DocketNumber: Nos. CV97 034 01 35S, CV97 033 98 30S
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 12604
Judges: MOTTOLESE, JUDGE
Filed Date: 9/22/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
As a preliminary matter both Bodnar and Massello agree that it is appropriate to correct the ATR's report in the following ways: 1) correct conclusion #3 to change the extension date from March 30, 1996 to October 30, 1996; 2) Finding # 21 should read as follows: "Ciaglo testified that in his opinion the premises either met or could meet environmental standards existing at the time". Pursuant to § 19-13 the court hereby makes the above correction.1
Review of a report of an attorney trial referee consists of two tasks. The first is to determine whether "there was ample evidence to support the attorney trial referee's factual findings" and the second is to rule on whether "the conclusions reached were in accordance with applicable law". Thermoglaze Inc.v. Morningside Gardens, Co.
As a threshold matter it is noted that no issue has been made over ATR conclusion # 3 that Bodnar gave timely notice of his intention not to proceed with the purchase. Massello rather attacks the legal effect of the notice of termination claiming that it was invalid and pretextual because the real reason for Bodnar's withdrawl from the contract is that he did not want to pay for a new roof and it was too late for him to terminate for this reason. The Court believes that its resolution of the sole issue in the case will necessarily include a resolution of the claim of pretextual conduct.
Essentially, Massello claims that Bodnar did not act in good CT Page 12606 faith upon receipt of the phase I environmental assessment, a) because he never read the study and b) because in point of fact Bodnar never did disapprove the study. The ATR has found to the contrary and the court finds that the record amply supports the ATR's findings. Moreover, as will appear from the discussion that follows the ATR properly applied the applicable law to the facts as found.
It is appropriate to begin with a consideration of the principles of law which govern the ATR's and ultimately the court's consideration of this issue. Notwithstanding Massello's argument, Bodnar's conduct is not governed by the principles found in Phillipe v. Thomas
The court believes the proper standard to be applied is that found in Warner v. Konover,
An implied duty of good faith dealing in a commercial contractual setting requires "that neither party do anything that will injure the right of the other to recover the benefits of the agreement". Habetz v. Condon,
Massello argues that Bodnar never approved or disapproved of the study because he never read it, yet Massello admits that Bodnar was entitled to rely upon the advice of his attorney in disapproving the assessment. Massello thus contradicts himself. The record adequately supports the ATR's finding that Bodnar registered his disapproval of the study on the basis of information conveyed to him by his attorney, which information was gleaned from the study and from the letter which his attorney received from his financing bank (Plaintiff's Exhibit V). Even if Bodnar's attorney failed to read the study (which is immaterial) it was sufficient for him to base his advice to his client on Plaintiff's Exhibit V.
Furthermore, Massello's claim that the environmental concerns which were uncovered by the study were readily correctable misses the point. Under the contract Bodnar had the right not to proceed if those concerns were going to cost him time and money. This is especially so in the face of Plaintiff's Exhibit V which states that Chase Bank's willingness to finance the purchase depended upon a favorable response from the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection concerning a prior contamination, which response was estimated to take 45 days after application was made. On these facts a contract purchaser cannot be said to have acted without good faith when he exercised his contractual right of termination. In fact, that exhibit recommended that Bodnar reevaluate and reconsider his commitment to purchase the property after obtaining a response from DEP.
In view of the foregoing, judgment may enter in accordance with the recommendation of the attorney trial referee including "interim" interest. The court construes the term "interim" as embracing the period commencing with the date on which Bodnar first became entitled to a refund, namely November 26, 1996 (one week after Bodnar's last demand, Plaintiff's Exhibit N).
THE COURT,
A. WILLIAM MOTTOLESE, JUDGE