DocketNumber: No. FA96-0153327S
Citation Numbers: 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 2082
Judges: TIERNEY, J.
Filed Date: 3/10/1997
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The plaintiff wife and the defendant husband were married in Norwalk, Connecticut on July 22, 1994. The parties have satisfied the residency requirements. There were no minor children issue of the marriage. The evidence clearly indicates that the marriage of the parties has broken down irretrievably.
The wife filed a pro se complaint dated June 26, 1996 seeking a decree dissolving the marriage. Both parties are employed. Their CT Page 2083 financial circumstances are similar. The parties have been living separate and apart since December of 1995. There were a number of trial separations prior to that date. Having heard the evidence, the court finds that the marriage of the parties has broken down irretrievably and a decree dissolving the marriage will enter accordingly.
The husband appearing pro se filed a cross complaint dated October 26, 1996 seeking an annulment of the marriage. He has failed to prove the statutory requirements of annulment. C.G.S.§
The principal issue of this case has to do with the wife's request for a permanent restraining order. The court finds the following facts. The husband has been under psychiatric care for some period of time and is currently taking medication. The husband has engaged in threatening and bizarre actions toward the wife. In February 1995, the wife came home and shortly after her arrival the police arrived with guns drawn, saying "Drop the weapon." The wife had no weapon. The husband had called the police falsely complaining that it was her intention to kill him. As a result of this incident the husband was arrested. The wife obtained her first order of protection from the Superior Court at the arraignment.
The parties later attempted to reconcile based upon the promises of the defendant that he would not commit any such acts. The violent and bizarre acts continued. On December 19, 1995, the husband had an ex parte restraining order served on the wife, requiring the wife to immediately vacate the marital home. She packed up her clothes, took her personal property and vacated the house. She never returned to live with the husband. Fourteen days later, the parties went to court and the husband withdrew the restraining order.
The husband has been arrested on three separate occasions for CT Page 2084 his violent, threatening and bizarre behavior. On each occasion the Superior Court at the criminal arraignment entered restraining orders in favor of the wife.
On June 26, 1996 the plaintiff applied for a civil restraining order against the defendant in accordance with C.G.S. §
In the meantime the husband had resolved his criminal matters. He was convicted of a number of criminal charges for which the wife had him arrested. As a result of these convictions he was placed on probation. The conditions of probation included a standard restraining order as per C.G.S. §
The husband expressed unusual and bizarre behavior during the trial. He represented himself pro se. The wife testified that she was still in fear of him. She feared that there would be personal violence to her after the restraining order ceased in January of 1998. The court found her testimony credible. She expressed visible signs of fear at trial.
The court, after considering the standards of C.G.S. §
Permanent Restraining Order
This court believes that there are four authorities for the court to entertain a permanent restraining order based upon the facts and circumstances of this case: 1)
In 1996, the legislature provided for standing criminal restraining orders issued on a permanent basis on the following standards: "If the court is of the opinion that the history and character and the nature and circumstances of the criminal conduct of such offender indicate that a standing criminal restraining order will best serve the interest of the victim and the public, issue a standing criminal restraining order which shall remain in effect until modified or revoked by the court for good cause shown."
The authority for the entry of a civil restraining order is C.G.S. §
The Superior Court has the authority to enter permanent injunctions. C.G.S. §
In general, for a plaintiff to prevail in an injunction action the plaintiff must show (1) that there is no adequate remedy at law and (2) the plaintiff would be subject to imminent and irreparable damage. Pet v. Department of Health Services,
For a legal remedy to be adequate, it must be "specific and adapted to securing the relief conveniently, effectively and completely." Burchett v. Roncari,
Irreparable connotes the inability to make good or to restore.Murray v. Egan,
There must also exist a real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged, that is, a substantial likelihood of immediate, irreparable injury. It is also clear that past conduct may be considered in determining at the time of trial the probability of future conduct warranting injunctive relief.Labbadia v. Bailey,
Such an injunction was ordered in a post judgment dissolution matter between a former husband and wife. The injunction was made permanent even though C.G.S. §
Lastly, the court has inherent powers to enter appropriate orders in family cases. "Because every family situation is unique, the trial court drafting a dissolution decree has wide discretion to make suitable orders to fit the circumstances."Passamano v. Passamano,
The plaintiff's claims for relief state, "such other relief as the court deems appropriate." This request is sufficiently broad for the trial court to enter a lump sum award despite the fact that the claim for relief did not contain such a request nor recite the statutory authority for the property order. Lord v. Lord,
"We have often stated that the power to act equitably is the keystone to the court's ability to fashion relief in the infinite variety of circumstances that arise out of the dissolution of a marriage. Tessitore v. Tessitore,
31 Conn. App. 40 ,45 ,623 A.2d 496 (1993). These equitable powers give the court the authority to consider all the circumstances that may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution of the marital dispute. Sands v. Sands,188 Conn. 98 ,105 ,448 A.2d 822 (1982), cert. denied,459 U.S. 1148 ,103 S. Ct. 792 ,74 L. Ed. 2d 997 (1983)". Lord v. Lord, supra 374.
This court, for the four reasons stated above, has the authority CT Page 2088 to order a permanent restraining order in this dissolution matter under the facts found. The court enters the following restraining orders:
"The defendant, Thomas X. Farmer, is restrained from 1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of Lora G. Allshouse; 2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking Lora G. Allshouse or 3) entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of Lora G. Allshouse."
"This order shall remain in effect until modified or revoked by the court for good cause shown."
The order is made effective February 27, 1997.
The defendant was notified by this court on the record on February 27, 1997 of this order. In accordance with section 1 of
The clerk was instructed to serve a certified copy of this order upon the defendant as well as upon the police departments of Stamford, CT, Norwalk, CT and Bridgeport, CT within forty-eight hours of its February 27, 1997 issuance.
This decision was rendered from the bench in open court on February 27, 1997 and thus is effective February 27, 1997.
Tierney, J.
Labbadia v. Bailey , 152 Conn. 187 ( 1964 )
Murray v. Egan , 28 Conn. Super. Ct. 204 ( 1969 )
Stoner v. Stoner , 163 Conn. 345 ( 1972 )
Yontef v. Yontef , 185 Conn. 275 ( 1981 )
City of New London v. Perkins , 87 Conn. 229 ( 1913 )
Gorham v. City of New Haven , 82 Conn. 153 ( 1909 )
LaCroix v. LaCroix , 189 Conn. 685 ( 1983 )
Patry v. Board of Trustees , 190 Conn. 460 ( 1983 )
Pasquariello v. Pasquariello , 168 Conn. 579 ( 1975 )
Burchett v. Roncari , 181 Conn. 125 ( 1980 )
Sands v. Sands , 188 Conn. 98 ( 1982 )