DocketNumber: No. CV 91-0446460S
Citation Numbers: 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 1241
Judges: MICHAEL R. SHELDON, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 2/25/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
I. Failure to Comply with Conn. Practice Book Sections 142-144
The purposes of the simultaneous memorandum and affidavit requirements of Practice Book Section 143 are largely CT Page 1242 self-evident. First, they ensure that both the Court and all adverse parties will receive timely and effective notice of the precise legal and factual nature of the moving party's claims. Second, they guarantee that any jurisdictional challenge which depends materially on non-record facts will be decided on a more reliable factual basis than the unsworn, unsubstantiated averments of the parties in their pleadings. Compliance with both requirements enables each adverse party to decide intelligently whether or not to oppose the motion and, if he does oppose it, to comply with Practice Book Section 143 by filing his own responding memorandum and countering affidavits as to non-record facts at least five days before the motion is heard. It thereby serves both the ends of justice and the interests of judicial economy by ensuring that all legal and factual issues underlying any jurisdictional challenge will be narrowed, joined, and made susceptible to proper resolution at the earliest possible stage of the lawsuit.
In this case the defendant filed no affidavits as to facts not apparent on the record along with her Motion. Instead, having presented neither testimony nor oral argument in support of that Motion, she relies exclusively on the facts described and the arguments set forth in the three-paragraph Memorandum of Law which accompanied her Motion.
As described in her Memorandum, the defendant's claims must fail for two reasons apart from their underlying merits. First, each claim depends materially on non-record facts as to which no supporting affidavit has been filed. Second, her Memorandum is so devoid of legal authority and/or appropriate legal argument as to deprive the Court and opposing counsel of meaningful notice as to the nature of her legal claims. See Boyd v. Booth,
Secondly, based on information and belief, the manner of service of process of the Complaint on the Defendant, Ellen Landino, was insufficient, Defendant moves the Court to dismiss on this basis also.
Here, without even alluding to particular "facts" alleged to support her claim, the defendant simply advances a wholly unsubstantiated legal conclusion. Unsupported either by facts of record or by facts set forth in a proper affidavit accompanying the Motion to Dismiss, this aspect of her Motion must also be denied for want of a factual basis.
Similarly, this claim is utterly unsupported by any legal authority whatsoever, not even vague constitutional references or repealed statutes, as featured in defendant's challenge to personal jurisdiction. Far from guiding the Court and opposing counsel to the gist of her legal arguments, this portion of defendant's Memorandum fails even to identify a legal argument, much less to particularize it or to apply is to the facts of this case. In short, the defendant's submission is a "memorandum" in name only. See Boyd, 3 CSCR at 256. Her failure to comply even superficially with the requirements of Practice Book Section 143 independently requires the denial of her Motion to Dismiss.
In this State it is well settled that a party who fails to contest personal jurisdiction and/or the sufficiency of service of process upon her in the manner prescribed by law thereby waives the right to make such a challenge and consents to the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over her. See generally Practice CT Page 1244 Book Section 144. Since this defendant failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Practice Book Section 143, and thereby deprived the Court both of a proper factual basis on which to decide her claims and of minimum legal argumentation in support thereof, her Motion to Dismiss is denied and she is hereby deemed to have waived her right to present such claims in the future.
II. The Defendant's Substantive Claims are Without Merit
Notwithstanding the defendant's failure to comply with Practice Book Sections 142-144 by her failure to refer to relevant legal and factual authority supporting her position, the plaintiff's brief demonstrates that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant and that the defendant was properly served.
When jurisdiction is based on a long-arm statute, there must be some relationship between the defendant and the state asserting jurisdiction. All that is required is sufficient contact to make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the obligations incurred there.
Wedig v. Brinster,
Upon executing the note, moreover, the defendant agreed to certain Investor Representations which stated in pertinent part that "the undersigned does hereby consent that any such action or proceeding against him may be commenced in any court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue within the State of Connecticut . . ." See Exhibit B, Paragraph 4. It is settled CT Page 1245 that personal jurisdiction may be obtained by consent. U.S. Trust Co. v. Bohart,
MICHAEL R. SHELDON JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT