DocketNumber: No. CV96-386369
Citation Numbers: 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 6030, 17 Conn. L. Rptr. 483
Judges: BARNETT, J.
Filed Date: 8/22/1996
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
For the criminal prosecutions, Farricielli has of course the privilege against self-incrimination provided by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States and by article
Quite a different situation prevails in the administrative action. Farricielli may exercise his privilege to remain silent on the claim that his answers might incriminate him in the pending criminal prosecution but the privilege when claimed by a party in a civil case does not preclude the drawing of adverse or unfavorable inferences. Olin Corporation v. Castella,
The same dichotomy prevails with respect to the production of documents. Under the Constitution of Connecticut the privilege against giving evidence against oneself extends to the production of any document that may furnish such evidence in or for a criminal prosecution. Burritt Interfinancial Bancorporation v.Brooke Point Associates, 43 Conn. Sup. 445, 459 (1992).
Corporations do not enjoy a privilege against self-incrimination.Lieberman v. Reliable Refuse Co.,
Section
Turning to the second prong which the State claims is absent for all defendants, the court agrees with the Hearing Officer that the remedial purpose sought by the proposed administrative order means that the pending criminal and administrative actions do not offend double jeopardy. State v. Hickam,
In determining that the administrative action should not be stayed until the criminal case against Farricielli is decided, the Hearing Officer relied upon United States v. Kordel,
The pertinent language from Securities Exchange Com'n. v.Dresser Indus., supra is as follows:
The Constitution, therefore, does not ordinarily require a stay of civil proceedings pending the outcome of criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, a court may decide in its discretion to stay civil proceedings, postpone civil discovery or impose protective orders and conditions when the interests of justice seem to require such action, sometimes at the request of the prosecution . . . sometimes at the request of the defense. The court must make such determinations in the light of the particular circumstances of the case.
Other than where there is specific evidence of agency bad faith or malicious governmental tactics, the strongest case for deferring civil proceedings until after completion of criminal proceedings is where a party under indictment for a serious criminal offense is required to defend a civil or administrative action involving the same matter. The noncriminal proceeding, if not deferred might undermine the party's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, expand rights of criminal discovery beyond the limits of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16 (b), expose the basis of defense to the prosecution in advance of criminal trial or otherwise prejudice the case. If delay of the noncriminal proceeding would not seriously injure the public interest, a court may be justified in deferring it. (citations omitted).
The continuing vitality of Securities Exchange Com'n. v.Dresser Indus. is shown by recent decisions such as Federal Sav. Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro,
As noted, the Hearing Officer's decision was a discretionary one. And in the court's opinion, that discretion was abused. The thrust of Security Exchange Com'n. v. Dresser Indus., supra and succeeding cases is that the question of whether or not the administration proceeding should be stayed must be decided in light of the particular circumstances and competing interests involved. A suggested list, all of which may or may not be applicable, is provided by Federal Sav. Loan Ins. Corp. v.Molinaro, supra. A court should consider the extent to which Fifth Amendment rights are involved, the plaintiff's interest in proceeding expeditiously and what potential prejudice could occur from a delay, the burden which any particular aspect of the parallel proceedings may impose on the defendants, the efficient use of administrative and judicial resources, the interests of persons not parties to the administrative action and the interest of the public in the pending administrative and criminal litigation. See
A review of the Hearing Officer's decision discloses that the interest of the public in cleaning up the site was considered but little else. Farricielli's privilege against self-incrimination was discussed only in terms of being personal to him and as to adverse inferences that might result from its exercise in the administrative proceeding. There was no discussion at all of how the exercise by Farricielli of his privilege could or would affect the corporate plaintiffs in the exercise of their due process rights to present defenses. Kukanskis v. Griffith,
The criminal penalties against Farricielli call for fines on each offense of not more than $25,000.00 per day for each day of violation and/or imprisonment for a term of not more than one year. Conn. Gen. Stat. §
Barnett, J.
lida-nosik-v-anthony-l-singe-individually-and-as-superintendent-of , 40 F.3d 592 ( 1994 )
Kukanskis v. Griffith , 180 Conn. 501 ( 1980 )
In Re Quality Medical Consultants, Inc. , 192 B.R. 777 ( 1995 )
Kron v. Thelen , 178 Conn. 189 ( 1979 )
State v. Biller , 190 Conn. 594 ( 1983 )