DocketNumber: No. CV01 0182260 S
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 16802
Judges: ADAMS, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 12/12/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
On August 20, 2001, Donaldson filed a motion to strike count two, accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law, on the ground that the allegations that the plaintiff implicitly and explicitly consented to Donaldson's examination renders count two insufficient to state a cause of action for assault and battery. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition on August 16, 2001.1
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any [complaint] . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates,
The plaintiff first makes a procedural objection to the motion to strike. The plaintiff argues that this is the third motion to strike that Donaldson has brought and that the rules of practice do not allow for multiple motions. The plaintiff cites Hartt v. Schwartz, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 331912 (March 15, 1994, Hodgson, J.) (
Donaldson's first motion to strike was filed on April 4, 2001, with an accompanying memorandum, and directed at count two of the plaintiff's first revised complaint. Before the April 4, 2001 motion to strike was ruled on, however, the plaintiff filed, on June 18, 2001, a second revised complaint. Donaldson thus filed a second motion to strike on June 26, 2001, with an accompanying memorandum, identical in all respects to his first motion and memorandum, with the exception that it was directed at count two of the second revised complaint. The plaintiff represents that this second motion was denied by the court, D'Andrea, J., on August 13, 2001, for failure to specify the distinct reasons for the claimed insufficiency in the motion as required by Practice Book § 1041. Donaldson then filed the present motion to strike and accompanying memorandum, identical in all respects to his first and second motions and memoranda, with the exception that the defect in the form of the motion was corrected.
In Hartt v. Schwartz, supra,
The circumstances of the present case are distinguishable from the above cited cases. Donaldson's second motion to strike was prompted by the plaintiffs filing of a second revised complaint, and the third motion was due to a failure of the second on a matter of form. Donaldson thus is not improperly attempting to assert additional or different grounds in each successive motion. To the contrary, each successive motion and memorandum are substantively identical to the ones filed previously. Moreover, the plaintiff has not been subject to any delay or prejudice. Donaldson wasted no time in addressing the defect in form of the second motion, indeed, the third motion is dated the very same day that the second motion was denied, and, within one week, the defendant's third motion, his supporting memorandum and the plaintiff's opposition memorandum had all been filed.2 Finally, the plaintiff has suffered little prejudice, if any, in terms of the time and effort required to respond to each successive motion, the plaintiff herself having filed CT Page 16805 each time a substantively identical opposition memorandum. For these reasons, this court rejects the plaintiff's claim of procedural impropriety and considers Donaldson's motion on the merits.
B. Substantive Objection
1. Lack of Consent as an Element of the Tort of Assault and Battery
Turning to the merits of the motion to strike, both parties argue a distinction between "assault and battery in a medical malpractice context" and "common law assault and battery" as relevant to the issue of whether the plaintiff must allege lack of consent as a necessary element of the cause of action. For the reasons that follow, this court finds that lack of consent is an essential element of a claim of assault and battery against a physician and whether this action is one for medical malpractice is irrelevant to this determination.
Donaldson argues that this is a medical malpractice action and relies on the principles set forth in Godwin v. Danbury Eye Physicians Surgeons, P.C.,
The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that this is not a medical malpractice action and thus focusing on consent in the context of medical malpractice is misplaced since she and Donaldson did not have a CT Page 16806 physician-patient relationship.3 The plaintiff relies on the principles of assault and battery set out in 1 Restatement (Second), Torts, Battery: Harmful Contact § 13, p. 25 (1965): "An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results." The plaintiff argues that count two alleges common law assault and battery in that it alleges that Donaldson acted with intent to cause harmful contact with the person of the plaintiff, and harmful contact with the person of the plaintiff resulted. The plaintiff concludes, therefore, that "[c]onsent or lack of consent is not an element of the alleged tort." (Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 4.) Instead, the plaintiff argues, consent is a defense to intentional torts; see, e.g., D. Wright, J. Fitzgerald W. Ankerman, Connecticut Law of Torts (3d Ed. 1991) § 15; which must be specially pleaded.
