DocketNumber: No. 523206
Judges: LEUBA, J.
Filed Date: 4/19/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
On December 8, 1992, the court, Hurley, J., granted Coyne's motion to implead Commercial Printers of Connecticut, CT Page 4079 Inc., (hereinafter Commercial), as a third-party defendant. On February 4, 1993, Coyne filed a third-party complaint against Commercial seeking indemnification and alleging that any personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff were caused by the negligence of Commercial. Coyne alleges that Commercial had exclusive control of the area in connection with the plaintiff's alleged slip and fall.
On January 6, 1993, Coyne filed an answer to the plaintiff's complaint and a special defense stating that any injuries sustained by the plaintiff were caused by the plaintiff's own negligence. On January 7, 1993, the plaintiff filed a reply to Coyne's special defense, denying the allegations.
On February 16, 1993, the court, Hurley, J., granted Commercial's motion to intervene as a co-plaintiff in accordance with the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act, (hereinafter Act). On January 26, 1993, Commercial filed an intervening complaint, alleging that the plaintiff's slip and fall was caused by the negligence of Coyne's employee and that Commercial may be obligated to pay money damages to the plaintiff as prescribed by the Act. Commercial claims that any recoverable damages be apportioned between Commercial and Coyne; Commercial additionally claims reimbursement for any future obligations paid by Commercial as maybe required under the Act.
On March 22, 1993, Commercial filed an answer to Coyne's third-party complaint and a special defense stating that no independent legal relationship existed between Coyne and Commercial on June 13, 1990 to render Commercial liable to Coyne for indemnification or any other means of contribution in accordance with the Act. On March 24, 1993, Coyne filed a reply to Commercial's special defense, denying the allegation.
On November 12, 1993, Coyne filed an answer to Commercial's intervening complaint and a special defense stating that Commercial's cause of action against Coyne is barred by the two-year statute of limitations period prescribed by General Statutes
On December 1, 1993, Coyne filed this motion for summary judgment, accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law, against the intervening complaint on the ground that CT Page 4080 Commercial's cause of action against Coyne is barred by the two-year statute of limitations period prescribed by General Statutes
On January 20, 1994, Commercial filed a reply to Coyne's special defense, denying the allegation. On January 20, 1994, Commercial filed a memorandum of law in opposition to Coyne's motion for summary judgment.
"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Citations omitted.) Wilson v. New Haven,
"The standard of review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is well established." (Citations omitted.) Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld,
The "party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact. . . ." (Citation omitted.) Connecticut Bank Trust Co. v. Carriage Lane Associates, supra, 781. "The movant must show that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact." (Citation omitted.) State v. Goggin,
"[A] party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue." (Citations omitted.) Connell v. Colwell,
The plaintiff alleges that he sustained personal injuries "during the course of work." Compensation for injuries sustained arising out of and in the course of employment is exclusively provided by the Act. Vorvis v. Southern New England Tel. Co.,
A cause of action under General Statutes
General Statutes
Coyne argues that because Commercial's motion to intervene was filed after June 13, 1992, Commercial's action is barred by General Statutes
General Statutes
If either such employee or such employer brings such action against such third person, he shall forthwith notify the other, in writing, by personal presentation or by registered or certified mail, of such fact and of the name of the court to which the writ is returnable, and such other may join as a party plaintiff in such action within thirty days after such notification, and, if such other fails to join as a party plaintiff, his right of action against such third person shall abate.
General Statutes
The procedure set forth in
Commercial submits a supporting correspondence sent by the plaintiff, dated January 11, 1993, sent certified mail #P747 493 472, in which the plaintiff advised Commercial of his claim against Coyne. On January 26, 1993, Commercial filed its motion to intervene, within thirty days of receiving the January 11, 1993 correspondence. Commercial's motion to intervene, therefore, is in compliance with the procedure set forth in General Statutes
"If an employee sues a third party, the employer is "entitled to notice and an opportunity to join in the action." Packtor v. Seppala AHO Construction Co., supra, 430, citing Enguist v. General Datacom, supra, 23. "[W]here the action is seasonably brought so far as the general Statute of Limitations is concerned, the legislature did not intend that it (
To hold otherwise would encourage employees to notify their employers of a third party action, as prescribed by General Statutes
Therefore, Coyne is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly Coyne's motion to summary judgment against Commercial's intervening complaint is denied.
Leuba, J. CT Page 4084