DocketNumber: No. CV 99 0432460
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 7082
Judges: JONES, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 5/30/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The defendants have filed an answer and special defenses to the plaintiff's complaint. In one of their special defenses the defendants claim that the plaintiff signed a waiver form that holds the defendants harmless for their alleged negligence. The defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment based upon the waiver.
Summary judgment provides a method to resolve litigation when all of the evidence presented shows both that there are no questions of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miles v. Foley,
The defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that there are no issues of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff signed a waiver holding the defendants harmless for any injuries which the plaintiff may have sustained while snow tubing. The plaintiff argues in opposition that because her injuries were not foreseeable, the waiver of liability does not cover the incident in question.
The Supreme Court has not decided whether a waiver of negligence claims by an adult participant in a sporting event are enforceable. "The law does not favor contract provisions which relieve a person from his own negligence." Griffin v. Nationwide Moving Storage Co.,
There are two lines of reasoning as to what language must be included in sport facility waiver agreements to bar a negligence claim against the owner or its employees. See Bashura v. Strategy Plus Inc., supra,
This court takes the position as expressed in Bashura, supra that requires ". . . the exculpatory agreement to specifically alert the patron that he or she by signing the waiver is releasing the operator of the facility from injury caused by the operator's own negligence." Id at 62. Two reasons support this view. First, "[w]hat may be `common sense' to judges and lawyers who are used to interpreting the ambit of legal phrases is not necessarily obvious to the nonlawyer public who by signing these agreements give up valuable rights." Id., 63. Second, such a rule does not impose a great burden on the operator; small changes in liability waivers can now be made with a computer and a printer. Id.
In the present case, the release from liability does not include language specifically alerting the plaintiff that the agreement waives claims for the defendants own negligence. (See Defendants' motion, appendix C). Furthermore, the language of the waiver does not specifically include the words "I release (the operators) from (any particular) liability." This court finds that the alleged waiver language itself creates a question of material fact as to whether it immunizes the defendants from the allegedly negligent acts in question.
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
Clarance J. Jones, Judge