DocketNumber: No. CV 0140152
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 14421
Judges: LEWIS, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 12/26/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
In brief, the plaintiff alleges that on December 31, 1987, the plaintiff and his partner agreed to sell 90% of the common shares of Forum Home Video Corporation (Forum) to Management Company Entertainment Group, Inc. (MCEG). In return, the plaintiff received a new issue of 200 preferred shares of Forum, the option to purchase 210,000 shares of common stock in MCEG, and the right to put his preferred shares to MCEG at a future date. On December 31, 1988, the plaintiff alleges that he entered into a second written agreement with MCEG pursuant to which MCEG agreed to purchase controlling interest in eleven companies known as the Pickwick Companies that were owned by the plaintiff, for consideration of $10 million and other promises. The plaintiff further alleges that MCEG transferred all of Forum's business and assets into MCEG's subsidiary, Virgin Vision Ltd. thus rendering Forum a dormant, non-operating entity and causing MCEG and Forum to breach their agreements with the plaintiff.
The plaintiff alleges that in 1989 CIC issued a "Directors and Officers Liability and Company Reimbursement Policy # DO-012679" to MCEG for the period from August 1, 1989, to January 31, 1989, which provided that CIC would pay for losses incurred by the directors and officers of MCEG in connection with claims made against them for specific wrongful acts that were first made during the policy period. The plaintiff claims that on or about July 6, 1990, within the policy period, he made a claim against the officers and directors in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff alleges that instead of settling his claims against the directors and officers of MCEG, CIC and CIGNA filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court in California where MCEG had filed a bankruptcy action in order to enjoin him from pursuing his claims.
The plaintiff further alleges that in April 1992, CIC and CIGNA commenced an action in California Superior Court seeking a; judgment declaring that the policy was void from its inception, and that he was not provided with notice of this action until one year later. The plaintiff alleges that CIC, CIGNA, MCEG and the defendants have "intentionally, deliberately and maliciously CT Page 14423 conspired to rescind the Policy with the intent of preventing the plaintiff from ever recovering any of the proceeds of said Policy." (Amended Complaint, ¶ 22.)
The plaintiff further alleges that in August 1992, he commenced an action against CIGNA and CIC in Federal District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiff alleges that at the court-ordered settlement conferences, the defendants, by counsel, continued to act in bad faith by making misrepresentations, as well as by having the plaintiff stalked by a former United States Secret Service agent employed by CIGNA and hired by the defendants. The plaintiff claims that since he commenced the federal action in Connecticut, he has not been allowed to propose a resolution at the annual stockholders meeting of CIGNA, even though he was a shareholder at the time and substantially complied with the requirements for introducing a resolution.
Finally, the plaintiff alleges that "[a]s a result of the complete domination and control of CIGNA and CIC by these defendants, CIGNA and CIC have no separate mind, will or existence of their own. Moreover, there is such a unity of interest between the defendants and CIGNA and CIC that it would defeat both equity and justice to recognize the fiction of separate identifies between the defendants and CIGNA and CIC. Accordingly, the corporate structure or `veil' of CIGNA and CIC should be disregarded and these defendants, who control the finances and business practices of CIGNA and CIC, should be held liable for all of the damages suffered by the plaintiff on account of the conduct of CIGNA and CIC alleged herein." (Amended complaint, ¶ 26(a).)
Based upon these allegations, the plaintiff has asserted claims for: violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA); tortious breach of contract; violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA); civil conspiracy; common law bad faith; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress; violation of the plaintiff's civil rights; and breach of fiduciary duty.
The defendants have filed a motion (#120) to strike the amended complaint on three grounds: the plaintiff has still failed to allege any facts sufficient to pierce the corporate veil; the plaintiff's claims are premised on an alleged duty of CIC as insurer to settle Mr. Weinberg's underlying claims against CIC's insureds, but there is no such duty, particularly in light of the dismissal of the plaintiff's underlying claim against CIC's CT Page 14424 insureds and consequently there is no duty owed by the parent company CIGNA; and each of the nine counts, standing alone, is, legally insufficient to state a claim.
On October 18, 1995, the defendants filed a supplemental memorandum apprising the court that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had affirmed the prior dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against CIC and CIGNA.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to `contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff." Novametrix Medical Systems, Inc. v.BOC Group, Inc.,
"To hold a corporate officer personally liable for wrongdoing, there must be a sufficient factual basis for a court to pierce the corporate veil." United Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. ProgressBuilders, Inc.,
The defendants argue that in the amended complaint the plaintiff added a paragraph to the original complaint in an effort to establish the requisite domination and control, but succeeded only in alleging duties and responsibilities that officers and shareholders normally owe to a corporation. The defendants argue that the allegations fall far short of alleging complete domination and control. The plaintiff counters that the additional allegations are sufficient to demonstrate the requisite control.
