DocketNumber: No. 33 55 52
Citation Numbers: 1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 5804
Judges: STANLEY, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 6/15/1993
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
In counts four, five and seven of the amended complaint the plaintiff alleges a breach of contract, negligent failure to perform and violation of
When deciding a motion to dismiss, "the [court's] inquiry usually does not extend to the merits of the case." (Citation omitted.) Southport Manor Convalescent Center Inc. v. Foley,
Simply put, "[subject matter] [j]urisdiction involves the power in a court to hear and determine the cause of action presented to it and its source is the constitutional and statutory provisions by which it is created." State v. Carey,
The considerations applicable to the present case are set forth in Halpern v. Board of Education,
In opposition to the City of West Haven's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argues that the defendant waived its right to file a motion to dismiss counts four and five when it failed to do so within thirty days of its appearance as required by Practice Book 142 and 144. Practice Book 144 provides that "[a]ny claim of lack of jurisdiction over the person or improper venue or insufficiency of process or insufficiency of service of process is waived if not raised by a motion to dismiss filed in the sequence provided in 112 and 113, and within the time provided by 142." Practice Book 145 provides that "[a]ny claim of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived. . . ."
While research discloses there is no case law as to whether a motion to dismiss based upon the prior pending action doctrine is waivable under Practice Book 142 and 144, the claim need not be addressed in this case because of the distinction between the facts here and those of the Halpern case.
The defendant City of West Haven, in addressing counts four and five of the amended complaint, maintains that "it is well established in Connecticut that when a plaintiff has filed two separate law suits which are alive, the second action should be dismissed by the court." Defendants assert that the issues involved in a prior pending action between the parties; see Brophy v. City of West Haven, supra, encompass the issues raised in counts four and five in the amended complaint. Therefore, defendant concludes that "justice and equity mandate that counts four and five should be dismissed." CT Page 5807
In the Halpern case, "both matters were filed and [were] pending in the same jurisdiction and venue." (Emphasis added.) Halpern v. Board of Education, supra, 651. In the instant case there is no prior action between the parties pending. Rather, on June 10, 1991 the court entered an order pursuant to a stipulation between the parties in Brophy Ahern v. City of West Haven, supra, which was a final judgment. Thus the prior pending action doctrine does not apply and the motion to dismiss counts four and five is denied.
As to count seven, the defendants urge dismissal as the plaintiff is a partnership and not a person entitled to protection under 1983. Under 1983, a corporation is a person entitled to protection. A partnership has standing to sue under the statute that creates a federal cause of action against persons whose misconduct, under color of state law, violates the constitutional rights of another. See Gordon v. City of Cartersville, Georgia,
The plaintiff partnership may properly bring an action for deprivations it has allegedly suffered in violation of the
Richard J. Stanley, Judge