Citation Numbers: 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 7162
Judges: DOWNEY, JUDGE
Filed Date: 7/28/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
This matter concerns a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Gail N. in and to her children, Lisa, Michael and Sara. The petitioner was the children's father, Michael N. In November, 1991, after the hearing on the petition was concluded and trial briefs had been filed by the parties, the petitioner died.
On February 27, 1992, the court on its own motion reopened this matter for the sole purpose of determining the following issues.
(1) Does this cause of action survive the petitioner's demise?
(2) If the answer to question 1 is "yes", does General Statutes
In its order the court set a hearing date of March 5, 1992 and directed the parties to file memoranda of law on the issues cited by March 4th. On March 2nd the attorney for respondent mother requested an extension of time and indicated his willingness to waive the provisions of General Statutes
Memoranda were filed by the children's attorney on April 8 and April 29; by petitioner's attorney on April 23 and April 30; and by the attorney for respondent mother on April 22, April 28 and May 6.
Survival of actions is the rule and not the exception, and the presumption is that every cause or right of action survives CT Page 7164 until tl the contrary is made to appear. Terwilliger v. Terwilliger,
Counsel for the respondent mother concedes that a petition to terminate parental rights is a civil proceeding but that it is a "distinct statutory proceeding which is separate and apart from regular civil proceedings". Counsel lists several of what he perceives as "significant differences" between proceedings to terminate parental rights and other civil proceedings but fails to establish why such differences require the exclusion of petitions to terminate parental rights from the application of General Statutes
Respondent also claims that the provisions of General Statutes
Section 52-999 sets out the matters covered by the statute: "a cause or right of action" (
These sweeping categories are then explicitly limited by
Exclusion (1) is: "Any cause or right of action or. . .any civil action or proceeding the purpose or object of which is defeated or rendered useless by the death of any party thereto." (
The instant action is a petition brought by a father on behalf of his children to terminate the parental rights of their mother. That is its purpose. This purpose or object is not defeated or rendered useless by the death of the petitioner.
Exclusion (2) is: "Any civil action or proceeding whose prosecution or defense depends on the continued existence of the persons who are plaintiffs or defendants." The prosecution or defense of the instant matter does not depend on the continued existence of the petitioner. A petition to terminate parental rights would be rendered moot as to a respondent by the demise of that respondent or by the demise of a child who is the subject of such petition, but is not mooted by the demise of a petitioner. Neither exclusion cited by respondent here is applicable to this case.
JOHN T. DOWNEY, JUDGE