DocketNumber: No. SPM 9411-4786
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 111-R
Judges: SILBERT, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 1/4/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
On November 17, 1994, the defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that MHA, which receives federal subsidies, is required by federal law to provide the defendant with a hearing prior to taking court action to evict him. A motion to dismiss is the "proper vehicle for claiming any lack of jurisdiction in the trial court." Upson v. State,
The Secretary shall by regulation require each public housing agency receiving assistance under this chapter to establish and implement an administrative grievance procedure under which tenants will . . . (2) have an opportunity for a hearing before an impartial party upon timely request within any period applicable under CT Page 112 subsection (1) of this section. . . . For any grievance concerning an eviction or termination of tenancy that involves any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises of other tenants or employees of the public housing agency or any drug-related criminal activity on or near such premises, the agency may . . . (B) exclude from its grievance procedure any such grievance. . . .
The plaintiff argues that even if the October 7, 1994 request for a hearing is considered to be timely, it was inappropriate because the defendant's conduct constituted "criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises of other tenants or employees of the public housing agency. . . ." See
MHA has alleged that the defendant drives in the parking lot while intoxicated (based on the complaint of an unnamed tenant), and has suggested that the defendant's activity of urinating and leaving puddles of urine in public areas violates several criminal statutes, such as General Statutes §§
Neither party has offered much guidance as to how to interpret the phrase "criminal activity" in this context. If the phrase means conduct resulting in the conviction of a crime, that has clearly not been established in this case, nor has there even been a finding of probable cause resulting in an arrest. Although the law on violations of probation gives us some guidance as to ways in which one can establish the violation of criminal statute without having to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, Payne v. Robinson,
This conclusion, however, does not end the inquiry. The defendant was aware that MHA was acting to terminate his lease as early as June 13, 1994, but the defendant did not request a hearing at that time. The pretermination notice served upon him on that date informed him that if he did not stop urinating on the premises, his lease would be terminated, and it also notified him of his right to request a hearing in accordance with MHA's grievance procedure. According to
The plaintiff's grievance procedure requires a tenant to request a hearing within ten business days. Moreover, the language of the statute and of the regulations indicates that the right to a hearing does not last indefinitely, but may be waived if the tenant does not make a timely request.
All grievances shall be personally presented either orally or in writing pursuant to the informal procedure prescribed in § 966.54 as a condition precedent to a hearing under this section: Provided, That if the complainant shall show good cause why he failed to proceed in accordance with § 966.54 to the hearing officer or hearing panel, the provisions of this subsection may be waived by the hearing officer or hearing panel.
CT Page 114
The defendant has not attempted to show good cause for his failure to request a hearing in June. The fact that he requested a hearing after receiving the notice to quit on October 1, 1994 does not change his failure to make a timely request for a hearing in June of 1994. MHA attempted to offer the defendant the opportunity to try to resolve his problems before terminating his lease. The defendant declined the opportunity, and his lease was terminated. Because he did not vacate, MHA eventually served a notice to quit.
A tenant is not permitted to wait to request a hearing until after the tenant himself finally concludes that the landlord is actually serious about wanting to evict him. The proper time for requesting a hearing, whether viewed as within the ten business days after the June 13, 1994 pretermination notice provided for in the plaintiff's grievance policy, or within ten business days after the termination of the defendant's lease as of July 31, 1994, or even within a broad reading of the "reasonable period" provided by federal law, has long since passed.
Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction, and the Motion to Dismiss is therefore denied.
Jonathan E. Silbert, Judge