A cause of action for battery is separate and distinct from a cause of action for medical malpractice. Zabensky v. Lawrence MemorialHospital, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. 545872 (August 5, 1999, Martin, J.). "Medical malpractice actions are a type of negligence action." Ali v. Community Health CarePlan, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 364055 (July 25, 1995, Martin, J.). "[T]here can be no actionable negligence, on the part of a physician where there is no physician-patient relationship. . . . Even absent a physician-patient relationship, [however,] the physician still has a duty to conduct the examination so as not to cause harm to the patient." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Nothing in Logan v. GreenwichHospital Assn., supra,
Notwithstanding the plaintiff's reliance on the Restatement for the required elements of a cause of action for assault and battery, Connecticut case law has refined these elements in cases involving assault and battery against a physician in his or her capacity as such, CT Page 16807 limiting recovery to three specified situations involving lack of consent. See Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., supra,
Further support that consent is an essential element is found in Khouriv. Koloniaris, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 330880 (February 7, 1997, Melville, J.), where the court, in discussing the theory of battery as alleged against a physician, stated: "The consent of the person will ordinarily avoid liability. . . . It is not strictly speaking, a privilege, or even a defense, but goes to negative the existence of any tort in the first instance. . . . [T]he plaintiff's consent negatives the wrongful element of the defendant's act, and prevents the existence of the tort." (Citation omitted.) Id. In a footnote, the court cited Ford v. Ford,
Therefore, this court finds that, under the circumstances of this case, lack of consent is a necessary element to the plaintiff's cause of action for assault and battery, and the legal principles set out in Loganv. Greenwich Hospital Assn., supra,
2. Second Count of the Revised Complaint
The issue raised by Donaldson's motion to strike is whether the allegations of count two are sufficient to state a cause of action for assault and battery against a physician. In count two, the plaintiff alleges that she "consented to an independent medical examination by Dr. Donaldson." (Count two, ¶ 10.) She further alleges that "[c]onsent given by the plaintiff did not include consent to being examined by Dr. Donaldson in such a way as to cause physical injury"; (count two, ¶ 11); and that she "had not given consent to being examined or tested in such a way as to cause her injury." (Count two, ¶ 12.) CT Page 16808
Donaldson first argues that rather than allege a lack of consent to Donaldson's examination, the plaintiff implicitly and explicitly alleges that she consented to it. The plaintiff counters that merely because she alleges that she consented to an examination by Donaldson does not mean she consented to all conduct and procedures by Donaldson during the course of such examination.
On this point, this court agrees with the plaintiff. Consent in general to being examined does not negate the plaintiff's cause of action for assault and battery. Rather, it is a lack of consent to the particular treatment or . . . procedure" which permits recovery. Logan v. GreenwichHospital Assn., supra,
Donaldson next argues that lack of consent must be to the conduct of the physician and that allegations of lack of consent to the resulting injury are insufficient to state a claim of battery against a physician. The plaintiff counters that she has alleged sufficiently lack of consent to conduct of Donaldson.
As stated previously, "a patient can recover for assault and battery when the physician (1) fails to obtain any consent to the particular treatment, (2) performs a different procedure from the one for which consent has been given, or (3) realizes that the patient does not understand what the procedure entails." Godwin v. Danbury Eye Physicians Surgeons, P.C., supra,
At most, the plaintiff alleges that she did not consent to any conduct which would subject her to injury. Consent focused on the consequences of particular conduct is, however, insufficient to allege a cause of action for assault and battery against the defendant. This issue was addressed in Godwin v. Danbury Eye Physicians Surgeons, P.C., supra,
This court finds that, even taking all of the allegations of count two as true, the plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for assault and battery. She fails to allege facts within any of the three situations enumerated in Godwin, and allegations of lack of consent to resulting injury are insufficient. Therefore, this court finds that Donaldson's motion to strike count two should be granted.
ADAMS, J.