DocketNumber: No. CV93 0353764 S
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 4027, 9 Conn. Super. Ct. 498
Judges: HODGSON, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 4/18/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
It is alleged in the amended complaint that on October 24, 1991, the vehicle in which Abdullah Shabazz, his wife, Chandra Shabazz, and his son, Michael Sistrunk, were driving was hit from the rear by the car driven by the defendant Charles B. Price, Jr., and that it was caused to strike a tree on the west side of Route 15 in Milford. In the challenged counts of the complaint (Count 3 at paragraph 5 and Count 6 at paragraph 5), Abdullah Shabazz and Sistrunk allege that they observed the injuries to Chandra Shabazz and her pain and suffering which led to her death and that they suffered emotional distress and anguish, the effects of which, they allege, are likely to be permanent.
The defendants assert three grounds for striking the plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress:
1. Connecticut law does not recognize a cause of action for emotional distress suffered by a bystander;
2. If such a claim were recognized as a valid cause of action, it can be maintained only where a plaintiff alleges serious emotional distress beyond the reaction which could be anticipated in a disinterested witness and beyond the normal response to the circumstances;
3. Parties who seek to recover for their own injuries in an accident cannot also maintain claims as bystanders.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The function of a motion to strike is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Practice Book 152; Ferryman v. Groton,
II. THE EXISTENCE OF A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN WITNESSING HARM TO ANOTHER
Though the Connecticut Supreme Court has decided cases on the outskirts of the issue presented, it has not, in fact, decided squarely whether a cause of action may be maintained for emotional distress suffered by a direct witness to physical harm to a close relative in a collision or other immediate traumatic occurrence. In Strazza v. McKittrick,
In dicta, the court cited various encyclopedia references for the proposition that
[e]ven where a plaintiff has suffered physical injury in the accident, there can be no recovery for nervous shock and mental anguish caused by the sight of injury or threatened harm to another. Note, 18 A.L.R. 2d 220, 224, 234; 38 Am. Jur. 660, 18; 67 C.J.S. 761, 55.
The issue before the Court in Strazza, however, was not the direct witnessing of actual injury to a family member but only the fear of such an injury even when no injury occurred, and the observation set forth above is therefore clearly obiter dicta. To the extent, however, that this statement signifies that the Connecticut Supreme Court continues to follow the guidance of the American Law Reports, it is useful to consider 29 A.L.R. 3d 1337, (1970) which supersedes the section cited by the Court in Strazza. In the 1970 A.L.R. entry that specifically considers recovery by some occupants of a car for emotional distress suffered from witnessing injury to other occupants, 29 A.L.R. 3d 20, 1379, the commentator reported that there was a split in decision among the cited courts, which were trial courts, not appellate courts. When the entry was updated in the 1993 supplement, it cited four appellate decisions recognizing a cause of action in this situation: Keck v. Jackson,
To extent that Strazza indicates a willingness by the Connecticut Supreme Court to follow the weight of authority reported in the American Law Reports, that authority reports recognition of a cause of action of people who are present at a collision for emotional distress arising from witnessing injury to members of their families.
Contrary to the suggestion of the movant, the Connecticut Supreme Court did not address the issue now before this court in Maloney v. Conroy,
The holding in Maloney was specifically confined to claims of bystanders to medical malpractice: "[w]e hold that a bystander to medical malpractice may not recover for emotional distress and accordingly find no error in the striking of the complaint by the trial court." (emphasis supplied) Maloney v. Conroy,
The Court in both Amodio and Maloney specifically left open the issue of bystander, or, more accurately, participant, recovery from emotional distress caused by witnessing a sudden injury to a relative, and the Court issued only a very narrow holding, specifically acknowledging that it was not deciding issues outside the setting of medical malpractice:
[w]hatever may be the situation in other contexts where bystander emotional disturbance claims arise, we are convinced that, with respect to such claims arising from malpractice on another person, we should return to the position we articulated in Strazza that "there can be no recovery for CT Page 4031 nervous shock and mental anguish caused by the sight of injury or threatened harm to another."
