DocketNumber: No. 373314
Citation Numbers: 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 1025
Judges: HENNESSEY, JUDGE
Filed Date: 1/6/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
Plaintiff Robert Namnoum, a tenured teacher employed by the Granby Board of Education ("Board"), brings this action against the defendant Board and its Superintendent of Schools, defendant, Ralph Wallace. Plaintiff's second amended complaint' is in three counts. The first count alleges that plaintiff's five day suspension without pay deprived him of his federal constitutional right to due process of law in violation of
In their revised answer to the second amended complaint, defendants deny the allegations and also set forth four special defenses. In response to defendants' special defenses, plaintiff has filed the present motion to strike. Pursuant to Practice Book 155, plaintiff has filed a memorandum of law in support of the pending motion and defendants have filed an opposing memorandum of law.
It should be noted that at oral argument on October 7, 1991, the court, Hennessey, J., struck defendants' first special defense, and the defendants abandoned the second special defense. In the third special defense, which applies to plaintiff's second and third counts, the defendants claim governmental immunity pursuant to General Statutes
"The function of a motion to strike is to challenge the legal sufficiency of the allegations as set forth in the pleadings." Ferryman v. Groton,
While "[a] municipality itself was generally immune from liability for its tortious acts at common law; Ryszkiewicz v New Britain,
The defendants assert in their third special defense, which is directed to counts two and three of the plaintiff's complaint, that in suspending the plaintiff, they acted in good faith in a discretionary capacity and are therefore immune from liability. In their memorandum of law in opposition to the plaintiff's motion to strike, the defendants contend that the immunity that they claim emanates from the common law and General Statutes
(2) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by . . . (B) negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function or the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.
The defendants argue that they have the authority to maintain the school system and control its employees pursuant to General CT Page 1027 Statutes
The plaintiff moves to strike the defendants' third special defense on the ground that it is not a legally sufficient defense "because governmental immunity may not be asserted by a municipality for the performance of discretionary acts by a municipality where, as here, an individual, not a public, duty was breached." Plaintiff argues that his suspension without a prior hearing before the defendant Board involved a duty owed to him rather than an obligation to the public in general.
The plaintiff has not alleged in his complaint any negligence on the part of the defendants. The plaintiff appears to allege in count two that his suspension by defendant Wallace, without a prior hearing before the Board, was pursuant to a policy/decision or the Board, which policy violated his rights to due process under article
Section
The defendants' third special defense also addresses the plaintiff's allegation in count three that his suspension was in violation of General Statutes
Plaintiff argues that defendants' fourth special defense of collateral estoppel should be stricken because arbitration awards are without preclusive effect in actions brought under
Because defendants' fourth special defense is a defense only to plaintiff's statutory claim, and plaintiff's arguments do not address the sufficiency of the collateral estoppel defense to its statutory claim, plaintiff has not provided a ground to strike the defendants' fourth special defense. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' fourth special defense is denied.
SUMMARY
The court grants plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' third special defense as it applies to plaintiff's second count. The court grants plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' third special defense of governmental immunity as it applies to plaintiff's third count.
The court grants the motion to strike defendants' fourth special defense as it applies to plaintiff's first and second counts. The court denies plaintiff's motion as it applies to plaintiff's third count.
M. HENNESSEY, JUDGE