DocketNumber: No. 28 86 23 28 84 65
Citation Numbers: 1990 Conn. Super. Ct. 1276
Judges: FLANAGAN, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 8/15/1990
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The court (Berdon, J.) previously held that the notice required by statute was fatally flawed.
Thereafter, the plaintiff amended his complaint (#115) seeking to obviate the implications of defective notice. Paragraph 14 of the amended complaint alleges in substance that the defendant acknowledged receipt of the notice and indicated the matter would be investigated by his insurer who thereafter advised it had received the state's investigation report. From these facts plaintiff alleges the defendant "is estopped and has waived its right to statutory notice." Waiver and estoppel by conduct are "nearly indistinguishable." S.H.V.C. v. ROY,
Estoppel requires proof that the State acting through the Commissioner did or said something to induce plaintiff to believe that certain facts existed and to act on that belief; also the plaintiff must change his position to his detriment in reliance on those facts. Zotta v. Burns, supra, p. 175.
Here it was the plaintiff who failed to comply with notice requirements. It is not incumbent upon the State to "educate" the plaintiff. The instant matter is not one wherein the plaintiff was unable to assess the implications of his conduct or lacked the means of acquiring appropriate knowledge. Zotta v. CT Page 1277 Burns, supra, p. 175.
The plaintiff has not alleged the elements necessary to establish that the defendant Burns is estopped from asserting the defense of insufficient notice under the applicable statute.
Motion to Strike is granted.
The decision herein also applies to Docket No. 288465, Hood v. DiSturco et al.
JOHN C. FLANAGAN, Judge