DocketNumber: No. CV 97 0401852 S
Citation Numbers: 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 3435, 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 582
Judges: ROBINSON, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 3/20/2002
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The plaintiff appealed the aforementioned assessment to the city's Board of Tax Review and on or about March 28, 1997, the Board denied the appeal and made no changes in the assessment or valuation. The plaintiff then filed the instant action CT Page 3436
On February 26, 2002, the defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that the plaintiff's action is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
The defendant asserts that the exact issues in this tax appeal were brought before the Court by the previous property owner in the matter ofRouse Chapel Square, Inc. v. CONH, CV 91 0316024 S, (Moran, J). The defendant further asserts that said issues were adjudicated and the Court entered judgment, on June 29, 1995. Upon reviewing the motion and its attachments, the Court notes that Rouse was not heard on its merits, but judgment was entered in accordance with a Stipulation between the parties, dated May 30, 1995.
The Court has examined the file in this matter and has determined that the plaintiff has not as of this date and time filed any objection to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Section 17-45 of the Connecticut Practice Book concerns the proceedings for motions for summary judgment. It provides that:
A motion for summary judgment shall be supported by such documents as may be appropriate, including but not limited to affidavits, certified transcripts of testimony under oath, disclosures, written admissions and the like. The motion shall be placed on the short calendar to be held not less than fifteen days following the filing of the motion and the supporting materials, unless the judicial authority otherwise directs. The adverse party [prior to the day the case is set down for short calendar] shall at least five days before the date the motion is to be considered on the short calendar file opposing affidavits and other available documentary evidence. Affidavits, and other documentary proof not already a part of the file, shall be filed and sewed as are pleadings.
Attached to the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was:
1) A copy of an executed Stipulated Judgment; and
2) An Affidavit of William O'Brien, Tax Assessor.
Before addressing the merits of plaintiff's motion, a brief review of the standards for the granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment is necessary: CT Page 3437
Norse Systems, Inc. v. Tingley Systems, Inc.,"Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Orkney v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
248 Conn. 195 ,201 ,727 A.2d 700 (1999). QSP, Inc. v. The Aetna Casualty Surety Co.,256 Conn. 343 ,351 (2001).A "material fact" is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case. See Hammer v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co.,
214 Conn. 573 ,578 ,573 A.2d 699 (1990). The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings. See Plouffe v. New York, N.H. H.R. Co.,160 Conn. 482 ,489 ,280 A.2d 359 (1971). The party seeking summary judgment "has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law." D.H.R. Construction Co. v. Donnelly,180 Conn. 430 ,434 ,429 A.2d 908 (1980).
The defendants hereto have asserted that the plaintiff is prohibited from litigating the instant action for reason of res judicata and collateral estoppel, therefore a brief review of these doctrines is necessary.
Res judicata and collateral estoppel "express no more than the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated, and finally decided, it comes to rest." State v. Ellis,
Carol Management Corp. v. Board of Tax Review,
The action that that defendant cites as having previously determined the issues that are the subject of this action was resolved by the parties by the use is a stipulated agreement upon which the Superior Court entered judgment.
"A stipulated judgment is not a judicial determination of any litigated right. . . . It may be defined as a contract of the parties acknowledged in open court and ordered to be recorded by a court of competent jurisdiction. . . . [It is] the result of a contract and its embodiment in a form which places it and the matters covered by it beyond further controversy. . . . The essence of the judgment is that the parties to the litigation have voluntarily entered into an agreement setting their dispute or disputes at CT Page 3439 rest and that, upon this agreement, the court has entered judgment conforming to the terms of the agreement. . . . Gillis v. Gillis,
City of Torrington v. Zoning Comm., Tn., Harwinton,
63 Conn. App. 776 ,788 (2001).
In light of the fact that a stipulated judgment is not a judicial determination of any litigated right, but a contract to resolve the controversy between the parties to said contract, the issue becomes whether or not a subsequent purchaser of the property is bound by the provisions of said contract. A similar issue was raised in a city of Hartford tax appeal. In that case, a plaintiff in a tax appeal case raised the issue after the defendant had filed a motion for summary judgment:
. . . In response to the motion for summary judgment the plaintiff raises three issues in this appeal. The first issue is whether the plaintiff, as a subsequent owner not involved in the prior litigation, is bound by any stipulation previously agreed to by the prior owner and the city.
Maharishi School v. City of Hartford, No. CV95 0551521 (Oct. 17, 1997)
1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 10317 , 10640 (Aronson, JTR)
The Court in Maharishi, Id., held that because the plaintiff in that matter was the successor to the interest of the plaintiff (former property owner) in the tax appeal, there was a "privity of estate" between successor and the former property owner and therefore the subsequent property owner was bound by the provisions of the stipulated agreement.
A party who takes title to real estate is a successor in interest and takes an assignment of that property and all of the rights that run with it. Bobhic Assoc. Ltd. v. Carrabba OB-Gyn Assoc.,
The prior action cited by the defendant concerns a tax appeal on the subject property brought pursuant to the provisions of §
In light of the foregoing, the motion for summary judgment is granted.
Richard A. Robinson, J March 19, 2002