1981 )
Proctor v. United States , 177 F.2d 656 ( 1949 )
Stoni v. Wasicki , 179 Conn. 372 ( 1979 )
State v. Coulombe , 143 Conn. 604 ( 1956 )
State v. Dennis , 150 Conn. 245 ( 1963 )
State v. Silver , 139 Conn. 234 ( 1952 )
State v. Johnston , 207 La. 161 ( 1944 )
State v. Ryan , 23 Conn. Super. Ct. 425 ( 1962 )
Matter of Rouss , 221 N.Y. 81 ( 1917 )
Terry v. Ohio , 88 S. Ct. 1868 ( 1968 )
Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 98 S. Ct. 330 ( 1977 )