DocketNumber: No. 38 90 75
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 7656
Judges: SHEA, STATE JUDGE REFEREE.
Filed Date: 7/29/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The incident that precipitated the revocation of the plaintiff's permit occurred on June 22, 1990, when the plaintiff's ten year old stepson committed an act of sexual abuse on a four year old boy who was in the care of the plaintiff at her home that day. (F.
DCYS conducted an investigation of the incident and other aspects of the plaintiff's operation of the day care center at her home from July 3, 1990 to July 10, 1990. (F.
The plaintiff has briefed the following claims of error in the administrative decision: (1) the conclusion that the plaintiff violated C.S.A. Reg. §
C.S.A. Reg. §
"The provider shall report actual or suspected child abuse or neglect of any child to the nearest office of the Department of Children and Youth Services as mandated by Section 17-38a and 17-38b of the Connecticut General Statutes. An oral report shall be made immediately by telephone or otherwise to the State Commissioner of the Department of Children and Youth Services or his representative, or the local police department, or the state police, to be followed by a written report as required by law.
The regulation parallels General Statutes §
The plaintiff disputes the conclusion of the hearing officer that the June 22 incident constituted "sexual abuse" on the grounds that there is no evidence that the four year old victim suffered any injury and that the perpetrator was a ten year old child, not an adult. This argument borders on the frivolous. The plaintiff does not contest the victim's narrative of the incident as detailed in the finding (F. 17). It is clear that the facts as detailed indicate commission of the crime of sexual assault CT Page 7659 in the first degree, a Class B felony, in violation of General Statutes §
The findings of the hearing officer do not indicate that the plaintiff had any reason to believe that her ten year old step-son had any inclination or propensity to molest other children sexually prior to the telephone call from the mother of the four year old victim on June 22, 1990. (F.
Similarly, the conclusion that regulation §
The conclusion that the plaintiff violated these regulations is not supported by the finding or the evidence and has resulted from a misinterpretation of the regulations that would make day care providers responsible for any mishap to a child without proof of neglect or other fault.
The plaintiff claims that her admitted failure to comply with the notification requirements of the regulations would not justify revocation of her home day care registration. Whether this transgression of the regulations would alone constitute the substantial noncompliance with the regulations that General Statutes § 17-588(a) prescribes as a condition precedent to revocation is not the issue in this case, however, in which the decision of the commissioner is based on several grounds. (F. 46) "[The Court] must uphold the [commissioner's] decision if any of those [grounds] are sufficient to justify the action taken." Griffin Hospitalv. Commission on Hospitals of Health Care,
The plaintiff also attacks findings 15, 19, 21, 27, 30, 37, 38, 39, 44, 45 and 46 as "not supported by the weight of the evidence. In two findings (F. 15 and F. 37), the term, "unsupervised" is used when it would be more precise to state that the children referred to were not being visually observed by the plaintiff. Another finding (F. 38) is similarly flawed by equating "suspension", with visual observation. The remaining findings are supported by substantial evidence and the corrections sought therein CT Page 7662 would be of no significance.
After the June 22, 1990 sexual abuse incident was reported to DCYS on June 28, 1990, the department conducted an investigation in which it was discovered that the plaintiff's ten year old stepson had been involved as a victim in several other sexual abuse incidents perpetrated by two older boys, including his fourteen year old brother. (F. 26, 28, 29). These incidents had begun in 1987 and may have affected the behavior of the plaintiff's ten year old stepson, for which he had received psychiatric counseling, (F. 31). Even while the investigation was proceeding, the ten year old engaged in an incident of sexual contact with the plaintiff's three year old son. (F. 32, 33) The hearing officer concluded that both of the plaintiff's stepsons had a "relatively long history of child abuse, both as perpetrators and as victims," and that "their presence in a registered family day care home would present unreasonable and unforeseeable risks to the health, safety, and welfare of day care children." (F. 45).
Under the agreement with his first wife, the mother of his two sons, the husband of the plaintiff had custody of them during the summer school vacation and also during other school vacations. They ordinarily attended school for the remainder of the year in Indiana, residing with their mother. (F. 6) The fourteen year old boy, however, had attended school in Bloomfield during the 1989-90 school year and had returned to Indiana for the summer to be with his mother. His younger brother, who had attended school in Indiana that year, had come to Bloomfield to spend the summer with his father.
In her application for reinstatement of her home day care registration, the plaintiff offered to send her younger stepson to Illinois to reside with his paternal CT Page 7663 grandparents so that neither he nor his older brother would have any contact with the day care children. She expressed her intention to bring him back to her household later under an arrangement that would insure his absence from the home while day care children were on the premises. At the hearing the plaintiff testified that, if DCYS were to require that her younger stepson be excluded from her home entirely, she would "have to stop doing day care". (T. III, 9/18/90 pp. 93-94).
The hearing officer gave five reasons for rejecting the plaintiff's proposal for conditional reinstatement of her day care registration:
"First, the Appellant has stated unequivocally that conditional reinstatement is not a real option for her, because she intends to bring her stepsons back into her home in the near future. As I have indicated previously, there is substantial evidence on the record to establish that the presence of the Appellant's stepsons on the premises of a day care home is inconsistent with the health, and welfare of day care children.
"Second, conditional reinstatement would require the Appellant to voluntarily comply with the regulations and to enforce the hearing order, for the Department does not have sufficient staff to closely monitor whether the Appellant is in compliance with a conditional reinstatement order. In light of the fact that the Appellant was unable or unwilling to comply with the regulations in the past, one must question whether she will be able and willing to comply in the future.
"Third, the statute and regulations do not expressly authorize conditional reinstatement orders. Section 17-31t of the Connecticut General Statutes authorizes suspension and revocation. Being a tribunal of limited authority, an administrative agency must act strictly within its statutory authority. Castro v. Viera,
207 Conn. 420 ,428 (1988); State v.CT Page 7664 White,204 Conn. 410 ,419 (1987). Therefore, there may be insufficient legal authority to issue and enforce a conditional reinstatement order."Finally, conditional reinstatement of the registration at this particular time would not be in anyone's best interest. It would merely postpone the inevitable closing of the Appellant's family day care home, place the State in the difficult position of having to enforce a conditional reinstatement order, and compromise the safety of the day care children.
"As a postscript, I note that the ideal solution is to assure the safety of the children and keep the day care home open. Unfortunately, in some cases, as in this one, that ideal is unrealistic or unascertainable; for the risks to children are too great and the acts of non-compliance too serious. In balancing the competing interests, therefore, it is important to remember that sexual abuse often results in long-term physical or psychological damage to children, and that the provider's property interest in the registration must be reconciled with the Department's mandate to assure that family day care homes are safe for children. In the final analysis, the scale must tip in favor of assuring the safety of the day care children."
Of these reasons, the first two are adequate to support the refusal to accept the plaintiff's proposal for conditional reinstatement. The first reason is based upon the plaintiff's statement that she would not continue her work as a day care provider if her stepsons could not live her home. She did propose a program for avoiding contact between her younger stepson and the day care children that would allow him to remain at home after those children had left the premises. That proposal, however, would require surveillance by DCYS, which would have the serious responsibility of insuring that no repetition of the June 22, 1990 incident will occur. There is no basis for disputing the inability of DCYS to provide sufficient staff to monitor enforcement of the conditions proposed by CT Page 7665 the plaintiff.
The court has concluded that there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of substantial noncompliance with C.S.A. Reg. §
It is ordered that judgment enter dismissing the appeal.
David M. Shea State Judge Referee