DocketNumber: No. CV92-051 94 88 S
Citation Numbers: 1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 4993, 8 Conn. Super. Ct. 581
Judges: ARONSON, JUDGE
Filed Date: 5/20/1993
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The plaintiff claims that the amended offer of judgment is a second offer which supercedes the first, and therefore, when the second offer of judgment was filed, there was no outstanding offer of judgment for $100,000.00 for the defendant to accept. The plaintiff thereafter claimed this matter to the Hearing in Damages list. The defendant moves to strike the Hearing in Damages claim on the basis that the acceptance of the first offer of $100,000.00 within thirty days results in a judgment for that amount.
The issue here is whether the filing of the second offer within the thirty day filing of the first offer revokes the first offer. If the filing of the second offer revoked the first offer, obviously, there was no $100,000.00 offer for the defendant to accept on April 27, 1993. If the second offer did not revoke the first offer, defendant's acceptance of the first offer would have resolved the case thereby eliminating the need for a hearing in damages.
C.G.S.
Prior to its amendment in 1982,
Sec.
"A stipulated judgment has been defined by our Supreme Court as a contract of the parties acknowledged in open court and ordered to be recorded by a court of competent jurisdiction. Gillis v. Gillis,
214 Conn. 336 ,339 ,572 A.2d 323 (1990); Bryan v. Reynolds,143 Conn. 456 ,460 ,123 A.2d 192 (1956). The essence of the judgment is that the parties to the CT Page 4995 litigation have voluntarily entered into an agreement setting their dispute at rest and that, upon this agreement, the court has entered judgment conforming to the terms of the agreement. Gillis v. Gillis, supra, 339-40."
Bank of Boston Connecticut v. DeGroff,
Since the legal basis for the offer of judgment is in contract, it is appropriate for us to look to the law of contacts for a resolution of this problem.
It is a "basic principle of contract law that an offeror is the master of his offer, and therefore, is not obligated to make an offer on any terms except his own. See E. Farnsworth, contracts (1982) section 3.13." Daddona v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc.,
It is also a basic proposition in contract law that an offer may be revoked at any time prior to acceptance. 1 Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contract (4th Ed. Lord) sec. 5:8.
The condition of the offer from the plaintiff to the defendant, by virtue of the plaintiff using the statutory offer of judgment procedure, is that the defendant has thirty days from the filing of the offer to accept. The defendant could have accepted the plaintiff's offer at any time prior to the expiration of the thirty day period to create a binding contract. The defendant chose to wait until one day before the expiration of the thirty day period before filing its acceptance. The delay by the defendant poses a risk that the offer may be revoked prior to his acceptance. Sec. 52-219a does not prohibit the offer to stipulate for judgment from being revoked. "[E]ven though the offeror specifies in his offer a definite time within which acceptance may be made, the offeror may, nevertheless, revoke his offer within that time period. This is true even if the offer expressly states that it shall not be withdrawn; revocation is still possible, since the promise not to withdraw the offer is not itself enforceable." 1 Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (4th Ed. Lord) sec. 5:8.
The failure of the defendant to accept the plaintiff's offer of $100,000.00 prior to its being revoked left the second offer of the plaintiff for $114,733.00 outstanding for thirty CT Page 4996 days. That offer, not having been accepted, is now deemed rejected.
Accordingly, the appropriate procedure now is to find the damages in this case since liability has been previously determined. See Just et al v. The Meriden Industrial Laundry, Inc.,
Defendants Motion to Strike the plaintiff's claim to the Hearing in Damages list is denied.
Aronson, J.