DocketNumber: No. CV91 0310066S
Citation Numbers: 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 11385
Judges: MAIOCCO, J.
Filed Date: 12/15/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The facts pertinent hereto are as follows:
While acting as an employee of Stop Shop Companies, Inc. (hereinafter "Stop Shop), the plaintiff, Eleanor Vreeland slipped and fell on a wet and freshly waxed floor that had been CT Page 11386 allegedly, washed and waxed by the defendant, Medi-Kleen Corporation (hereinafter "Medi-Kleen").
On January 14, 1991 the plaintiff filed a writ, summons and compliant, naming "Medi-Kleen" as the only defendant. On and special defenses dated February 12, 1991. Plaintiff then responded by filing her reply to special defenses on February 22, 1991, thereby closing the pleadings as between the plaintiff and the defendant "Medi-Kleen."
Then on December 13, 1991 the defendant filed a motion to implead (Motion #109), which motion was granted by the court, Fracasse, J., on December 30, 1991. The defendant next filed a third party complaint on January 27, 1992.
Thereafter, the third party defendant, "Stop Shop," filed its answer and special defenses dated May 12, 1992 (No. 113). However, on may 15, 1992 the same third party defendant filed a withdrawal of its answer and special defenses, followed by the filing on May 18, 1992, of the third party defendant's motion to strike the third party complaint (Motion #116).
The purpose of a motion "to strike [is to] challenge the legal sufficiency of a pleading." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc.
In the instant case the third party defendant, "Stop
Shop," filed an answer and special defenses, followed by a withdrawal, which was followed by a motion to strike. Practice Book 112 however, specifies the order of pleadings as follows: "(1) the plaintiff's complaint; (2) the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint; (3) the defendant's request to revise the complaint; (4) the defendant's motion to strike the complaint; (5) the defendant's answer (including any special defenses) to the complaint. . . ." Our courts have long held that "after filing an answer, it [is] improper. . .to file any motion addressed to the complaint without seeking the permission of the court." Phaneuf v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
Section 113 of the Practice Book goes on to say that:
In all cases, when the court does not otherwise order, the filing of any pleading provided for by the preceding section will waive the right to file any pleading which might have been filed in due order and which precedes it in the order of pleading provided in that section.
In one of the seminal cases in this area that dealt with the predecessor to 112 and 113 of the Practice Book, the court has noted that "Section 74 of the Practice Book specifies the order of pleadings. That order ``must be complied with except by consent of counsel or order of court after hearing. . . .'" Arpin v. Arpin,
Nevertheless, Practice book 173 says that "further proceedings, subsequent in nature, may be had if necessary by leave by court."
[Where] the parties have stipulated that the defendants may file an answer [out of order], and [where] the plaintiff [has] not object[ed] to the defendant's motion to strike being filed out of order [,] [i]t is within the discretion of the trial court to allow the defendant to plead out of the order prescribed.
McAnerney v. Wilson, supra, 398-99. the file does not indicate, however, that the third party defendant requested permission from the third party plaintiff or the court to file its pleadings out of order. CT Page 11388
The provisions of the Connecticut Practice Book and supporting case law hold "inasmuch as the answer. . .precede[s] the motion to strike, the right to file a motion to strike [is] thereby waived in accordance with Section 113 of the Connecticut Practice Book." Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Mascolo,
Consequently, because the third party defendant neither obtained the consent of the third party plaintiff to file its answer and special defenses before its motion to strike, and more importantly, failed to ask leave of the court to file its pleadings in this way, third party defendant's attempt to circumvent the process by its filing of a withdrawal fails and its motion to strike must be denied as procedurally defective.
Motion to Strike is denied.
MAIOCCO, J.