DocketNumber: No. CV94 31 39 02 S
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 369
Judges: COCCO, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 1/25/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
In an amended complaint filed on September 16, 1994, the plaintiffs allege that on January 28, 1993, they entered into a written contract to purchase the defendants' property located in Trumbull, along with a new home that Michael Montanaro was constructing on the property. The plaintiffs allege that Michael Montanaro warranted that all construction would be performed in a good and workmanlike manner, and that he would correct any defects in the workmanship and materials for a period of one year from the closing date (February 16, 1993). The plaintiffs allege that certain work performed and materials used were defective, and that Michael Montanaro breached his promise to repair these defects. The plaintiffs further allege that after they commenced the present action and obtained a prejudgment attachment of Michael Montanaro's real property (located in Easton), he fraudulently conveyed his interest in the property to Emily Montanaro.
Counts one and three of the amended complaint sound in breach of contract. In count two, the plaintiffs allege that Michael Montanaro violated General Statutes §
On October 24, 1994, the defendants filed a motion to strike count six of the amended complaint (#115), on the ground that the allegations against Emily Montanaro do not constitute a legally sufficient CUTPA claim. More specifically, the defendants contend CT Page 371 that Michael Montanaro's actions in transferring his interest in real property to Emily Montanaro do not constitute "trade" or "commerce" as defined in CUTPA. On November 10, 1994, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants' motion is procedurally improper because the defendants are attempting to strike individual paragraphs instead of the entire count.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) NovametrixMedical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc.,
A review of count six reveals that the plaintiffs base their CUTPA claim on Michael Montanaro's alleged failure to correct defects in the workmanship and materials used to construct the plaintiffs' house, as well as on his alleged violation of General Statutes §
The court reasons that even if the defendants' argument is a correct statement of the substantive law with respect to CUTPA, their motion to strike is procedurally improper. "A motion to strike a single paragraph is technically improper when the paragraph does not purport to state a cause of action." Michaud v.St. Mary's Hospital,
In the present case, the plaintiffs are not attempting to state a cause of action in paragraphs 12 through 17 of count six. Rather, the plaintiffs' CUTPA claim is dependent upon the facts alleged in all of paragraphs contained in count six. Since paragraphs 12 through 17 contain allegations of misconduct on the part of both Michael and Emily Montanaro, they cannot be stricken with respect to only Emily Montanaro. Therefore, the court denies the defendants' motion to strike count six of the amended complaint.
COCCO, JUDGE