DocketNumber: No. CV94314888S
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 469-F, 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 411
Judges: FREEDMAN, J.
Filed Date: 1/19/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
In the fifth count of the amended complaint, Carol Roda asserts negligence claims against Carlson, Progran and Cunningham. In this count, Carol Roda also asserts a claim pursuant to General Statutes §
On December 5, 1994, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition, and Progran and Cunningham filed an "objection" to Carlson's motion. At short calendar on December 5, 1994, Progran and Cunningham requested a continuance pursuant to Practice Book § 382 so that they could conduct further discovery with respect to Carlson's motion. Carlson objected to the granting of a continuance on the ground that the issue before the court (whether a golf cart is a motor vehicle) is an issue of law, and that Progran and Cunningham's request for a continuance involves their attempts to obtain discovery with respect to Carlson's insurance coverage.
The court denies Progran and Cunningham's request for a continuance, as their discovery request is not relevant to the issue raised in Carlson's motion for summary judgment. Progran and Cunningham's "objection" specifically addresses the issue of whether a golf cart is a motor vehicle. Furthermore, all of the parties to this action had previously briefed this issue with respect to a motion to strike (#110) filed by CT Page 469-H Carlson on September 8, 1994. Accordingly, there appears to be no need for additional discovery and the court will address Carlson's motion for summary judgment on the merits.
Practice Book § 384 provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp.,
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Carlson argues that because the golf cart upon which the plaintiff was riding at the time of the incident was not suitable for operation on the highway, it does not meet the statutory requirements of General Statutes §
General Statutes §
If an employee . . . has a right to benefits or compensation under this chapter on account of injury . . . caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee . . . no action may be brought against such fellow employee unless such wrong was willful or malicious or the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle as defined in section
14-1 . . . (Emphasis added.) CT Page 469-I
While the plaintiffs seek to recover from Carlson pursuant to this statute, the plaintiffs do not allege that Carol Roda was injured in a work-related accident, nor do they allege that Carlson and Carol Roda were employed by the same employer at the time of the accident. Nevertheless, in his affidavit, Carlson attests that at the time of the accident, both he and Carol Roda were employed by Van de Bergh Foods Company, and that they were attending a work-related event. (See the affidavit of Carlson at ¶¶ 2, 3, and 4.) Because neither the plaintiffs nor Progran or Cunningham contradict the facts stated in Carlson's affidavit, the court may rely on these statements. Bartha v.Waterbury House Wrecking Co., Inc.,
General Statutes §
14-1 (a) provides in pertinent part that:(47) "Motor vehicle" means any vehicle propelled or drawn by non-muscular power, except aircraft, motor boats, road rollers, baggage trucks . . . golf carts operated on highways solely for the purpose of crossing from one part of the golf course to another, golf cart type vehicles operated on roads or highways on the grounds of state institutions by state employees, . . . special mobile equipment as defined in subsection (i) of section
14-165 and any other vehicle not suitable for operation on the highway.
(Emphasis added.) In support of his motion for summary judgment, Carlson argues that even in light of the specific language which excludes certain golf carts from the definition of a "motor vehicle," golf carts in general are not motor vehicles because they are not vehicles suitable for operation on the highway. In response, the plaintiffs argue that the legislature's decision to exclude a specific use of a golf cart from categorization as a motor vehicle inherently recognizes CT Page 469-J that a golf cart when used for other purposes, is a motor vehicle.
Ordinarily, if the provisions of a statute are plain and unambiguous, "we need look no further for interpretive guidance because we assume that the words themselves express the intention of the legislature."Rhodes v. Hartford,
The language of §
In arguing that a golf cart is not a motor vehicle, Carlson also relies on the catch-all language at the end of §
In Pinheiro v. Board of Education,
The phrase "any other vehicle not suitable for operation on highway" must be understood by reference to the specifically enumerated vehicles that precede it, which are also excluded from the definition of a motor vehicle. Under the rule of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, "where a particular enumeration is followed by general descriptive words, the latter will be understood as limited in their scope to matters and things of the same general kind or character as those specified in the particular enumeration, unless there is something to show a contrary intention . . . When no such contrary intent appears, the general words will be construed with reference to the context, and the specific terms with which the general are associated in the context will control the meaning to be given to the more general expression used in their immediate connection . . . Most of the enumerated vehicles specifically excluded from the definition of motor vehicles in §
14-1 (a)(47) are certainly capable of being operated on a highway but are nonetheless not suitable for such use because of their design . . . It is therefore the vehicle's design that controls in determining whether a particular vehicle is suitable CT Page 469-L for operation on a highway and qualifies as a motor vehicle."
(Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Id., 272-73. The court held that the trial court correctly concluded that the tractor involved in that case was not a motor vehicle as defined in §
In Gatti v. Hartford Distributors, Inc., 9 CONN. L. RPTR. 568,
Section
14-1 (a)(47) specifically mentions golf carts and excepts only certain golf carts from the "motor vehicle" definition. Therefore, the phrase "any other vehicle" refers to vehicles other than golf carts and cannot apply to remove the golf cart in question from those vehicles which are "motor vehicles" under the statute.
Id., 942. The court, while noting that the golf cart in question "lacked many items of equipment required under Title 14 of the Connecticut General Statutes to make it suitable for operation on the highway," held that the rules of statutory construction mandated the conclusion that the golf cart in question was a motor vehicle as defined in §
In Smith v. The Associated Food Distributors Co.,
The court need not conclude that a golf cart which does not fall into one of the "golf cart exceptions" is a motor vehicle as a matter of law, as the court did in the Gatti case. In deciding the present motion, the court will follow the rule that "the vehicle's design . . . controls in determining whether a particular vehicle is suitable for operation on a highway and qualifies as a motor vehicle." See Pinheiro v. Board of Education,supra,