DocketNumber: Nos. CV95 0555212, CV95 0555202
Citation Numbers: 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 210-II
Judges: MUNRO, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 1/7/1997
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
Most of the salient facts in these two appeals are not in dispute. SCCRA generates electricity through a trash-to-energy plant. It is a political subdivision of the State of Connecticut which functions as a resource recovery authority pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes
One of the oversight areas of the DPUC is the review and approval or rejection of agreements entered into between CLP and any private producers of electricity. (
The Decision approving the Agreement between the parties described the Project, as follows:
The Facility will be designed to dispose of residential, commercial and non-hazardous industrial municipal solid waste (MSW) generated in the member municipalities of SCRRA pursuant to municipal service contracts between the member municipalities and SCRRRA. The solid waste will be burned through the use of a mass-burning grate system and boiler combination to produce steam to energize turbines which will generate electricity. The Project's electricity will be used to operate the Facility and made available for sale to CLP.
The Facility will have an approximate gross output of 16.0 MW and a net output for sale of about 13.85 MW. The Facility will process approximately 180,000 tons of MSW annually at a rate f 600 tons per day assuming 500 Btu per pound of waste. SCRRRA expects that the Facility will operate seven days a week, 365 days a year. With an availability factor of 82%. (Emphasis added).
The 1987 decision by DPUS resolved two questions essential to the determination of this appeal.
"1. Whether CLP must purchase the entire electric energy output pursuant to C.G.S.
2. Whether CLP must purchase a portion of the electric energy output at a front loaded rate equaling CLP's full avoid costs over the life of the contract. . . ."
In consideration of these questions, the DPUC reviewed the statutory language of C.G.S.
After substantial written consideration of the positions of the respective parties, DPUC found as a matter of fact that ". . . SCRRRA has agreed to sell all of its output to CLP, and will make efforts to maximize on-peak production." It also ruled: CT Page 212
"In regard to the applicability of C.G.S.
Per the 1987 DPUC decision, CLP and the generating parties entered into an agreement consistent with the DPUC decision. That agreement is the Electric Energy Purchase Agreement (EEPA). The plant was built. There is no dispute between the parties that the plant was built pursuant to the plans and specifications and so certified by the parties' respective engineers, to DPUC.
From January, 1992 through December, 1993, the plant had a permit to burn to a limit of 600 tons per day. On December 9, 1993 they received a rise in that limit to 689 tons per day. The output of the plant has fairly consistently exceeded 16.00 MW gross output and 13.85 MW net output for sale after December, 1993, measured monthly. Measured monthly it never exceeded 13.95 MW, but did when measured in smaller increments. CLP claimed the right in the instant controversy to pay the
The standard of review for these administrative appeals is found at C.G.S.
The standard of review for these administrative appeals is found at C.G.S.
4-183 :The court shall not substitute tits judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory CT Page 213 authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
The appellants challenge the decision of the DPUC regarding the rate above 13.85 MW production on several bases:
(1) They claim the decision is in violation of C.G.S.
(2) That it was made upon unlawful procedure, to wit: the conclusion that energy generated above 13.85 MW was to due to energy savings procedures, without the allowance of testimony;
(3) That it improperly interpreted the agreement (EEPA) between the parties.
Connecticut General Statute The statute at issue, C.G.S.
The only case in Connecticut construing
As stated by the Supreme Court in its first look at one portion of
Generally, this court accords `considerable deference to the construction given by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement.' Sutton v. Lopes,
201 Conn. 115 ,120 ,513 A.2d 139 , cert. denied sub nom. McCarthy v. Lopes,479 U.S. 964 ,107 S.Ct. 466 ,93 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). However, `the construction of a statute on an issue that has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny is a question of law on which an administrative ruling is not entitled to special deference.' Schlumberger Technology Corporation v. Dubno,202 Conn. 412 ,423 ,521 A.2d 569 (1987)." Ibid at p. 357.
