DocketNumber: No. CV89-0368360
Citation Numbers: 1991 Conn. Super. Ct. 1120, 6 Conn. Super. Ct. 436
Judges: SPADA, J.
Filed Date: 2/22/1991
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The plaintiff, Gosford Samuels, an employee of White Oak Corporation. (hereinafter employer) sustained injuries on June 28, 1988, during his employment at a construction site located on Interstate 91. The injuries were caused by the negligent operation of an automobile owned by the defendant, Stanley Stumbers. On May 21, 1990, defendant Stumbers filed a motion to CT Page 1121 cite the employer as a co-defendant, charging that the plaintiff's injuries resulted, in whole or in part, from the employer's negligence.
On June 11, 1990, the court, without memorandum, but citing to Conn. Gen. Stats.
The employer's motion seeks to strike the second count of the amended complaint.
Defendant Stumbers appropriately argues that because the motion to strike eviscerates the court's earlier decision to cite the employer, proper deference and consistency compel a rejection of the instant motion. "Where a matter has previously been ruled upon interlocutorily, the court in a subsequent proceeding in the case may treat that decision as the law of the case, in the absence of some new or overriding circumstance. Further, a judge should hesitate to change his own rulings in a case and should be even more reluctant to overrule those of another judge." Dunn v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 16 C.L.T. 44 (J.D., Hartford-New Britain, September 17, 1990).
The impact of the ruling to cite the employer, in effect, abolishes the statutory immunity to common law negligence prescribed by Connecticut's Workers' Compensation Act, Ch. 568. This court is genuinely reluctant to disagree with a colleague over a prior interlocutory ruling. It is recognized that the orderly process of litigation is threatened by reversals or modifications of interlocutory rulings. Nevertheless, where sincere and professional differences exist on a significant issue of first impression, the trier is obliged to follow his conscience.
Several Superior Court decisions have addressed the issue of named defendants seeking to cite co-defendants pursuant to
Conn. Gen. Stats.
The relevant statutes to be examined are
(1)
"In a negligence action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property occurring on or after October 1, 1987, if the damages are determined to be proximately caused by the negligence of more than one party, each party against whom recovery is allowed shall be liable to the claimant only for his proportionate share of the recoverable economic damages and the recoverable non economic damages, except as provided in subsection (g) of this section: (Emphasis added).
(2)
(a) "An employer shall not be liable to any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out CT Page 1123 of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained, . . . . All rights and claims between employer and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment as aforesaid art abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter. (Emphasis added).
(3)
"Upon motion made by any party or nonparty to a civil action the person named in the party's motion or the nonparty so moving, as the case may be, (l) may be made a party by the court if that person has or claims an interest in the controversy, or any part thereof, adverse to the plaintiff, or (2) shall be made a party by the court if that person is necessary for a complete determination or settlement of any question, involved therein, provided no person who is immune from liability shall be made a defendant in the controversy. (Emphasis added).
Defendant Stumbers argues that notwithstanding
Defendant's argument that an employer's immunity is suspended when the employer is a joint tortfeasor and reinstated when the employer is the sole tortfeasor would surely invite chaos and bizarre results. An employer's immunity cannot pivot precariously on whether a second tortfeasor exists. Such an unfathomable legal formula would render employers hostage to the imaginations of a named defendant.
The cornerstone of Connecticut's Workers' Compensation law is employer immunity to common law negligence claims. The removal of this pillar would without doubt disembowel a near century old policy of protecting employee injuries without regard to fault. CT Page 1124
"The Workers' Compensation Act exists to compensate employees for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment through a guarantee fixed schedule recovery system. Under the statute, the employee surrenders his right to bring a common law action against the employer, thereby limiting the employer's liability to the statutory amount." DeSantis v. Gaudioso,
In DeSantis, although the named defendant was allowed to assert a special defense against the intervening employer so as to reduce the employer's right to reimbursement, this was not deemed a "contribution" from the employer. c.f. Cirrito v. Continental Can Co.,
". . . [W]here a worker's personal injury is covered by the act, statutory compensation is the sole remedy and recovery in common law tort against the employer is barred." Jeff v. Dunlap,
179 Conn. 215 ,217 , (1979). (Citations omitted).
"We have consistently held that the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act operate as a total bar to actions brought by employees against their employers or job related injuries." Sgueglia v. Milne Construction Co.,
The defendant Stumbers understandably seeks to minimize his exposure by gathering additional parties into the circle of liability.
The language in
The language in
"We must presume that the legislature . . . acted in view of existing relevant statutes and with the intention of creating one consistent body of law. . . ." Budkofsky v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
Accordingly, the motion to strike the second count of the amended complaint is granted.
SPADA, J.
Budkofsky v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , 177 Conn. 588 ( 1979 )
Stavola v. Palmer , 136 Conn. 670 ( 1950 )
Desantis v. Gaudioso , 39 Conn. Super. Ct. 222 ( 1983 )
McKinley v. Musshorn , 185 Conn. 616 ( 1981 )
Heffernan v. Slapin , 182 Conn. 40 ( 1980 )