DocketNumber: No. CV89 0261424 S
Citation Numbers: 1991 Conn. Super. Ct. 10292
Judges: SPEAR, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 12/19/1991
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
On the date of the alleged slip and fall, the premises located at 925 Housatonic Avenue in Bridgeport were in the possession of the State of Connecticut ("State" or "Tenant") by virtue of a lease signed by it and defendant D'Addario Construction Company Partnership ("D'Addario" or "Landlord").1 the owner of said premises. By the terms of the lease, the tenancy, which had commenced on September 5, 1986, was to continue for a period of five years. (Defendant's exhibit C.) Pursuant to the lease, D'Addario was to provide for the building maintenance and on-site, paved, lighted parking facilities, and the State was to provide for the groundskeeping and snow and ice removal. (Lease, paragraph 24.)
The issue is whether an employee of a tenant has a cause of action against the landlord under the "public use" doctrine for injuries sustained in a fall on ice on the demised premises which occurred one year and two months after commencement of the tenancy.
Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it was not in exclusive possession and control of the premises on the date of the alleged fall, nor was defendant responsible for snow and ice removal in the parking lot where the alleged injury occurred. In support of its motion defendant submits its brief, a sworn affidavit from David D'Addario, a copy of the lease and a copy of a contract between the State and one Gwendolyn B. O'Hara for snowplowing, sanding and salting of all parking areas, driveways, walkways and steps at the demised premises.
Plaintiff has submitted a brief in opposition to the motion. Although she concedes that a landlord is not generally responsible for injuries which occur on demised premises, she claims that the public use exception to that rule applies under the above facts. She submitted one document, an affidavit, reciting that:
1. I am over the age of eighteen and believe in the obligation of an oath.
2. On the day of the accident, after I fell, the area in question was sanded by trucks of D'Addario.
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment CT Page 10294 as a matter of law. Conn. Practice Bk. 384; Connecticut National Bank v. Great Neck Development Co.,
Plaintiff in the instant action is seeking damages against the Landlord for injuries sustained because of an alleged dangerous condition on the Landlord's property. The common law of the State of Connecticut has generally upheld the proposition that the possession and control of land, not its ownership, determine liability for any injuries incurred because of defects on the land. See Farlow v. Andrews Corp.,
[A] landowner, at least where he has made no agreement to repair, is not liable for injuries due to defective conditions arising upon the leased premises during the tenancy; he has surrendered possession and control of them to the tenant and has no right to enter to abate the conditions; and it is the tenant who is liable for injury arising from them.
Hahn v. Musante, Berman Steinberg Co., Inc.,
Plaintiff's affidavit, recited above, does not create an issue of material fact on the issue of possession and control. Connecticut Practice Book 381 provides that:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
This two sentence affidavit falls far short of those requirements. See Evans Product Company v. Clinton Building Supply, Inc.,
An exception to the general rule stated above, and relied upon by plaintiff herein, is the "public use" doctrine which was first stated in Webel v. Yale University,
Using the same rationale as Webel to impose liability, the court in Hahn v. Musante, Berman Steinberg Co., Inc., extended the public use doctrine to situations in which the dangerous condition was created by the landlord during the period of the tenancy, even if there was no dangerous situation at the time the premises were turned over to the tenant. Hahn v. Musante, Berman Steinberg Co., Inc.,
The public use doctrine as set forth in the cases above does not apply to the facts before the court in this action because the defect in question, namely, the icy condition of the parking lot, did not exist at the commencement of the State's tenancy, nor was the dangerous condition created by the landlord during said tenancy. The parties do not dispute the fact that the injury occurred on November 12, 1987. The evidence presented to the court by defendant indicates that the five-year leasehold began on September 5, 1986. Plaintiff does not dispute that date. In order for the defendant Landlord to be held liable for injuries sustained by virtue of an icy condition, that condition must have existed at the time the premises were put into the possession and control of the Tenant, i.e. on September 5, 1986, or alternatively, the condition must have been created by the defendant at some time subsequent to commencement of the tenancy. Plaintiff makes no allegation and produced no documents to sustain either proposition.
In a case similarly involving a slip and fall on snow and ice on premises used by the public and entirely within the control of the tenant, and where the tenant had the responsibility under the lease to remove snow and ice, Judge McDonald in Romani v. Silverio,
Plaintiff reasons in her brief that the Landlord should be held liable since he knew or should have known that a portion of the demised premises would become covered with snow and ice in the winter months, and, therefore, the icy and slippery condition of the parking lot should be considered a defect in the premises which existed at the time the lease was made. Such reasoning is faulty as the mere presence of snow and ice on some portion of the premises does not necessarily constitute a dangerous condition or defect of the premises. Further, the notice required of a landlord to establish a duty on his part "must be notice of the very defect which occasioned the injury and not merely of conditions naturally productive of CT Page 10297 that defect even though subsequently in fact producing it." Monahan v. Montgomery,
The basis for imposing liability on the landlord is the likelihood of harm to the public when the public is allowed to enter the demised premises before the defect is corrected. If, there is no defect , the landlord cannot be held liable. See Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 63 , p. 440 (5th ed. 1984). ("Since the basis of liability is the likelihood that the public will be permitted to enter before the dangerous condition is changed, it is logical that it should be limited to the time within which there is reason to believe that it will remain unaltered)". To rule otherwise would require imposing upon the landlord a duty of continuing inspection which is not warranted under the case law of this State.
Since plaintiff has raised no genuine issues of material fact, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted as a matter of law.
E. EUGENE SPEAR, JUDGE
Kathryn J. Pritchett v. Louis Rosoff , 546 F.2d 463 ( 1976 )
Pollack v. Gampel , 163 Conn. 462 ( 1972 )
Monahan v. Montgomery , 153 Conn. 386 ( 1966 )
Evans Products Co. v. Clinton Building Supply, Inc. , 174 Conn. 512 ( 1978 )
White v. E & F CONSTRUCTION CO. , 151 Conn. 110 ( 1963 )
Hahn v. Musante, Berman Steinberg Co., Inc. , 130 Conn. 441 ( 1943 )
Romani v. Silverio , 26 Conn. Super. Ct. 230 ( 1965 )
Webel v. Yale University , 125 Conn. 515 ( 1939 )
Corrigan v. Antupit , 131 Conn. 71 ( 1944 )