This court finds that DPUC erred in not requiring CLP to pay CT Page 215 the municipal rate for any electrical energy generated by the plant in question. While the plant may have exceeded its estimated nameplate capacity, and it may have done so for non-energy saving reasons (including increase in ___________ burned), there is absolutely no contemplation in the statutory scheme of
CLP and DPUC try to argue that by contract, the parties could agree to limit the application of
Counsel each argue to New York authority seeking to continue the decision of the DPUC. However, where the law in Connecticut provides sufficient controlling authority, this court need go no further.
What controls between these parties is the language of the applicable statutes and the Agreement of the parties read in light of the statutes. If a contract is clear on its fact its language controls.
""In determining the meaning and effect of the controverted language in the [agreement], the inquiry must focus on the intention expressed in the [agreement] and not on what intention existed in the minds of the parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gateway Co. v. DiNoia, supra,
The terms of the Agreement that the parties respectively urge on the court are all ____________ to the DPUC findings in approving it which include:
"[5.] The facility will have an approximate gross output of 16.00 MW and a net output for sale of about 13.85 MW."
"[12.] SCRRRA has agreed to sell all of its output to CLP, and will make all efforts to maximize on-peak production."
Further, the DPUC found, [i]n regard tot he applicability of C.G.S. §
The Agreement, in its premises, itself recognizes that CLP is required to purchase the electricity at the municipal rate.3 The definitions describe the facilities incorporating Exhibit A. There has never been a dispute between the parties that the facility was constructed in conformity therewith. Paragraph 10 of the Agreement requires "_____________ shall deliver to buyer and buyer shall purchase from seller the entire net electric output of the facility. . . . (emphasis added). Payment is provided only at the Municipal Rate, once the plant is properly certified. No alternative or ____________ rate is provided. (Paragraph 11 of the Agreement). The statute, §
"A court simply cannot disregard the words used by the parties or revise, add to, or create a new agreement." Collins v. Sears.Roebuck Co.,
The record and statutory scheme provide no support for the decision of the DPUC. The decision was clearly erroneous in light of the record and abuse of its discretion and in violation of C.G.S. § 243e. CT Page 217
The appeal is sustained. The matter is remanded to the DPUC to modify its decision in accordance with this judgment and enter orders directing payment, with interest pursuant to paragraph 13 of the Agreement, from CLP to the appellants.
(It should be noted that CRRA supports the appeal position of CLP). The claim of error made by the appellant here is that there is no substantial evidence in the record to support DPUC's decision that rates should be calculated on an "average monthly basis" rather than an "hourly" basis.
In deciding that the output should be calculated on an "average monthly basis". The DPUC stated that this method of calculation would ". . . take[s] into account the day-to-day and hourly fluctuation in production and unavoidable variations attendant to solid waste fuel. Certainly, variations in Btu content and moisture can cause changes in heat, steam and electricity production on an hourly basis." Citing to the record before it the decision goes on to note that this type of variation ". . . often occurred to the plant's production during 1992 and 1993, prior to the time of the Facility's permit amendment."
The sole question before the court on this issue is whether the record supports the DPUC decision on this issue, or, whether the decision was devoid of support in the record and arbitrary or capricious. New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission,
The record reflects that there is a variability of the amount of output from trash — to — energy plants. Further, it reflects that the variability is not pronounced when the output is measured hourly when compared to a monthly measurement.
The record further reflects that CLP has historically calculated its payment for the energy on a monthly basis.
Finally, that this issue was squarely before the DPUC and CLP was aware of it can be easily gleaned from the Interrogatories from DPUC addressed to CLP. The responses from CLP to DPUC reflect the output measured hourly, daily and monthly. (Record VI.2). CT Page 218
Therefore, the court (finding sufficient basis in the record to support this aspect of the DPUC decision) finds no merit to the appeal.
Therefore, this appeal is denied.
Lynda B. Munro, Judge