DocketNumber: No. CV91-0446447
Citation Numbers: 1991 Conn. Super. Ct. 10407, 7 Conn. Super. Ct. 183
Judges: DORSEY, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 12/19/1991
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The plaintiffs brought this civil action on July 17, 1991, claiming that the fees, charges and conditions of the Agreement were "illegal" and seeking relief on the legal theories CT Page 10408 of breach of contract (Count One) and conversion (Count Two). Plaintiffs seek relief by way of 1) money damages and 2) rescission of contract.
A lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy is properly raised by a Motion to Dismiss. Connecticut Practice Book Section 143(1). Park City v. Commission on Hospitals and Health Care,
A comparison of the complaint filed in this action with the DPUC decision illustrates that each and every one of the allegations of "illegal" conduct made in this action were addressed and decided by the DPUC. The following is a list of these allegations made in this action previously decided by the DPUC.
1. Excessive well development fees.
2. Excessive tapping fees.
3. Improper extraction of easements as a condition of supplying service.
4. Excessive engineering and counsel fees.
5. Improper calculation of reimbursements and rebates.
6. Improper accounting for project costs.
7. Improper calculation of income tax rate.
The DPUC decided the plaintiffs' petition under the legislative authority granted to it by section
Upon receiving the plaintiffs' petition, the DPUC was, by statute, obligated to and did hold a hearing to determine whether the Company had failed to furnish adequate service at reasonable rates. The DPUC is empowered to set the conditions under which service shall be provided and to prohibit the Company from charging rates or imposing conditions which exceed those prescribed. C.G.S. section
The legislature, by enacting a statutory scheme found in Chapter
The complaint does not mention that these issues have been litigated over the course of some days of hearings before the DPUC. The complaint does not mention the DPUC order directed to the plaintiff to grant certain easements to the defendant Company as a condition of service. The complaint does not allude to any fact or facts which explain its failure to appeal the DPUC decision to the Superior Court as is provided by section
In their memorandum to the court [MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS] November 12, 1991, plaintiffs make the claim that
"Since the above DPUC findings were favorable to the Plaintiffs, they the Plaintiffs, were obviously not aggrieved by the DPUC's decision. In fact, it is the impact of these findings that enable the Plaintiffs to bring this present action."
In its Decision the DPUC observed the following:
The Petitioner (Plaintiff) had not granted easements to the Company as agreed to in the main extension agreement, claiming that the Company had requested a wider easement than normally is required for a main extension of this size. The easement would affect one of the building lots in the Petitioner's development by reducing the size of the dwelling that could be built there. The Petitioner reasserted his argument during oral arguments that the easement required by the company is excessive and detracts from the value of the lot. He further indicated that he is not prepared to grant the easement under the current conditions.
The easements required by the Company CT Page 10410 comply with Conn. Agencies Regs.
The DPUC concluded its Decision as follows:
VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS
A. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Authority concludes that the Company did collect funds from the Petitioner which were inappropriate and in violation of section
16-19 of the General Statutes of Connecticut and contrary to Department directives issued to the Company. The Authority shall initiate a new proceeding to investigate these violations and to determine whether any additional action shall be taken against the Company.
B. Orders
1. On or before March 24, 1990, the Petitioner shall grant easements to Company as detailed in the main extension agreement for this development.
2. No later than ten days after receiving the easements for this development, the Company shall refund to the Petitioner $7,914.79. The account for this matter shall be considered closed upon issuance of this refund to the Petitioner. CT Page 10411 A copy of the check to the Petitioner shall be submitted to the Department on the same day it is issued, as evidence of compliance with this order.
Quite obviously all of the findings of the DPUC were not favorable to the plaintiffs. While some findings were favorable, the right to receive recompense relief clearly hinged on the grant of easements by the plaintiffs. Quite obviously the plaintiff chose not to grant the easements ordered.
No impediment to bring a direct appeal pursuant to APA Sec.
Where the legislature has provided an administrative remedy, it should be exhausted. Connecticut Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association v. Jackson,
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is grounded in a policy of fostering an orderly process of administrative adjudication and judicial review in which a reviewing court will have the benefit of the agency's findings and conclusions. ". . . the doctrine of exhaustion furthers the salutary goals of relieving the courts of the burden of deciding questions entrusted to an agency . . . in advance of possible judicial review." Concerned Citizens of Sterling, at 557 (citations omitted).
The Harwinton Drilling case is procedurally identical to the case before this court. There, the plaintiffs failed to take a direct appeal to the Superior Court of a DPUC decision, but instead brought a civil action to enjoin the decision, declare it a nullity, to recover money damage and for other appropriate relief. Id. at 93. The plaintiffs in this case similarly pray for money damages and a rescission of the agreement.
The Supreme court in Harwinton Drilling framed the issue as follows: CT Page 10412
". . . we must decide whether the plaintiffs' failure to pursue Appellate review of the DPUC decision by way of an appeal under the [Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, cited as "UAPA"] foreclosed the trial court from exercising jurisdiction." Id. at 93.
In deciding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' action, the court held that "absent a showing of immediate and irreparable harm [which is not alleged by the plaintiffs herein], a party who is aggrieved by a decision of an administrative agency may not institute an independent action for the purpose of bypassing the UAPA appeal process. In instances where the hearings before administrative agencies have been exhausted, there can be no judicial bypass of the UAPA absent allegations and evidence of immediate and irreparable harm." Id. at 98.
The Harwinton Drilling court also reiterated that the failure to pursue a direct appeal of an agency decision does not give rise to the right to maintain an independent action in equity. Id. at 97-98, citing Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer,
The DPUC has the statutory authority to grant the plaintiffs' relief from the fees, charges and conditions of service about which they complained both before the DPUC and in their complaint to this court. C.G.S. section
The motion to dismiss is granted.
LEONARD W. DORSEY SENIOR JUDGE