Maloney v. Conroy,
Having concluded, as did Judge Ballen in Diaz v. Camacho,
The primary reason stated by the Court for refusing to recognize a cause of action in Maloney and Amodio was the difficulty of distinguishing between the "natural grief of a family member upon the death of another family member — a grief that goes uncompensated when it happens without the negligence of another — and the emotional distress specific to the events set in motion by the claimed tortfeasor, that is, the ante mortem injury, pain and suffering, apart from the fact of the death and loss to the claimant of his or her family member.
Because the wrongful death statute reflects a legislative choice to allocate solely to the decedent's estate the recovery for loss of the life; Lynn v. Haybuster Mfg., Inc.,
Jurors are often required to differentiate between various periods of injury. For example, in the context of statutory wrongful death actions brought pursuant to
Similarly, juries in wrongful death cases are routinely instructed not to consider the loss to family members from the death, but rather to determine the losses to the decedent. See CT Page 4032 Wright and Ankerman, Connecticut Jury Instructions, (Civil) (4th ed.) 245, 450 (1993), and this differentiation has never been thought to be beyond the ability of jurors. There is no reason to assume that a trier of fact cannot perform the similar task of separating a claimant's distress in witnessing an injury and ante mortem suffering by a family member in an accident from distress arising from the death itself.
The other reasons cited by the Connecticut Supreme Court for not recognizing a cause of action for bystander emotional distress in a medical malpractice context were 1) the possibility that hospitals would curtail visitation of patients to reduce the number of potential bystander claimants and 2) the fear that medical providers would be distracted by the need to mollify bystanders rather than being guided by the needs of the patient, Maloney,
Courts have recognized that in deciding which of the rippling effects of negligence should be held actionable and which not, we are engaged in drawing arbitrary lines; Thing v. LaChusa,
[w]e conclude, therefore, that a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person if, but only if, said plaintiff; (1) is closely related to the injury victim, (2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress — a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to the circumstances.
The Appellate Court of New York has similarly recognized a CT Page 4033 right of recovery for emotional distress for persons who witness injury to family members. Bovsun v. Sanperi,
Since the Connecticut Supreme Court has never ruled on the precise cause of action presented here, and since the reasons for its decision in Maloney either do not apply or do not appear to present any greater difficulties of determination than is already countenanced as to other causes of action, this court finds that a negligence action which seeks recovery for emotional distress by a passenger in an automobile from observing ante mortem injuries to close family members may be maintained in Connecticut. Such injuries are hardly speculative or outside the anticipated results of negligence, and they should be given the same recognition as other kinds of emotional harm.
III. SATISFACTION OF PLEADING REQUIREMENTS
The defendants plead that even if this court recognizes a cause of action for injuries within the scope of Thing v. LaChusa, supra, the husband and son of Chandra Abdullah have not alleged facts sufficient to state claims within the limits of what is actionable. Specifically, the defendants urge that the plaintiffs have not alleged "a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not a normal response to the circumstances," citing Thing,
By alleging that they are, respectively, the spouse, father and son of their fellow occupants of the Shabazz car, Abdullah Shabazz and Michael Sistrunk have set forth facts sufficient to give rise to an implication that they suffered a reaction beyond the normal response of a disinterested witness, since appropriate implications are to be recognized in the context of a motion to strike. Bouchard v. People's Bank,
IV. SIMULTANEOUS CAUSES OF ACTION FOR DISTRESS AS AN INJURED PARTY AND WITNESS TO OTHERS' INJURIES
Relying solely on a trial court ruling, Murphy v. Banziruk,
CONCLUSION
The Connecticut Supreme Court has not ruled on the existence of a cause of action for emotional distress caused by witnessing the ante mortem injuries and suffering of a family member in an automobile collision. The third and sixth counts of the complaint adequately allege causes of action within the scope recognized by other appellate courts.
The motion to strike Counts Three and Six is denied.
Beverly J. Hodgson Judge of the Superior Court
Amodio v. Cunningham , 182 Conn. 80 ( 1980 )
Senior v. Hope , 156 Conn. 92 ( 1968 )
Dawson v. Garcia , 1984 Tex. App. LEXIS 4889 ( 1984 )
Strazza v. McKittrick , 146 Conn. 714 ( 1959 )
Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc. , 144 Conn. 659 ( 1957 )
Benson v. Housing Authority , 145 Conn. 196 ( 1958 )
Keck v. Jackson , 122 Ariz. 114 ( 1979 )