DocketNumber: No. CV 97 0571700 S
Citation Numbers: 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 3888
Judges: BEACH, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 3/30/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
T.R. Paul has moved to reargue for several reasons, and I granted the motion to the extent that reargument was allowed.
One ground sought to be revisited is the claim by Paul that in count one, only one contract was alleged, and Paul was sued only in the capacity as agent for New England. Paul claims that I denied its motion for summary judgment as to the first count by conjuring a second contract that has not been alleged: an arrangement whereby Paul sold consulting services in return for a commission. See n. 4, at p. 7 of the original memorandum of decision. Although my characterization perhaps may have been inartful, the footnote was intended only to be illustrative and conceptual. The basis for the denial of Paul's motion as to count one is stated in the body of the memorandum of decision at pp. 20 et seq., and relies on specific allegations in the plaintiffs complaint and supporting materials.
Of more import is the claim by Paul that because it has been sued in count one only in its capacity as an agent for New England Life, it cannot be sued individually; as a result, no claim has been stated against Paul in the first count in any event. On analysis, this claim cannot compel the granting of summary judgment. First, because of the other allegations in the first count, it is not entirely clear that Paul was sued only in a capacity as an agent. Second, even if the sole basis of the count as to Paul is premised on agency, Paul does not necessarily prevail as a matter of law.
It is true, as a general proposition, that a disclosed principal is liable for the authorized acts of an agent, and the agent incurs no liability. See, generally, Gateway Co. v. DiNoia,
The case of Ursini v. Goldman
I have carefully considered the other claims raised by Paul in its motion to reargue and do not believe that they suffice to alter the original disposition of the motion for summary judgment. In sum, I believe that genuine issues of fact remain as to the first count. The relief sought in the motion to reargue is denied.
Beach, Judge.