DocketNumber: No. 32 16 47
Citation Numbers: 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 4255-OO, 17 Conn. L. Rptr. 1
Judges: LEHENY, J.
Filed Date: 5/29/1996
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
On October 23, 1995, Cummings Lockwood (CL), McDonald's employer, filed a motion to intervene in the action as a co-plaintiff pursuant to General Statutes §
On November 24, 1995, McDonald filed an objection to CL's motion to intervene on the grounds that it was untimely. In her memorandum, McDonald stated that by letter dated August 16, 1995, sent certified mail, return receipt requested, her counsel notified CL that she was about to commence this action. Attached to McDonald's memorandum of law are copies of the letter and the return receipt indicating that the letter was delivered to CL on August 17, 1995.
CL filed a memorandum in response to McDonald's objection in which it asserted that the letter sent by McDonald's attorney did not satisfy the requirements of §
On November 30, 1995, the court, Leheny, J., granted CL's CT Page 4255-QQ motion to intervene. However, even though McDonald's objection had been filed with the clerk's office on November 24, 1995, the objection was not in the file when the court ruled on the motion. Upon discovering that an objection had been filed, the court, on March 13, 1996, vacated its order and set the matter down for a hearing to determine the timeliness of CL's proposed intervention.
On March 23, 1996, McDonald filed a supplemental objection to CL's motion to intervene, in which she observed that the Appellate Court's decision in Rana v. Ritacco, relied upon by CL, was reversed by the Supreme Court on March 19, 1996. Thus, she argues, CL's argument that the notice was defective under the Appellate Court's holding in Rana is no longer legally sound following the Supreme Court's decision in that case.
On April 8, 1996, counsel appeared before the court to argue the motion to intervene. Counsel for CL argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Rana should not be applied retroactively to render the notice in the instant case legally sufficient. CL argues that the court should follow the Appellate Court's decision in Rana since that was the law at the time of the allegedly defective notice.
General Statutes §
It is undisputed that the notice given to CL of the present action was by letter dated August 16, 1995, sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, attached to which was a copy of the complaint in this action. The letter states in full:
Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes §
31-293 (a), this correspondence shall constitute formal notice that my client, Linda McDonald, is instituting an action against Robert Barako in connection with injuries she sustained in a collision on or about June 7, 1994 while operating her motor vehicle in connection with her employment with Cummings Lockwood. Enclosed please find a courtesy copy of the Writ, Summons and Complaint regarding the action Linda McDonald v. Robert Barako, returnable to the Judicial CT Page 4255-RR District of Danbury at Danbury, the original of which has been delivered to a sheriff for service.
(Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit A.) If the court finds that the above notice was adequate for purposes of §
CL's argument that the Supreme Court's decision in Rana
should not apply retroactively is without merit. While it is true that under the Appellate Court's decision in Rana, the notice provided to CL would have been deficient, the fact is that the Supreme Court's decision is now the law of this state and, accordingly, controls this case. In Rana v. Ritacco,
Although CL argues that the Appellate Court's decision in Rana
should control, that position is without support in the law. "Procedural decisions involving jurisdiction, such as standing to appeal, are generally held to be retroactive and to apply to pending cases." Timber TrailsCorporation v. Planning Zoning Commission,
At the April 8, 1996 hearing, counsel agreed to have the court take CL's motion to strike, filed March 4, 1996, on the papers. The court does not address the motion to strike, since it is filed by CL, which has been determined not to be a proper party in this action due to its untimely attempt to intervene. Additionally, the motion seeks to strike a special defense contained in Barako's answer to CL's intervening complaint, and the court has determined that CL may not file an intervening complaint.
Accordingly, the motion to strike is moot and need not be ruled upon by the court.