DocketNumber: No. 094331
Judges: LANGENBACH, J. CT Page 117
Filed Date: 1/27/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The third party plaintiff filed a motion to implead, which was granted by the court, Kulawiz, J., and complaint against the third party defendants Ketrys. The third count of this complaint alleges that the third party defendants "agreed to defend, indemnify and hold harmless the third party plaintiff" from and against actions such as the plaintiff's. The third party plaintiff then alleges that the third party defendants have refused to defend this action and that they are responsible to the plaintiff for any judgment against the third party plaintiff.
On July 3, 1991 the third party defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on this third count on the ground that they never contracted to defend, indemnify and hold harmless the third party plaintiff. As the third party defendants had filed an answer on August 6, 1990, the pleadings are closed. The third party plaintiff objects to the motion, and the parties have filed supporting memoranda of law, affidavits and other evidence.
The third party defendants claim that they never agreed to defend, indemnify and hold harmless the third party plaintiff. The third party plaintiff claims that the agreement in the lease between third party defendants and the third party plaintiff can be seen as an agreement to indemnify and that therefore summary judgment is not appropriate.
Paragraph 12 of the lease states that the tenant, third party defendant, "will provide, and keep in force insurance policies protecting Landlord and/or Tenant from liability in an amount not less than $100,000.00 in respect to any one accident or disaster, and in the amount of not less than $50,000.00 in respect to injuries to any one person." The third party plaintiff argues that he interpreted this provision to mean that the third party defendants agreed to defend, indemnify and hold him harmless for the type of claim that the plaintiff is claiming.
Generally, "the language of a contract is typically construed CT Page 118 most strongly against the party whose language it is and for whose benefit it was inserted." Sturman v. Stocks,
A "relevant provision" would be paragraph 13 of the lease which states that it is "the intent of the Landlord [third party plaintiff] to be responsible for maintenance and repair to roof, structural defects, and parking lot." (emphasis added). The parking lot is where the plaintiff claims she was caused to slip and fall. The parking lot is the area claimed by the plaintiff to be defective and dangerous.
In these circumstances, it is irrelevant what the third party plaintiff may have believed paragraph 12 to mean. Paragraph 12 clearly states that the third party defendants would maintain an insurance policy. This paragraph, in its ordinary, common and natural meaning and usage, in no way provides that the third party defendants agreed to defend, indemnify and hold harmless the third party plaintiff. This is especially true in light of the fact that the third party plaintiff agreed to repair and maintain the area in which plaintiff's injury occurred. Therefore, the third party defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
LANGENBACH, J.