DocketNumber: No. SPNH 9511 45269
Citation Numbers: 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 1420-TTT, 16 Conn. L. Rptr. 357
Judges: JONES, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 2/16/1996
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
FACTS
On or about January 27, 1995, plaintiff Barkan Management Co., Inc., now plaintiff herein, and defendants Gregory and Mary Artis, now defendants herein, entered into a written lease and addendum for the defendants to lease apartment number three at 364 Putnam Avenue for the term January 27, 1995 through January 31, 1996.
The plaintiff sought to evict the defendants by serving four notices of termination, to wit 1) a notice of good cause; 2) a pretermination notice under Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec.
"Repeated minor violations of this Agreement which disrupt the livability of the project, . . . or the right of any tenant to the quiet enjoyment of the leased premises, and
Violations of Paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Addendum to Lease executed by you on January 27, 1995, which includes:
`Refrain from the use of alcohol . . . If I do relapse, I must attend five AA/NA/CA meetings per week for one month.'
`I agree to a weekly and/or PRN tox screens . . .'
`I agree to attend scheduled meetings . . .'
`I agree to respect others privacy and to observe the rules of the apartment community as determined by the house residents and VA staff.'
`I agree to adhere to all recommended outpatient treatment . . .'
`I agree to maintain a schedule of productive activity (a minimum of twenty hours per week).'"
Furthermore, on October 5, 1995, the defendants were served with a final notice advising them of the plaintiff's intention to terminate their tenancy on November 6, 1995, including notice that failure to vacate by said date would lead to an eviction action. On November 8, 1995, the plaintiff served a Notice to Quit Possession on Defendant, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec.
The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Summary Process action, pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book Section 1423, for failure to provide specific "acts or omissions" constituting the breach of their lease, as set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. Secs.
STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING MOTION TO DISMISS IN THIS ACTION
The standards for a Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are found in case law. "[A] motion to dismiss may be granted only when it clearly appears on the face of the entire record that the court is without jurisdiction." In ReBaskin's Appeal from Probate,
The standards for summary process are found in the statutes and case law. "The applicable principles of Connecticut law are codified in General Statutes [Sec.]
The defendants argue that the plaintiff's notices lacked the requisite specificity, as required by statute and case law, and therefore that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case. However, case law seems to support the plaintiff's position that such notices under Conn. Gen. Stat. Secs.
Sufficiency of Notice
There is a question whether the plaintiff's notices to the defendants were specific enough to appraise the defendants of their alleged violations and to therefore give them an opportunity to correct or defend against them. The notices at issue are set out in Conn. Gen. Stat. Secs.
The defendants claim that the plaintiff's notices were not specific enough. While relevant, the cases cited in support of the defendants' motion can be distinguished from the present case. The defendants argue that the language of the notice inParkridge Apartments v. McGann, SPH 8408-24518, #H-571, 3 (September 26, 1984) (Aronson, J.), found by the court not to be "clear, unambiguous, and specific" was similar to the language in the plaintiff's notices in this case. However, the language, "conduct detrimental to the health and safety of other tenants" was found by the court in Parkridge Apartments v. McGann to be ambiguous. Parkridge Apartments, supra, 3. Clearly, the language in Parkridge Apartments v. McGann is more ambiguous than the language used by plaintiff in this case, i.e. "[f]ailure to refrain from the use of alcohol . . ." Even the language struck down as unclear in Almagro v. Jackson, SPH 9003-54901, #H-929, 2 (October 9, 1990) (Berger, J.), "[defendant's] conduct on the premises which is a violation of Federal, State and/or Local law and not respecting the rights of other residents to privacy, safety, security and peaceful enjoyment[,]" is far less specific than the plaintiff's language in this case. Similarly, the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's notice is comparable to the notice found "so vague as to constitute a nullity," inHousing Authority of the Town of East Hartford v. Schub, SPH 8010-8299, #H-262, 6 (December 15, 1980) (Spada, J.) fails. InHousing Authority of the Town of East Hartford v. Schub, the court found that "material noncompliance of `adopted rules and regulations concerning your use and occupancy of the premises . . .'" was not only vague, but it failed to appraise the defendant of both his "`obligation'" and the "`violated rules and regulations.'" Housing Authority of the Town of EastHartford, supra, 6. In the present case, the defendants were unambiguously advised that they failed to "refrain from the use of alcohol," and "attend scheduled meetings." The clarity of the plaintiff's notice must have put the defendants on notice "as to what actions are prohibited" and "what covenants have been breached." Housing Authority of the Town of East Hartford, supra, CT Page 1425 6.
Additionally, the defendants cite to two cases which they claim support their argument as to lack of specificity in plaintiff's notices. These cases, though, may also be distinguished from the present case. In Housing Authority of Cityof Meridan v. Roman, (CV-0942, February 10, 1987) Judge Nash found that both the pretermination notice and notice to quit were insufficient where plaintiff merely cited to relevant sections of the lease, (i.e. "Lease, Article 4, Section A,") because such language failed to provide ". . . any information as to the specific conduct which needs to be corrected to avoid eviction." The plaintiff in this case did not merely cite to a section of the lease, as in Housing Authority of the City of Meridan v.Roman, but spelled out what needed to be cured, namely, the ". . . use of alcohol." In Housing Authority of the City ofBridgeport v. Rogers, (SNBR #371, March 2, 1992), Judge Leheny found that the notice to quit language, namely, "violation of the lease rules and regulations. . .," was insufficient for proper notice. The plaintiff in this case provided more than the general allegation found insufficient in Housing Authority of the City ofBridgeport v. Rogers, by alleging the defendants' "failure and/or refusal to Tox Screen . . ."
The plaintiff's notices are more akin to the notices found to be sufficient in Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, supra. InJefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, the court held that the landlord's notice to quit, which merely recited a provision of the lease agreement, was specific enough to appraise the tenant of her alleged violation, allowing her an opportunity to cure or defend against the claim. Id. at 145-46. Similarly, in Thomas E.Golden Realty Co. v. Society for Savings,
This court finds that plaintiff's have followed all applicable preconditions set by state and federal law for termination of a lease and therefore this court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case. For the foregoing reasons and upon the foregoing authorities, the defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied.
Clarance J. Jones, Judge