DocketNumber: No. C 98 0148932
Citation Numbers: 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 7583
Judges: PELLEGRINO, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 6/1/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
Brandmeyer makes various allegations throughout his complaint against his employer and direct supervisor Parent claiming they offered illegal incentives to customers, that they ordered Brandmeyer to give illegal kickbacks and inducements and that they asked him to acknowledge false reports. Brandmeyer. . . . also charges that the defendants committed "unfair and targeted actions", unfairly reprimanded ridiculed and harassed him and forced him to sell his family store. Although it is difficult to identify the plaintiff's claims, it seems that the first count sounds in negligence and in the negligent infliction of emotional distress against Brescome; the second count in intentional infliction of mental distress against Parent and the third count in intentional infliction of mental distress and unlawful retalition against Brecome as well as a claim for loss of consortium.
The defendants bring this Motion to Dismiss claiming that CT Page 7584 this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the action is preempted under the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") and the exclusivity provisions of the Workers Compensation Act.
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer,
"The motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sadloski v. Manchester,
The defendants contend that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over count one because the claim for negligence and the negligent infliction of emotional distress against Brescome is preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA").
Section 301 of the LMRA provides: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce. may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties . . . ."
The critical issue here is whether the claims asserted in this court can be resolved without interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. If the claims are independent of the agreement then they are not pre-empted by section 301 of the LMRA. Our Supreme Court said in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
It is the defendants position that the claims for negligence do require interpretation of agreement and therefore are preempted. In Foy v. Pratt Whitney Group,
The defendants claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed because a resolution of this claim would necessitate the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. They argue that one cannot know the duty owed in an emotional distress claim to Robert Brandmeyer by his employer without first consulting the bargaining agreement.
To prevail on a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, Robert Brandmeyer must show that "the defendant[s] should have realized that . . . [their] conduct involved an CT Page 7586 unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kilduff v. Adams,Inc.,
Brescome and Parent next argue that the plaintiff's should be dismissed because it is barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. General Statutes
In Count two, Brandmeyer alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress against Parent was also preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.
To prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show: "(1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress; or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was a likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the CT Page 7587 defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeLaurentis v.New Haven,
Brescome and Parent argue that a determination that Parent's actions were outrageous or in reckless disregard for Robert Brandmeyer's welfare will require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Brescome and Parent rely uponBaker v. Farmers Elec. Cooperative, Inc.,
An analysis of the caselaw reveals that preemption of claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress depends upon the alleged facts underlying the plaintiff's claim. See Ellis v.Lloyd, supra,
In the present case, Robert Brandmeyer alleges several abusive practices in connection with his employment. He alleges that he was wrongfully reprimanded for unjust reasons. He alleges that Parent harassed and humiliated him. He further alleges that Parent attempted to have him write false statements about his work performance, and attempted to force Robert Brandmeyer to break Connecticut liquor sales laws. Robert Brandmeyer also alleges that Parent and Goldstein ridiculed and demeaned him. These allegations are factual in nature and do not depend upon interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement to determine if the alleged conduct is "outrageous." See Vorvis v.CT Page 7588Southern New England Telephone Co., supra,
In Count three Paragraph 7 the plaintiff Brandmeyer alleges that his "whistleblowing" was the cause of his criticism and reprimands. The defendants argue that that this claim as well should be preempted. The Supreme court in Lingle v. NorceDivision of Magic Chef, Inc., supra, 486 found that the questions to be resolved in connections with this type of claim pertained to the conduct of the motivation of the employer and these were purely factula inquiriew that did not turn on the meaning of a provsion of the bargaining agreement. Id.
Finally the defendants argue that Lisa Brandmeyer's claim derivative of Robert Brandmeyer's claim, which has no legal viability. "[A] cause of action for the loss of consortium is derivative of the injured spouse' s cause of action. . . . But although it is derivative, it is still a separate cause of action, dependent for its assertion on the legal viability of the cause of action in the injured party." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Champagne v.Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
For all of the reasons stated above the court will deny the defendants Motion to Dismiss.
PELLEGRINO, (J)
Angel Hernandez v. Conriv Realty Associates , 116 F.3d 35 ( 1997 )
claudia-foy-mary-e-nelson-betty-bradley-ida-haynes-donna-berger-grace , 127 F.3d 229 ( 1997 )
Upson v. State , 190 Conn. 622 ( 1983 )
Richard Baker, Cross-Appellee v. Farmers Electric ... , 34 F.3d 274 ( 1994 )
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Ass'n of ... , 88 S. Ct. 1235 ( 1968 )
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck , 105 S. Ct. 1904 ( 1985 )
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. , 108 S. Ct. 1877 ( 1988 )