"The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil . . . is a tool employed by judges to hold those in control of a corporate CT Page 14425 enterprise liable for the enterprise's obligations where the corporate machinery has broken down, or where corporate practice offends one's sense of justice, as when the enterprise is grossly undercapitalized for the risks encountered." S. Cross, Connecticut Corporation Law and Practice, § 3.9. In order to pierce the corporate veil under the instrumentality theory, the plaintiff must demonstrate the following: "(1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) that such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest, or unjust act in contravention of plaintiff's legal rights; and (3) that the aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Campisano v. Nardi,
The plaintiff's additional allegations charge that the defendants had control over the following: financial statements and CIGNA's annual reports; accounting policies, controls and public reports; audits and auditors and auditing standards; legal and ethical standards for CIGNA and CIC; capital resources of CIGNA; 500, 167 shares of CIGNA stock; premiums and fees for products; amounts required to be kept in reserve by CIGNA and CIC to pay claims and for litigation and public disclosure about litigation. (Amended Complaint, ¶ 26(b)1-11.)
The plaintiff is alleging that CIGNA and CIC failed to settle his claims, that they have rescinded the policy to his detriment, and they have lied and misrepresented facts to him and the courts regarding these matters. As to the first prong of the instrumentality test, the plaintiff has alleged that the defendants exercise control over a number of matters. None of the matters over which the defendants allegedly exercise control relate to the transaction at issue, nor do the allegations suggest complete domination by the defendants over the corporation. The only allegations relevant to the suit are the allegations that the defendants set aside reserve amounts to pay claims and judgments and represent to the public their opinion as to whether any pending judgments will materially affect the value of the company. (Amended complaint, ¶ 26(b)
The second prong requires allegations that the control alleged was used to perpetrate the wrongdoing. Since there is no control alleged in regard to the transaction at issue, there is no allegation of how the directors' and shareholders' duties and responsibilities contributed to the harm to the plaintiff. The last prong, causation, is likewise insufficient to meet this requirement. There must be a link between the control exercised by the defendants and the harm alleged.
The plaintiff has also attempted to name the defendants personally because of wrongful and tortious conduct. In this court's previous ruling, Judge Karazin held "[i]n the present case, the plaintiff's complaint contains allegations with regard to actions and conduct of CIGNA and CIC, and not the action or conduct of the individual defendants." The only action that the plaintiff attributes to the defendants directly in his amended complaint is the following: "on information and belief, these defendants are directly responsible for the hiring by CIGNA of individuals to follow and intimidate the plaintiff as herein alleged." (Amended Complaint, ¶ 26(b) 14.) The plaintiff alleges harassment in ¶ 24, claiming that CIGNA and CIC had the plaintiff stalked and followed' by car. The plaintiff subsequently incorporates this allegation into all the counts.
"[A]n officer of a corporation does not incur personal liability for its torts merely because of his official position. Where, however, an agent or officer commits or participates in the commission of a tort, whether or not he acts on behalf of his principal or corporation, he is liable to third persons injured thereby." Scribner v. O'Brien, Inc.,
The first count alleges a violation of General statutes §
Mr. Weinberg's second and fifth counts allege tortious breach of contract and violation of a common law duty of good faith. In, his complaint, the plaintiff claims that he is a third party beneficiary of the policy and there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing running to him. He alleges that the contract was breached and the defendants have not dealt with him in good faith. The defendants argue that the insurer' s duty is to the insured, not the insured's adversary and that Connecticut courts have repeatedly held that a third-party claimant is not entitled to sue an insurer for alleged refusal to settle the third party' s claim.
"A claimant has no direct cause of action against an insurance company of the tortfeasor. The insurance company has the obligations to defend its insureds and to pay damages which the insured owes to the plaintiff when there is a judgment against the defendant. The cause of action claimed by the plaintiff would interfere with the insurance company's right and duty to defend its CT Page 14428 insured. The plaintiff should not be allowed to short circuit this process by claiming that the insurer unfairly failed to settle an unliquidated claim (as opposed to an existing judgment) against the insured." Richards v. Deaton, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. 309417 (March 11, 1993, Fuller, J.,
"In every insurance contract there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." L.F. Pace and Sons Inc. v.Traveler's Indemnity Co.,
The plaintiff's fourth count alleges civil conspiracy by the defendants to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining any proceeds of the Policy to which he is lawfully entitled." (Complaint, ¶ 42). A cause of action for conspiracy to commit a tort exists in Connecticut. See Talit v. Peterson,
Counts six and seven allege intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress in that the defendants put the plaintiff and his family in fear of their safety and deprived the plaintiff of the proceeds from the policy. For intentional infliction of emotional distress the defendant must allege that "1. the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress, or knew or should have known that emotional distress was a likely result of his or her conduct; 2. the conduct was extreme and outrageous; 3. the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's distress; 4. the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe." Petyanv. Ellis,
To state a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must allege that "a defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, and from the facts known to it, should have realized that the distress, if it were caused might result in illness or bodily harm." Montinieri v. Southern New England Telephone Co.,
CT Page 14430
The plaintiff's eighth count, civil rights violation, rests on the alleged pursuit of him and his family by the guards. "To establish a claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, the two essential elements which the plaintiff must allege are' (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States'" Parrat v. Taylor,
In the ninth count, the plaintiff alleges breach of the fiduciary duty owed to minority shareholders by directors, officers and majority shareholders. "If the controlling majority, stockholder seeks to injure the minority stockholder though the means of looting the corporation or so wrecking it that the minority stockholder would get nothing out of his assets, the claim resulting therefrom is sufficient to constitute an individual action." Davis v. Vito,
In conclusion, the motion to strike the amended complaint in its entirety is granted.
So Ordered.
Dated at Stamford, Connecticut, this 26th day of December, 1995.
William B. Lewis, Judge