DocketNumber: No. 31 91 36
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 5253, 14 Conn. L. Rptr. 494
Judges: MIHALAKOS, J.
Filed Date: 5/31/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
On February 7, 1995, the plaintiff filed a three count amended revised complaint seeking damages arising out of a municipal public works construction project.
The first count alleges that the plaintiff entered into a subcontract with defendant Waterman, a general contractor, and that its last services were rendered on or about January 13, 1993. Further, despite demand for payment, Waterman owes plaintiff $11,934.77.
The second count incorporates the factual allegations of the first count and, further, that Waterman, acting in its capacity as principal, entered into a payment bond with the surety, IFIC.
The third count, in addition to incorporating the allegations of the second count, alleges a CUTPA violation.
On February 14, 1995, IFIC filed a motion to dismiss the second count of plaintiff's amended revised complaint alleging lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to General Statutes, Sec.
"[A] challenge to the court's jurisdiction is raised by the filing of a motion to dismiss." Park City Hospital v. Commissionon Hospitals Health Care,
Section
General Statutes, Sec.
(a) Every person who has furnished labor or material in the prosecution of the work provided for in such contract in respect of which a payment bond is furnished under the provisions of section
49-41 and who has not been paid in full therefor before the expiration of a period of ninety days after the day on which the last of the labor was done or performed by him or material was furnished or supplied by him for which the claim is made, may enforce his right to payment under the bond by serving a notice of claim within one hundred eighty days after the date on which he performed the last of the labor or furnished the last of the material for which the claim is made, on the surety that issued the bond and a copy of the notice on the contractor named as principal in the bond. . . .(b) Every suit instituted under this section shall be brought in the name of the person suing, in the superior court for the judicial district where the contract was to be performed, irrespective of the amount in controversy in the suit, but no such suit may be commenced after the expiration of one year after the day on which the last of the labor was performed or material was supplied by the claimant.
IFIC argues that the time limitation as contained in section
The plaintiff argues that the motion should be denied because a statute of limitations defense must be specially pleaded. Alternatively, if the court determines that IFIC's motion is properly before the court, the statute of limitations has not expired pursuant to
The time limitation within which suit must be commenced pursuant to section
Based on the foregoing, the operation of section
With regard to
No insurance company doing business in this state shall limit the time within which any suit shall be brought against it or any claim shall be submitted to arbitration on (a) a fidelity or surety bond to a period less than three years from the time when the loss insured against occurs; (b) a construction performance bond to a period less than three years from the date on which the principal last performed work under the contract; (c) a construction payment bond to a period less than three years from the date on which the claimant last performed work or supplied material for which the claim is made; and (d) all other policies to a period less than one year from the time when the loss insured against occurs. This section shall not apply to suits and arbitration claims under the uninsured or underinsured motorist provisions of a motor vehicle insurance policy.
The inference to be drawn from the plain language of section
In this case, the plaintiff has admitted that it last rendered its services on or about January 13, 1993. However, this action was not instituted until service was effectuated upon IFIC, which occurred on September 15, 1994. (Sheriff's Return dated September 15, 1994.) Since this action was not commenced within the one year limitation period, the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement provided for by the legislature in section
Mihalakos, J.