DocketNumber: No. CV-92-0330109
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 9864
Judges: MARTIN, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 8/29/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
On November 29, 1994, the Board of Education filed a motion to strike the fifth count, the sixth count and paragraphs 20 through 29 of the seventh count of the plaintiffs' revised complaint. On January 27, 1995, the plaintiffs filed an objection to the motion to strike.
The plaintiffs' revised complaint alleges the following facts: that the Board of Education is a quasi-municipal corporation established by General Statutes §
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint." NovametrixMedical Services v. BOC Group, Inc.,
The Board of Education moves to strike the fifth count, the sixth count, and paragraphs 20 through 29 of the seventh count of the plaintiffs' complaint on the grounds that (1) the Board of Education is a municipal entity and is therefore immune from liability under the doctrine of governmental immunity and (2) the Board of Education is an agent of the state and is therefore immune from liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The plaintiff objects to the Board of Education's motion to strike on the ground that (1) the issues of governmental and sovereign immunity are not properly decided by a motion to strike and (2) when a municipality assumes the duty of a non-governmental entity, it is not immune from liability for the negligent performance of that duty under either governmental or sovereign immunity.
"Generally, governmental immunity must be specially pleaded."Gauvin v. New Haven,
"A town board of education can be an agent of the state for some purposes and an agent of the municipality for others. . . . A town board of education thus potentially enjoys immunity under two different theories of immunity for acts carried out within its governmental capacity. For example, [w]e have long recognized the common-law principle [of sovereign immunity] that the state cannot be sued without its consent. . . . Alternatively, [a]t common law, Connecticut municipalities enjoy governmental immunity, in certain circumstances, from liability for their tortious acts." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)Heigl v. Board of Education of New Cannan,
"A municipality's potential liability for its tortious acts is limited by the common law principle of governmental immunity. . . . Governmental immunity, however, is not a blanket protection for all official acts. For example, [a] municipality is immune from liability for the performance of governmental acts as distinguished from ministerial acts." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 4.
In differentiating between ministerial and discretionary acts, the Connecticut Supreme Court has noted that "[g]overnmental acts are performed wholly for the direct benefit of the public and are supervisory or discretionary in nature. . . . On the other hand, ministerial acts are performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion as to the propriety of the action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Heigl v. Board of Education of New Cannan, supra,
In Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, supra,
The Gordon court stated that "[c]onsiderable latitude must be allowed to [a police chief] in the deployment of his officers, or in enforcing discipline. Indeed, because a police chief's authority to assign his officers to particular duties is deemed a matter that concerns the public safety, he may not be deprived of his power to exercise his own discretion and judgment as to the number, qualifications and identity of officers needed for particular situations at any given time. . . . [T]he general deployment of police officers is a discretionary governmental action as a matter of law." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 180.
In Couture v. Board of Education,
In Couture, the court further noted that "[p]ursuant to their duty to provide public education, the town boards are given substantial discretion to determine educational policy. . . . Included in this authority is the power to decide that sporting events are a necessary or desirable part of the town's educational program." Id., 313. The court held that, "in the absence of any showing to the contrary . . . the defendants, in sponsoring . . . [a high school] football game, were acting as agent[s] or representative[s] of the state in carrying out its public purposes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In the instant case, the plaintiff has alleged that the Board of Education was engaged in the act of holding a high school hockey game at the New Haven Coliseum. The plaintiffs allege that the Board of Education was negligent in that it failed to provide competent and adequate supervision for the safety of its patrons and failed to provide an adequate staff of personnel on the premises to control unruly patrons. Inasmuch as such events are part of the town's educational program, this was a governmental CT Page 9868 act.
The aforementioned acts of the Board of Education are analogous to those of a police department in the disbursement of its personnel. As with a police department, considerable latitude must be afforded in assessing the manner in which discipline was enforced. Accordingly, the acts of the Board of Education concerning the deployment of security personnel at the New Haven Coliseum are of a discretionary nature. Therefore, any acts or omissions in connection therewith do not give rise to liability on the part of the Board of Education. The Board of Education is immune from liability in that the events which give rise to the plaintiffs' allegations were discretionary governmental acts. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims against the Board of Education are barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity.
Accordingly, the Board of Education's motion to strike the fifth count, the sixth count, and paragraphs 20 through 29 of the seventh count of the plaintiff's complaint1 is granted.
Robert A. Martin, Judge