DocketNumber: No. CV 96 62440 S
Judges: RITTENBAND, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 8/7/1997
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
Defendants have moved to strike the first, second and fourth counts on the basis of governmental immunity alleging that the allegations are public duties that are discretionary in nature and by CGS §
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
The purpose of a motion to strike is to ``contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.' NovametrixMedical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group. Inc.,
"A municipal employee . . . has a qualified immunity in the performance of a governmental duty, but he may be liable if he misperforms a ministerial act as opposed to a discretionary act."Burns v. Board of Education,
Clearly, the duty of Davis is a public or governmental duty, but that alone does not permit governmental immunity. The issue is whether Davis' conduct was ministerial or discretionary. The court finds that Davis' conduct as alleged in the complaint inboth counts one and two were discretionary in nature. The determination of the location of home plate, where and how much dirt to put around home plate and the grooming of the area calls for discretionary judgment by Davis. Even the obligations in count two, although allegedly prescribed in writing, call for the exercise of some discretion. Governmental immunity does apply where some exercise of discretion by a municipal employee is involved. Evon v. Andrews,
To succeed in her claim, the plaintiff must allege and prove that Davis' discretionary acts or omissions fall within one of three exceptions to Davis' qualified immunity:
"First, where the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or CT Page 8223 her failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm . . . second, where a statute specifically provides for a cause of action against a municipality or municipal official for failure to enforce certain laws . . . and third, where the alleged acts involve malice, wantonness or intent to injure, rather than negligence." Burns v. Board of Education, supra, 645.
The second and third exceptions are not applicable here. The first exception would appear to be. However, plaintiff has not alleged the first exception nor facts to support it. If it were so alleged, it would require a factual finding and would, therefore, defeat a motion to strike. However, it has not been alleged. Accordingly, the doctrine of governmental immunity does apply. Even though the complaint must be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.2
The motion to strike is granted.
Rittenband, Judge