DocketNumber: No. CV 90 0381340
Citation Numbers: 1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 10511
Judges: HENNESSEY, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 12/6/1993
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
On September 20, 1993, the defendant Board filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's application for a tax appeal on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Practice Book 143. The defendant Board filed a memorandum of law in support of its motion to dismiss. On September 21, 1993, the plaintiff filed a request for leave to amend its citation and recognizance. In response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition on September 27, 1993.
Pursuant to Practice Book 143(1), "a motion to dismiss . . . ``properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.' (Emphasis in original.)" Gurliacci v. Mayer,
"Whenever the absence of [subject matter] jurisdiction is brought to the notice of the court . . . cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Baldwin Piano Organ Company v. Blake,
In its memorandum of law, the defendant Board argues that the court should dismiss the plaintiff's application on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The defendant Board notes that the plaintiff only named the Board in its citation. The defendant Board argues that the Town of West Hartford ("Town") is a necessary party in this action and that the plaintiff failed to name the Town in its citation. According to the defendant Board, the plaintiff's failure to name the Town in its citation deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the defendant Board urges the CT Page 10513 court to grant its motion to dismiss.
In opposition to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argues in its memorandum of law that the failure to name the Town in its citation is a circumstantial defect. The plaintiff contends that one has the right to amend a circumstantial defect in a citation pursuant to General Statutes
General Statutes
[A]ny person . . . claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the board of tax review in any town or city with respect to the assessment list for the assessment year commencing October 1, 1989, October 1, 1990 [or] October 1, 1991 . . . may, within two months from the time of such action, make application, in the nature of an appeal therefrom, to the superior court for the judicial district in which such town or city is situated, which shall be accompanied by a citation to such town or city to appear before said court.
General Statutes
General Statutes
The effect given to . . . a misdescription [in a writ of the party sued] usually depends upon the question whether it is CT Page 10514 interpreted as merely a misnomer or defect in description, or whether it is deemed a substitution or entire change of party; in the former case an amendment will be allowed, in the latter it will not be allowed.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pack v. Burns,
"It is a well settled rule that in appeals from administrative decisions, the failure to include the name of a necessary party or defendant in the citation is a jurisdictional defect that renders the appeal subject to dismissal." (Citations omitted.) Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Board of Tax Review,
The plaintiff's failure to name the Town in its citation is a jurisdictional defect depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff's failure to include the Town in the citation is not a defect curable by amendment. Accordingly, the defendant Board's motion to dismiss is granted.
Mary R. Hennessey, Judge CT Page 10515