DocketNumber: No. CV 00-0800688 S, CV 00-0598006 S
Citation Numbers: 2003 Conn. Super. Ct. 2568, 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 176
Judges: RITTENBAND, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
Filed Date: 2/24/2003
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
Shortly after the accident, Samuelrich notified Allstate of the injuries both had sustained. Allstate requested a copy of the police accident report which, according to Cromblehome's affidavit, was hand delivered to Allstate. Samuelrich and Cromblehome then brought suit against Krasinski. However, Krasinski had bodily injury liability insurance limits of $20,000 per person, $40,000 per accident insured by the Windsor Insurance Group.
According to the plaintiffs' affidavits Allstate advised Samuelrich that it had documented the plaintiff's claims, the accident, the injuries and the property damage in their file but told Samuelrich that if the plaintiffs intended to make any claims for either property damages and/or personal injuries they would have to first pursue such claims against the tortfeasor, Krasinski, before they could make any claim against Allstate. Plaintiffs then filed suit for personal injuries against Krasinski on or about November 4, 1998. After Samuelrich exhausted Krasinski's policy limits on or about March 20, 2000 his attorney filed an underinsured motorist complaint against Allstate on or about April 13, 2000. After Cromblehome exhausted Krasinski's policy limits on or about July 6, 2000, his attorney filed an underinsured motorist complaint CT Page 2569 against Allstate on or about July 28, 2000. On October 10, 2002 both claims were consolidated upon Allstate's motion.
Allstate, on January 2, 2003 filed a motion for summary judgment against both plaintiffs under date of December 23, 2002. The Motion claims that the claims are barred by the statute of limitations. It is true that the Allstate policy insuring the plaintiffs states that the suit must be brought within two years of the date of accident. However, this overlooks CGS §
(g)(1) No insurance company doing business in this state may limit the time within which any suit may be brought against it . . . on the uninsured or underinsured motorist provisions of an automobile liability insurance policy to a period of less than three years from the date of accident provided, in the case of an underinsured motorist claim theinsured may toll any applicable limitation period (A) by notifying suchinsurer prior to the expiration of the applicable limitation period, inwriting, of any claim which the insured may have for underinsuredmotorist benefits and (B) by commencing suit . . . not more thanone-hundred and eighty days from the date of exhaustion of the limits ofliability under all automobile bodily injury liability bonds orautomobile insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident bysettlements or final judgments after any appeals.
(Emphasis added.)
At oral argument before this Court, Allstate conceded that the statute of three years had been tolled in that each suit was initiated within the 180-day period from the date of exhaustion of the limits of Krasinski's liability policy. Accordingly, this issue is no longer before the Court.
What Allstate did not concede and brought up in oral argument, but not in writing, is that the notification to Allstate was in writing. Allstate's claim is that the notification was not in writing, and, therefore, the aforementioned section of the statute permitting a tolling of the limitation period is not applicable to the plaintiffs' claims.
A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Dougherty v. Graham,
In determining whether a genuine factual issue exists, the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
There is little question that the underinsured motorist coverage statute is remedial in purpose and that it is to protect and make whole a person injured at the hands of an uninsured/underinsured motorist.American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco,
This Court stated during oral argument that it believed as a matter of law that the notifying of Allstate verbally and in person by the plaintiffs with submission at the request of Allstate of the police accident report is sufficient to qualify under the statute as notification in writing. Further, there is the alleged statement by Allstate that it had documented the claims, the accident and the injuries in their file but told the plaintiffs that if they intended to make any claims for property damage and/or personal injuries, they would have to first pursue such claims against Krasinski before they could make any claim against Allstate. These statements are included in the affidavits of one or more of the plaintiffs. Counsel for Allstate vigorously denied CT Page 2571 at the oral hearing that Allstate or any representative thereof had ever made that statement. This is, of course, an issue of fact, which cannot be decided by summary judgment. The Court indicated to defense counsel that it was prepared to deny the motion for summary judgment because of this issue of fact which was in dispute, but gave defense counsel time to submit case law that would contradict this potential finding. Allstate, through its counsel, submitted to this Court Aetna Life CasualtyCo. v. Braccidiferro,
Fn. 8. According to the statute, notification must be in writing and alert the insurer of the underinsured motorist claim. Therefore, the fact that Aetna may have been the no-fault insurance carrier does not establish the proper notification.
There is no evidence that in the case at bar the subject insurance policy provided for no-fault benefits. This footnote appears to be dictum and not relevant to Aetna Life Casualty Co. v. Braccidiferro,supra. The issue in that case was primarily whether
In Velez v. Estey, et al., an unpublished Superior Court decision (
As stated above, this is a remedial statute, and it is the duty of the Court to construe it liberally in favor of the underinsured motorist it was designed to protect. The Court would also note that by submission of the police report Allstate was put on notice of all the facts concerning the accident and suffered no prejudice. It is clear from the report that the fault for the accident was Krasinski traveling westbound on Route 190 into Route 190 in the eastbound lane. Clearly Krasinski was liable so plaintiffs did not submit notice to Allstate concerning their liability coverage. They did not have no-fault benefits, and under the circumstances and based upon the alleged statement of Allstate, Allstate CT Page 2572 assumed or should have assumed that it was a claim for underinsured or uninsured benefits. Therefore, Allstate had actual notice.
In any event, the Court's original position during the oral hearing has not been changed by the cases submitted by the defendant.
The motions for summary judgment both dated December 23, 2002 are DENIED.
Rittenband, JTR CT Page 2577
fed-sec-l-rep-p-94847-national-union-fire-insurance-company-of , 892 F.2d 199 ( 1989 )
Bartha v. Waterbury House Wrecking Co. , 190 Conn. 8 ( 1983 )
Dougherty v. Graham , 161 Conn. 248 ( 1971 )
Plouffe v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad , 160 Conn. 482 ( 1971 )
Harvey v. Travelers Indemnity Co. , 188 Conn. 245 ( 1982 )