DocketNumber: No. CV95-0129471S
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 4441
Judges: ESPINOSA, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 4/14/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Mr. Giglio and Villa agreed that Mr. Giglio would repair the roofs on buildings 4 through 8 "including all connectors, excluding the main entrance of building #2, consisting of applying patches, reconstructing drainage, installation of flashing and metal edges at the rate of $45.00 per hour per person." (Complaint, count two, ¶ 3). Mr. Giglio began the roof repairs on March 21, 1994 and completed the project on April 10, 1994. Mr. Giglio presented Villa with a bill on April 20, 1994, in the amount of $19,600, which Villa has not paid. CT Page 4442
On January 23, 1998, Villa filed a motion for summary judgment on count two of Mr. Giglio's complaint on the ground that the contract was unenforceable because it did not comply with General Statutes §§
Discussion
With respect to motions for summary judgment, practice Book section 17-49 provides that "[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book §
Villa contends that any agreement between it and the plaintiff was oral and, therefore, unenforceable because it did not comply with the provisions of the Home Improvement Act, General Statutes §§
"We must presume, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, that the legislature intended the statute [the Home Improvement Act] to be interpreted exactly as it is written; that is, [n]o home improvement contract shall be valid unless it is in writing.'" Caulkins v. Petrilllo,
Mr. Giglio does not dispute that the parties' contract is subject to the Home Improvement Act. Mr. Giglio, asserts however, that the parties did have a written contract that substantially complied with the requirements of the Home Improvement Act. Mr. Giglio appended a document entitled "Proposal" to his Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated January 27, 1998, in support of his claim that the parties had a written agreement. That "Proposal," however, on its face, is not the same contract that is in issue in count two of Mr. Giglio's complaint. In count two, Mr. Giglio gives the following description of the contract in dispute:
The Plaintiff, Frank Giglio, and the defendant, Villa Sol D'Or Condominium Association, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby the plaintiff would repair roofs on building 4 through 8, including all connectors, excluding the main entrance of building #2, consisting of applying patches, reconstructing drainage, installation of flashing and metal edges at the rate of $45.00 per hour per person. (Complaint, ¶ 3).
The Plaintiff, Frank Giglio, presented a bill to the Defendant, Villa Sol D'Or Condominium Association, Inc., on April 20, 1994 for materials, labor and tax in the amount of $19,600.00. (Complaint, ¶ 5).
In contrast, the "Proposal" dated December 24, 1993 and submitted by Mr. Giglio as evidence of the agreement between the parties in issue in count two states the following:
We hereby propose to furnish all the material and perform all the labor necessary for the completion of Installation of approx. 18,000sq. ft. of Bird Weather Wood 25 year warrantee designer shingle. Sections of mansard that have been started will be completed as they erer (sic) started. All other sections will be properly stripped off old roofing materials and new felt and flashings installed before shingle application. All debris from the portion of job completed by me will be properly removed from job site and disposed CT Page 4444 of. $28,9000 plus tax.
While both agreements involve roof repairs and the installation of flashings, the other work called for is different. Moreover, the "Proposal" does not describe which buildings' roofs were to be repaired. The agreement described in count two, however, specifically states that roof repair work was to be performed on buildings #4 through #8. Finally, the "Proposal" contains the total cost of the work, while the contract described in count two merely states that the cost will be $45.00 per hour per person.3
Additionally, Mr. Giglio did not plead this "Proposal" with his complaint as evidence of the contract. Instead, Mr. Giglio submitted a copy of the bill for repairs made on building #4 through #8. Also, in Mr. Giglio's response to Villa's interrogatories, he stated that the contract in issue in count two, paragraph three of his complaint was an oral agreement. (Affidavit of James Gulalo, December 30, 1997, Exhibit A "Answer to Defendant's Interrogatories").
Moreover, Mr. Giglio's contention to the contrary notwithstanding, this "Proposal" does not comply with the Home Improvement Act either. If the allegations in count two of Mr. Giglio's complaint are part of this "Proposal", then the "Proposal" does not contain the entire agreement between the parties. It does not contain the date of the transaction. It does not contain a notice of the owner's cancellation rights in accordance with the provision of chapter 740. Additionally, it does not contain a starting and a completion date. In short, this "Proposal" only complies with four of the eight requirements of the Act. Accordingly, it is invalid and unenforceable against Villa.
In conclusion, Mr. Giglio has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact in his supporting documents that the parties' agreement in count two was in writing and complied with the Home Improvement Act. Villa, therefore, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Villa's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.
Dated at Waterbury, Connecticut this 14th day of April, 1998.
BY THE COURT, CT Page 4445
ESPINOSA, J.