DocketNumber: No. CV99 065397
Citation Numbers: 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 6916
Judges: FLYNN, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 6/11/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
Before the court is the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and a weekly order of payments. According to the plaintiff, there are no genuine issues of material fact as to the liability of the defendant. In support of its motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs offers the affidavit of Michael Fabro, the business manager for the Yale Psychiatric Institute which attests to the balance remaining on the amount owed by the defendant. The plaintiff also offers the credit agreement signed by the defendant. CT Page 6917
The defendant objects to the motion for summary judgment and argues that there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the granting of summary judgment. Specifically, the defendant notes that she has filed special defenses alleging that the plaintiff has violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act as well as the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. According to the defendant, the filing of these special defenses and a disclosure of defense based on similar arguments creates questions of material fact that cannot be reached on the motion for summary judgment.
the court finds the defendant's arguments without merit and grants the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
The defendant has filed two special defenses. In the first the defendant alleges that the plaintiff violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),
Neither of the special defenses raise any genuine issues of naterial fact that would preclude the plaintiff from obtaining a summary judgment as a matter of law. The FDCPA defines a debt collector as "any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or any business the principal purpose of which is to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another."
The defendant's special defense alleging that the credit agreement violated CUTPA also fails to raise any genuine issues of material fact that would preclude the granting of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff has presented uncontested evidence supporting the existence of the alleged debt and a credit agreement signed by the defendant. Thus, the plaintiff has met its burden of proof as to the liability of the defendant under the debt. See Rivera v. DoubleTransportation, Inc.,
The defendant's special defense simply states that the credit agreement drafted by the plaintiff is in violation of both FDCPA and CUTPA. Yet, having failed to present any evidence contradicting the underlying debt, the defendant's special defense cannot, as a matter of law, act as a bar to summary judgment as to the existence of the debt. Aside from a brief reference to CUTPA, the defendant fails to set forth any of the necessary elements of a CUTPA claim and fails to allege facts about how or why the credit agreement constituted an unfair trade practices act. Moreover, without any genuine issues of material fact concerning the underlying debt, the defendant would not be able to meet one of the threshold requirements for recovery under CUTPA, namely, evidence of an ascertainable loss as required by §
Summary judgment is entered for the plaintiff against the defendant in the amount of $2524.00 plus $378.60 attorney's fees, $435.39 statutory interest for a total judgment of $3337.99 payable $25.00 weekly commencing July 9, 1999.
Flynn, J. CT Page 6919